Is Office Properties Income Trust (OPI) a good stock to buy?
What we have tested leans negative. To like it anyway you need a reason our checks do not capture.
What each rating means, in numbers
Business quality — Very weak. Passes 1 of the 7 health checks we can measure — things like making a profit, turning it into cash, and not piling on debt. Across 131,000 company-quarters the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% against 1.4% for the strongest, in every era and all twelve sectors.
What "tested" means here, and why there is no score out of 100
Tested means the read was measured against what actually happened afterwards, on a history that keeps the companies that were later delisted, using only figures that had been filed on the day they are used. Survival was ranked on companies that really did fail. What an owner keeps was tested across the universe from 2011 to 2025.
The full record of everything we have tested is on the research pages.
Which benchmark. Over the period we tested, the median listed company returned +5.8% a year while the S&P 500 returned about +13.9% — the index is weighted by size and was carried by a handful of enormous winners. So "beats the index" and "beats the other companies you could have bought" are different questions. Where a read says it picks better companies, it means the second one. None of these gets you an index fund's return, and we would rather say that than imply otherwise.
The quality read is the strongest thing we have tested: 131,000 company-quarters across 5,300 companies, where the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% against 1.4% for the strongest, holding in every era and all twelve sectors. It still says less likely to break, not likely to beat the market — every band in that study lost to the index at the median, because the median listed company does.
Each read is shown on its own rather than merged into a single score, so you can see which part is strong and which is weak instead of taking an average on trust.
The market expects less growth than we do, by 28.5 points a year. Revenue fell 11.8% in 2025. The market may expect the decline to continue; our estimate assumes it recovers toward the industry norm.
Not a stock pick. This shows what the price assumes. None of our numbers has picked stocks that beat the S&P 500 so far. What we tested →
How we get our growth number, and how often it has been right
How often it has been right: on 3,782 filings, 1,129 companies, 2014-2021, scored on the next five years of revenue, our estimate missed actual growth by a median 4.3 points a year; the growth implied by the price missed by 8.8. Ours was the closer of the two 69% of the time.
For companies like this one (revenue growing 10% to 20% a year over the past five years): our estimate missed by a median 4.4 points a year and the price's implied rate by 8.8; ours was closer 68% of the time. The chance above uses this group's own record.
Do fast growers break it? No. Tested by how fast companies had been growing, we did not underestimate fast growers (if anything slightly the reverse), and leaning more on their own past made the estimate worse, not better: their growth fades faster than it looks.
Who has been closer, by time window (same two numbers, scored on what revenue actually did):
| Window | Our typical miss | Market's typical miss | Ours closer |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 months | 8.1 pts | 11.9 pts | 61% |
| 6 months | 8.2 pts | 12 pts | 61% |
| 1 year | 7.7 pts | 11.6 pts | 62% |
| 2 years | 6.9 pts | 11.1 pts | 64% |
| 5 years | 4.3 pts | 8.8 pts | 69% |
Is the chance above honest? We built these chances on 2014–2018 and checked them on 2019–2021: when they said about 15%, it happened 16% of the time; about 25%, 25%; about 50%, 50%.
Growth is scored on revenue over the next five years.
▾ What goes into the smart-money reading
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend, DCF applicability). It excludes the Altman Z score, whose retained-earnings input this filer does not report separately. See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
Chance the S&P 500 falls 10% or more in the next three months.
Counted from every day since 2006. Says nothing about OPI — see the board for how it is measured.
📍 Where to start on this page, and what to look at first
How to read OPI (pre-profit growth)
This company is reinvesting instead of generating profit, so a standard DCF cannot price it. The useful question is whether the growth the market is paying for is achievable — and whether the company can fund itself until then.
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Reverse-DCF — the growth the price demands ↓
It shows exactly how fast the business must grow to justify today's price. Compare that to what comparable companies have actually achieved.
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Cash runway ↓
Can it reach profitability before it has to raise money and dilute shareholders?
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Interactive calculator ↓
Set your own growth + margin assumptions and see what the business would be worth if you are right.
Is Office Properties Income Trust (OPI) overvalued?
Macro: Neutral / mid-cycleNo, by our measure: the price is about 50% below what we think the business is worth.
OPI trades at $12.84 vs an estimated intrinsic value of $25.53 — a 49.7% discount to model IV.
Not investment advice. The model can be wrong. Verify the assumptions in the sections below and consider consulting a licensed advisor for significant decisions.
What return would OPI pay as a bond?
Not measurable here. REITs: the owner-earnings analogue is AFFO, which we do not yet ingest from the earnings supplement. Coming with the REIT module. See the cross-company ranking →
Who owns OPI, and how it moves
From the SEC's own filings: every fund manager over $100M reports its holdings each quarter, and every officer and director reports theirs. Each point is what was public at the time.
35 institutions reported holding it at the latest quarter-end.
What growth must the market believe? Reverse DCF — Instead of asking "what is this stock worth?", asks "what growth rate is the current market price already assuming?"
Why it matters: It crystallizes the bull thesis as a single number you can argue with. If the market expects 40% growth for 10 years and you do not believe that, the stock is overvalued.
Reference: 10–15% = sustainable for strong companies · 20–25% = exceptional · 30%+ = historically very rare
Traditional DCF asks "what is this stock worth?" Reverse DCF flips it: it treats today's price as correct and solves for the growth rate that justifies it. In plain terms — if our model is right about everything else, the company's cash flow would have to grow (or shrink) by this much every year for the next 5 years for today's price to make sense. If that required growth looks unrealistic, the price is stretched; if it looks easy to beat, the price may be cheap.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation → must grow at:
▾ Exactly how this 5-year figure is computed
Forecast length: 5 years at the solved rate, then a linear fade to terminal growth over years 6-10 — the same shape the DCF above uses
Terminal growth after the fade: 3.0%
Discount rate: 12.5% (the rate the model used)
Price used: $12.84 — the live price shown on this page (not frozen)
Method: solve for the constant annual growth rate that makes the discounted 10-year FCF stream + terminal value equal today's price.
The market is pricing in shrinking cash flow — often a sign of undervaluation, and sometimes of a dying business. Check leverage, the cash-flow trend and the health screens below to tell those apart.
For reference: The market is pricing in a material multi-year contraction in cash flow (≈13.5%/yr) — a significant decline, not a flat business.
▾ How we computed this · Reality check thresholds · Assumptions
- Starting FCF/share: $2.80 (projected from revenue × terminal margin)
- Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation →: 12.5% — standard 8-12%; 9-10% matches S&P 500 historical return - Terminal Growth RateTerminal Growth Rate — The growth rate we assume the company holds forever, after the explicit 10-year forecast period ends.
Why it matters: It anchors the long-tail value. Cannot mathematically exceed long-term GDP growth or the company eventually becomes larger than the global economy.
Reference: 2–3% (matches long-term US GDP growth) · Above 4% is mathematically problematic
Full explanation →: 3.0% — matches long-term GDP growth - Forecast horizon: 10 years explicit + terminal perpetuity
| ≤ 0% | Priced for decline — likely undervalued OR dying business |
| 5-12% | Reasonable; sustainable for quality businesses |
| 12-18% | Demanding — strong execution required |
| 18-25% | Exceptional — few companies sustain for a decade |
| 25-35% | Heroic — historically very rare |
| 35%+ | Borderline impossible at scale |
Sustaining 30%+ cash-flow growth for a full decade at scale is exceedingly rare — the bar is brutally high.
Use the interactive calculator below to change the discount rate, growth and terminal-growth assumptions and watch the value move.
What this rating means
What the rating says — Methods disagree. Methods disagree: the price is BELOW 2 of 3 method ranges (If FCF grew -5%/yr → 21%/yr (flat 10-yr DCF sweep; model assumes 15.0%), Our model's scenarios (conservative → optimistic; ◆ base, ● weighted 40/35/25)), while remaining inside the very wide Priced like 8 similar companies (their EV / Sales, p25→p75) band. That makes the read assumption-sensitive, not "fairly valued" — the verdict depends on which lens you trust.
What it does not say — Not a forecast. This shows where today's price sits against several different ways of valuing the business. Where the methods disagree, the spread itself is the useful part - it tells you how much the answer depends on which one you trust.
Football field: where does the price sit?
Different valuation methods produce different fair-value ranges depending on assumptions. Plotting them together lets you see at a glance whether the current price is reasonable across approaches, or only one specific lens.
Industry multiples sourced from: industry: Real Estate. See the Peer Basket section below for the peer comparison and its limited-comparables caveat.
How does OPI stack up against its closest peers?
We take the 8 same- or closely-related-industry companies closest in size to OPI and check what investors are paying for each dollar of their revenue (or profits). If OPI is much more expensive on the same yardstick, that's a red flag — unless you have a specific reason it deserves a premium. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
5.8x / 8.9x / 12.9x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 same-industry peers; implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FRPH | FRP HOLDINGS, INC. | Real Estate | $361M | 12.9x | n/r | n/m | 1.7% |
| CHCI | Comstock Holding Companies, Inc. | Real Estate | $196M | 3.1x | n/r | 16.4x | 3.0% |
| CMTG | Claros Mortgage Trust, Inc. | Real Estate | $195M | 17.8x | n/r | n/r | 2.2% |
| TRC | TEJON RANCH CO | Real Estate | $439M | 8.9x | 30.3x | loss | 2.2% |
| OZ | Belpointe PREP, LLC | Real Estate | $174M | n/m | n/r | n/r | 6.3% |
| SRG | Seritage Growth Properties | Real Estate | $145M | n/m | n/r | n/r | n/r |
| FPH | Five Point Holdings, LLC | Real Estate | $633M | 5.8x | n/r | n/r | 6.0% |
| HPP | Hudson Pacific Properties, Inc. | Real Estate | $634M | 0.8x | 1.6x | n/r | 17.3% |
loss = the company lost money on that line, so the multiple has no meaning · neg. cash = free cash flow was below zero · n/r = not reported separately in its SEC filings · n/m or struck through = implausible, left out. None of these enter the medians above.
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
What these health ratings mean, in numbers
Business quality — Very weak. Passes 1 of the 7 health checks we can measure — things like making a profit, turning it into cash, and not piling on debt. Across 131,000 company-quarters the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% within a year against 1.4% for the strongest, and that held in every era and all twelve sectors. It says "less likely to break", not "likely to beat the market".
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
We can't produce a trustworthy Altman Z here: retained earnings weren't separately reported in our data, so a core input would have to be fabricated. Rather than show a categorical "distress" verdict from an invented number, we mark it unavailable. Judge financial health from the leverage, cash position, and the measurable Piotroski checks instead.
▾ The checks — what passed, what didn't (and what we couldn't measure)
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✗ Positive net incomeNet income -$272.4M in FY2025.Why this matters: Does the company actually earn a profit? Sustained losses eventually force it to raise money — diluting you — or take on debt.
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✗ Positive operating cash flowOperating cash flow -$6.6M (was $67.2M the prior year).Why this matters: Profit can be an accounting figure; cash from running the business is harder to fake. Negative operating cash flow means the core business consumes cash and must be funded externally.
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✓ Cash flow backs up reported profitOperating cash flow -$6.6M vs net income -$272.4M.
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✗ Return on assets improvingReturn on assets -7.8% vs -3.6% a year ago.Why this matters: Is the company squeezing more profit out of each dollar of assets than last year? Rising = getting more efficient; falling = the opposite.
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✗ Debt load (vs assets)Long-term debt is 69.0% of assets vs 66.3% a year ago ($2,408.6M of $3,488.6M assets).Why this matters: Rising debt relative to assets means more risk and more cash going to interest instead of shareholders. Falling debt is a sign of strengthening.
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· Short-term liquidity (current ratio) (n/a — data not reported; not scored)
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✗ Share count (dilution)Share count rose 38.8% (51.8M → 71.9M, average shares for the year, fiscal 2024 → 2025).Why this matters: Issuing lots of new shares splits the pie into more pieces, shrinking your slice. Stable or falling share count protects existing owners.
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· Gross margin improving (n/a — data not reported; not scored)
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✗ Sales per asset (asset turnover)Asset turnover 0.13x vs 0.13x a year ago.Why this matters: Asset turnover measures how much revenue each dollar of assets generates. Rising = more productive use of the asset base.
Missing data is never counted as a pass or a fail — it's shown as n/a and excluded from the denominator. Each check compares the company against its own prior year.
Plain English: the company holds about $29M in cash and is burning roughly $7M/year in operations. At that pace, the cash lasts 4.5 yrs before it must raise capital (diluting shareholders), take on debt, or cut spending.
Assumes constant burn and ignores financing/asset sales. For pre-profit biotech and growth companies, this matters more than a DCF — a great drug pipeline is worthless if they run out of money before approval.
This stock looks cheap by our DCF (~50% below intrinsic value) but the financial health scores show structural weakness. Many cheap stocks are cheap because the market correctly sees what's coming. Be very skeptical of a "deep value" thesis here without an explicit catalyst.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 12.5%, the figure our model used for OPI. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: the calculator opens at our published value of $25.53 — it is initialised to the same scenario-weighted result, so the two match exactly on load. The moment you move a slider, the value below becomes a single-path what-if at your assumptions (not the three-scenario weighting), which is why it can differ from the headline once you've touched it.
12.5% — beta-based (CAPM), from this stock's BetaBeta — How much the stock moves when the overall market moves. 1.0 = moves with the market; 1.5 = moves 50% more than the market.
Why it matters: Higher beta = more volatile = should demand higher discount rate. Low beta stocks (utilities, consumer staples) move less.
Reference: Most stocks 0.5–1.5 · Defensives ~0.3 · High-vol tech ~1.5–2.0
Full explanation → of 1.45. The safe Treasury rate plus a premium scaled by how much more (or less) volatile the stock is than the market.
10.0% — sector/quality tier. A simpler hurdle set by industry and business durability: lower for stable, wide-moat companies; higher for speculative or micro-caps.
The headline value and this calculator start at 12.5% — the beta-based rate. Drag the slider to the other rate to see the full range.
-49.7%
At the default assumptions the flat path lands near our published value of $25.53. Move any slider to recompute it with your own.
Pre-profit estimate: assumes a path to a mature free-cash-flow margin (sector norm by default; change it under Advanced).
Move any slider above to recompute this against your own assumptions.
⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
OPI is well below the model value by the model; the price is 49.7% below intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation → (a 49.7% discount / margin of safetyMargin of Safety — How much room there is between the current price and intrinsic value, in your favor.
Why it matters: Benjamin Graham's core idea: only buy when there is enough discount that you can be wrong about your assumptions and still not lose money.
Reference: 20%+ is the classic Graham target · 30%+ for higher-risk companies
Full explanation →); equivalently the intrinsic value is about 64% ABOVE the price. The market likely discounts OPI due to its negative net income and operating cash flow in the latest fiscal year, coupled with a low franchise/durability score of 0/5. The market may be assigning value to potential future asset sales or strategic repositioning of its office properties, which is not in the model. The biggest risk to our model's base assumptions is that operating cash flow continues to decline from its current negative level of -$6.6 million, rather than growing at the modeled rate.
As of 11 days ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though no cash leaves the company). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Return to positive operating cash flow in upcoming quarters
- Improvements in net income profitability
- Successful debt reduction beyond the recent nominal fall from $2578M to $2.4 billion
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Revenue fell 11.8%, from $502.0M to $442.6M.
- Free cash flow turned negative at -$6.6M, from $67.2M the year before.
- Still unprofitable at -$272.4M — loss widening from -$136.1M the year before.
Nothing was clearly improving year-over-year.
Management & Leadership
Brian E. Donley serves as the CFO and Treasurer, while Yael Duffy is the President and COO. The company's leadership also includes directors Jonathan Kolatch, Partners Management Lp Helix, Adam D. Portnoy, and Irvin Schlussel. These executives oversee the operations and financial strategy of Office Properties Income Trust.
What They Make
Office Properties Income Trust (OPI) owns and leases office properties, primarily to single tenants and government entities. The company generates revenue from rental income paid by its tenants for the use of these properties.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
The market prices OPI at a 49.7% discount to the model's intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation →, likely due to significant financial challenges. Specifically, the company reported negative net income and negative operating cash flow of -$6.6 million in the latest fiscal year, indicating operational difficulties. Separately, the market's pricing is consistent with an implied material multi-year contraction in per-share cash flow, reflecting concerns about its profitability and future prospects.
Three Scenarios, Weighted
| Scenario | IV | Price vs this value | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | $18.38 | 30.1% discount | 40% |
| Base | $26.05 | 50.7% discount | 35% |
| Optimistic | $36.22 | 64.6% discount | 25% |
| Weighted | $25.53 | 49.7% discount | 100% |
Reading the last column: today's price compared with each scenario's value (price ÷ value − 1) — the same measure as the headline premium or discount, so the Weighted row matches it.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
OPI's capital allocation is not explicitly detailed in terms of dividends or buybacks from the provided data. The company's operations are currently characterized by negative free cash flowFree Cash Flow (FCF) — Operating cash flow minus capital spending: cash left after a company covers operating costs, taxes and interest and reinvests in the business — but BEFORE repaying debt principal or paying dividends. The cash actually available to investors.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation →, suggesting reliance on external financing or asset sales to fund operations and manage its $2.4 billion in total debt.
Growth / Revenue DCF Medium
Negative free cash flow: revenue/margin growth model used - standard FCF DCF is unreliable for companies still scaling.
Show advanced inputs
| Revenue Growth | 15.0% |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings cash-flow model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project lots/units, inventory turnover and gross margin per unit independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
The company has a track record of negative net income in the latest fiscal year (0/5 profitable years) and negative operating cash flow in the latest fiscal year.
Geography & Markets
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)39.6NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BearishLine below signalThe fast trend is below the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently downward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (3 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (2)
- FCF negative: revenue/margin growth model projects future cash flows from revenue trajectory.
- Illiquidity discount 7% applied (small/micro-cap — harder to exit, demand a margin).
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From Office Properties Income Trust's SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | Diluted EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 443M | -272M | $-3.79 |
| 2024 | 502M | -136M | $-2.63 |
| 2023 | — | -69.4M | $-1.44 |
| 2022 | — | -6.11M | $-0.14 |
| 2021 | — | -8.18M | $-0.17 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
Capital expenditure isn't tagged in this filer's machine-readable data (the CapEx column shows "—"). The free-cash-flow column is therefore operating cash flow less stock-based compensation only — an upper bound on true owner earnings, not the real figure. Companies that report capex under a custom label (some large IFRS filers do) look better here than they are.
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | -6.57M | not reported | not reported | -6.57Mcapital spending not reported |
| 2024 | 67.2M | not reported | not reported | 67.2Mcapital spending not reported |
| 2023 | 142M | 195M | not reported | -53.1M |
| 2022 | 193M | 4.62M | not reported | 188M |
| 2021 | 221M | 443M | not reported | -221M |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF starts from the projected from revenue × terminal margin, not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 3.49B |
| Total Liabilities | 2.61B |
| Equity | 881M |
| Total Debt | 2.41B |
Similar companies worth a look
Same sector and industry, similar fundamentals shape. Verify everything yourself — this list is computed mechanically and does not reflect our judgment about whether any of these are a good investment.
The questions people ask about OPI
Is Office Properties Income Trust (OPI) a good stock to buy?
Office Properties Income Trust (OPI) trades about 50% below our $25.53 estimate of what the business is worth, so the price is not the obstacle. The questions are why it is cheap: check the failure-warning checks, the debt, and whether insiders are buying, all on this page. This is educational research from SEC filings, not investment advice.
Is Office Properties Income Trust (OPI) overvalued?
No, by our measure. Office Properties Income Trust (OPI) trades at $12.84, about 50% below our estimate of $25.53 for what the business is worth. This is educational research from SEC filings, not investment advice.
What is OPI's intrinsic value?
Our model estimates OPI is worth about $25.53 per share, built from the cash the business is expected to generate, taken from its SEC filings. The market price is $12.84.
What growth is priced into OPI?
Working backwards from today's price, the market expects OPI's cash flow per share to shrink by roughly 10.6% a year over the next five years. Compare that with the company's actual record on this page.
Where do these numbers come from?
From Office Properties Income Trust's own SEC filings (10-K and 10-Q), Form 4 insider filings and daily market prices. Every figure on the page links to how it was calculated, and the model's weak spots are listed next to its results.