Bandwidth Inc. (BAND) Stock Analysis
Bandwidth Inc.
▾ What's in the 61/100 risk score? (higher = riskier)
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend, DCF applicability). It excludes the Altman Z score, whose retained-earnings input this filer does not report separately. See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
How to read BAND (pre-profit growth)
This company is reinvesting instead of generating profit, so a standard DCF cannot price it. The useful question is whether the growth the market is paying for is achievable — and whether the company can fund itself until then.
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Reverse-DCF — the growth the price demands ↓
It shows exactly how fast the business must grow to justify today's price. Compare that to what comparable companies have actually achieved.
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Cash runway ↓
Can it reach profitability before it has to raise money and dilute shareholders?
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Interactive calculator ↓
Set your own growth + margin assumptions and see what the business would be worth if you are right.
Is now a good time to buy BAND?
Macro: Neutral / mid-cycle
BAND trades at $56.87 vs an estimated
intrinsic value
of $16.20
— a +251.0% premium to model IV.
Today's price is consistent with BAND's owner-earnings free cash flow per share growing about 38.2% per year 5-YR · SCENARIO PATH over the next 5 years (the
price-implied growth rate).
Our DCF projects
modeled growth
of 11.5% per year based on history + sector defaults
(analyst consensus estimates not yet integrated).
Note: this is a 5-year, per-share view. The Reverse-DCF section below asks the same question on a stricter 10-year free-cash-flowFree Cash Flow (FCF) — Operating cash flow minus capital spending: cash left after a company covers operating costs, taxes and interest and reinvests in the business — but BEFORE repaying debt principal or paying dividends. The cash actually available to investors.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation → basis — so its growth number is different, not contradictory.
▾ Exactly how this 5-year figure is computed
Current price: $56.87 (live)
Discount rate: 14.1%; terminal growth: 3.0%
Forecast: 5 years explicit growth, then a linear fade to terminal; end-of-period cash flows discounted to today
Growth path: the model's scenario-weighted path (conservative 40% / base 35% / optimistic 25% — assumed weights, not measured probabilities) — see the "Three Scenarios, Weighted" table below for the three IVs
Method: solve for the constant 5-year per-share growth rate that, run through this same structure, makes the intrinsic value equal today's price. (The 10-year figure below uses a flat 10-yr path instead — hence a different number.)
Not investment advice. The model can be wrong. Verify the assumptions in the sections below and consider consulting a licensed advisor for significant decisions.
What growth must the market believe? Reverse DCF — Instead of asking "what is this stock worth?", asks "what growth rate is the current market price already assuming?"
Why it matters: It crystallizes the bull thesis as a single number you can argue with. If the market expects 40% growth for 10 years and you do not believe that, the stock is overvalued.
Reference: 10–15% = sustainable for strong companies · 20–25% = exceptional · 30%+ = historically very rare
Traditional DCF asks "what is this stock worth?" Reverse DCF flips it: it treats today's price as correct and solves for the growth rate that justifies it. In plain terms — if our model is right about everything else, the company's cash flow would have to grow (or shrink) by this much every year for the next 10 years for today's price to make sense. If that required growth looks unrealistic, the price is stretched; if it looks easy to beat, the price may be cheap.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation → must grow at:
▾ Exactly how this 10-year figure is computed
Forecast length: 10 years, single flat growth rate (no fade)
Terminal growth after year 10: 3.0%
Discount rate: 14.1% (the rate the model used)
Price used: $56.87 — the live price shown on this page (not frozen)
Method: solve for the constant annual growth rate that makes the discounted 10-year FCF stream + terminal value equal today's price.
25-35% sustained for 10 years has been done a few times but is historically very rare. The market is pricing in a near-best-case outcome.
For reference: Heroic — very few companies have ever compounded cash flow this fast at scale for a decade. The price leaves no room for error.
▾ How we computed this · Reality check thresholds · Assumptions
- Starting FCF/share: $1.24 (TTM)
- Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation →: 14.1% — standard 8-12%; 9-10% matches S&P 500 historical return - Terminal Growth RateTerminal Growth Rate — The growth rate we assume the company holds forever, after the explicit 10-year forecast period ends.
Why it matters: It anchors the long-tail value. Cannot mathematically exceed long-term GDP growth or the company eventually becomes larger than the global economy.
Reference: 2–3% (matches long-term US GDP growth) · Above 4% is mathematically problematic
Full explanation →: 3.0% — matches long-term GDP growth - Forecast horizon: 10 years explicit + terminal perpetuity
| ≤ 0% | Priced for decline — likely undervalued OR dying business |
| 5-12% | Reasonable; sustainable for quality businesses |
| 12-18% | Demanding — strong execution required |
| 18-25% | Exceptional — few companies sustain for a decade |
| 25-35% | Heroic — historically very rare |
| 35%+ | Borderline impossible at scale |
Sustaining 30%+ cash-flow growth for a full decade at scale is exceedingly rare — the bar is brutally high.
Use the interactive calculator below to change the discount rate, growth and terminal-growth assumptions and watch the value move.
Football field: where does the price sit?
Different valuation methods produce different fair-value ranges depending on assumptions. Plotting them together lets you see at a glance whether the current price is reasonable across approaches, or only one specific lens.
Industry multiples sourced from: industry: Software. See the Peer Basket section below for the peer comparison and its limited-comparables caveat.
How does BAND stack up against its closest peers?
We take the 4 same-industry companies most similar to BAND (similar size) and check what investors are paying for each dollar of their revenue (or profits). If BAND is much more expensive on the same yardstick, that's a red flag — unless you have a specific reason it deserves a premium. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
4.0x / 4.2x / 5.8x |
| EV / Gross ProfitEV / Gross Profit — Enterprise value divided by gross profit — the multiple paid for what each dollar of sales contributes after direct costs. Why it matters: More refined than EV/Sales for high-margin businesses (software, marketplaces) where gross margin is the real economic engine. Reference: 8–15x for SaaS · 15–25x for hypergrowth software · >30x demanding Full explanation → |
8.4x / 8.9x / 9.6x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 4 same-industry peers; implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OPRA | Opera Ltd | Software | $1.7B | — | — | — | — |
| XNET | Xunlei Ltd | Software | $1.9B | 4.2x | 8.9x | 292.9x | 1.2% |
| TUYA | Tuya Inc. | Software | $1.3B | 4.0x | 8.4x | 113.4x | 4.0% |
| XZO | Exzeo Group, Inc. | Software | $1.3B | 5.8x | 9.6x | 11.9x | 8.5% |
| RCAT | Red Cat Holdings, Inc. | Software ·fallback | $1.8B | 43.7x | 1,397.0x | — | 1.0% |
| PDFS | PDF SOLUTIONS INC | Software ·fallback | $1.9B | 9.2x | 12.7x | 344.9x | 1.4% |
| PRGS | PROGRESS SOFTWARE CORP /MA | Software ·fallback | $1.4B | 2.8x | 3.5x | 18.1x | 11.4% |
| PRCH | Porch Group, Inc. | Software ·fallback | $1.3B | 4.1x | 5.1x | 47.1x | 3.4% |
Is the burn rate justified by the growth?
This is a pre-profit or thin-margin growth company. Standard DCF struggles when free cash flow is near zero. The Rule of 40 (revenue growth % + FCF margin %) is the Bessemer/SaaS-industry quality screen for growth-stage businesses: ≥40 = healthy tradeoff between growth velocity and margin discipline. Below 40 means the company isn't earning its burn rate.
Note: Rule of 40 is the gold-standard quality screen for growth-stage software/tech companies that aren't yet FCF-positive. Coined by Brad Feld / Bessemer Venture Partners. The threshold is empirical: companies sustaining R40 ≥ 40 historically command premium valuation multiples. Below 20 typically signals either growth is decelerating or unit economics aren't there.
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
We can't produce a trustworthy Altman Z here: retained earnings weren't separately reported in our data, so a core input would have to be fabricated. Rather than show a categorical "distress" verdict from an invented number, we mark it unavailable. The classic manufacturing-calibrated model also fits asset-light businesses like this one poorly. Judge financial health from the leverage, cash position, and the measurable Piotroski checks instead.
Why it matters: High score = fundamentals improving. Low score = deteriorating. Especially powerful for filtering cheap stocks: cheap + high F-score historically outperforms; cheap + low F-score is often a value trap.
Reference: 7–9 = strong · 4–6 = mediocre · 0–3 = weak
Full explanation →
▾ The checks — what passed, what didn't (and what we couldn't measure)
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✗ Positive net incomeNet income -$12.9M in FY2025.Why this matters: Does the company actually earn a profit? Sustained losses eventually force it to raise money — diluting you — or take on debt.
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✓ Positive operating cash flowOperating cash flow $89.5M (was $83.9M the prior year).
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✓ Cash flow backs up reported profitOperating cash flow $89.5M vs net income -$12.9M.
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✗ Return on assets improvingReturn on assets -1.2% vs -0.7% a year ago.Why this matters: Is the company squeezing more profit out of each dollar of assets than last year? Rising = getting more efficient; falling = the opposite.
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✓ Debt load (vs assets)Long-term debt is 23.5% of assets vs 28.4% a year ago ($247.6M of $1,052.6M assets).
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✓ Short-term liquidity (current ratio)Current ratio 1.42x vs 1.34x a year ago.
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✗ Share count (dilution)Share count rose 10.2% (27.2M → 30.0M year-over-year).Why this matters: Issuing lots of new shares splits the pie into more pieces, shrinking your slice. Stable or falling share count protects existing owners.
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✓ Pricing power (gross margin)Gross margin 39.1% vs 37.4% a year ago.
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✗ Sales per asset (asset turnover)Asset turnover 0.72x vs 0.76x a year ago.Why this matters: Asset turnover measures how much revenue each dollar of assets generates. Rising = more productive use of the asset base.
Missing data is never counted as a pass or a fail — it's shown as n/a and excluded from the denominator. Each check compares the company against its own prior year.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 14.1%, the figure our model used for BAND. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: the calculator opens at our published value of $16.20 — it is initialised to the same scenario-weighted result, so the two match exactly on load. The moment you move a slider, the value below becomes a single-path what-if at your assumptions (not the three-scenario weighting), which is why it can differ from the headline once you've touched it.
14.1% — beta-based (CAPM), from this stock's BetaBeta — How much the stock moves when the overall market moves. 1.0 = moves with the market; 1.5 = moves 50% more than the market.
Why it matters: Higher beta = more volatile = should demand higher discount rate. Low beta stocks (utilities, consumer staples) move less.
Reference: Most stocks 0.5–1.5 · Defensives ~0.3 · High-vol tech ~1.5–2.0
Full explanation → of 1.74. The safe Treasury rate plus a premium scaled by how much more (or less) volatile the stock is than the market.
12.0% — sector/quality tier. A simpler hurdle set by industry and business durability: lower for stable, wide-moat companies; higher for speculative or micro-caps.
The headline value and this calculator start at 14.1% — the beta-based rate. Drag the slider to the other rate to see the full range.
+251.0%
At the default assumptions the flat path lands near our published value of $16.20. Move any slider to recompute it with your own.
Move any slider above to recompute this against your own assumptions.
⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
Bandwidth Inc. is well above the model value, with the market pricing it at a +251.0% premium to the model's intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation → of $16.20. The market appears to be paying for a high implied growth rate of 38.2% compared to the model's 11.5%. The market may be assigning value to the potential for new communication platform features or expanded enterprise adoption, which is not in the model. The #1 quantifiable risk is the high stock-based compensation, which equals 58% of pre-SBCSBC (Stock-Based Compensation) — Paying employees with company shares instead of cash.
Why it matters: It's a real cost — it dilutes your ownership — so we subtract it from free cash flow even though accounting rules add it back, which would otherwise flatter cash-heavy tech companies.
Reference: Can be 10–30% of revenue at high-growth software firms.
Full explanation → free cash flowFree Cash Flow (FCF) — Operating cash flow minus capital spending: cash left after a company covers operating costs, taxes and interest and reinvests in the business — but BEFORE repaying debt principal or paying dividends. The cash actually available to investors.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation →.
As of 3 months ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Re-acceleration of gross margin expansion
- Return to net income profitability
- Continued reduction in long-term debt
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Free cash flow rose to $37.2M.
- Gross margin improved to 39% (+2 pts).
- Still unprofitable at -$12.9M — loss widening.
Roughly flat: Revenue was flat +1% to $753.8M.
Management & Leadership
David Morken is the CEO and co-founder of Bandwidth Inc., having led the company for over two decades. He has guided Bandwidth through its evolution in the communications platform as a service (CPaaS) space. Limited executive data available beyond the CEO.
What They Make
Bandwidth Inc. provides cloud-based communications platforms and voice, messaging, and 911 services to enterprises and software companies. Their offerings enable businesses to integrate real-time communication capabilities into their applications.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
The market prices Bandwidth at a +301% premium, implying a 38.2% growth rate, likely due to its consistent positive operating cash flow (positive 5/5 yrs) and revenue growth of 11.3%/yr over four years. The market may be assigning value to the potential for new strategic partnerships or expansion into emerging communication technologies, which is not in the model. This optimism persists despite net income being negative in the latest period and gross margin compressing from 43.6% to 39.1%.
Three Scenarios, Weighted
| Scenario | IV | Upside from today's price | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | $13.85 | -75.7% | 40% |
| Base | $16.47 | -71.0% | 35% |
| Optimistic | $19.59 | -65.6% | 25% |
| Weighted | $16.20 | -71.5% | 100% |
Reading the last column: it is the move from today's price to each value (IV ÷ price − 1). The headline "premium/discount to model IV" measures the same gap from the value's side (price ÷ IV − 1), so the two percentages differ in size and sign by construction — e.g. a price 8% above value is a value 7.4% below price.
What has to be true (historical comparison)
To justify today's price, BAND's owner-earnings cash flow must grow to roughly 5.0× its current level over 5 years. If profit margins and share count stay roughly constant, that is equivalent to about the same multiple of revenue. Each card below is a real company that grew revenue at a comparable magnitude — possibly in a different industry; the point is the growth magnitude required and its historical base rate, not that BAND resembles these businesses. The green/amber line shows whether that company cleared or fell short of the bar, and the tag on the right shows how it actually fared afterward (succeeded, faded, or wiped out).
IPO'd at a $20B+ valuation on $1B revenue and a $1.2B loss. Bears called it bloated consulting; the bull case was government + AIP. Outcome still being written.
Real business, big profits, but ~80x P/E. Stock took 17 years to make a new all-time high. The business compounded the whole time; the valuation took a long break.
DVD-by-mail still 99% of revenue when streaming was launched. Stock 30x'd over the next decade — but only because the pivot succeeded. The pivot was not visible in 2007 fundamentals.
Anchors are hand-curated 10-K snapshots. We surface the three whose 5-year revenue growth most-closely brackets the rate required to justify the current price. Source: SEC EDGAR.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
Bandwidth Inc. has no dividend or buyback programs, and it funds its operations and growth through its positive operating cash flow and has been reducing its long-term debt.
Free Cash Flow DCF High
Standard FCF DCF: positive free cash flow in a sector suited for cash-flow-based valuation.
Show advanced inputs
| Revenue Growth | 11.3% |
| Historical Fcf Growth | 9.1% |
| Sector Default | 12.0% |
| Best Estimate | 11.5% |
| Method | blend(70% revenue_cagr, 30% sector) |
| Growth Basis | total |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project product, services and recurring/cloud lines independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Revenue has grown at 11.3%/yr over four years, from $491M to $754M.
Geography & Markets
Bandwidth Inc. is headquartered in the US and operates globally, providing services across various international markets, though specific geographic revenue mix is not available from current data sources.
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)79.0OverboughtBought up hard recently — stretched; pullbacks are common from here.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BearishLine below signalThe fast trend is below the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently downward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (3 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (3)
- Stock-based compensation equals 58% of pre-SBC free cash flow; FCF used here is net of SBC (a real shareholder-dilution cost), so it is lower than the headline GAAP cash-flow figure.
- Price is 3.7x model IV - market may be pricing optionality, narrative catalysts, or margin expansion beyond what trailing cash flows support.
- Illiquidity discount 7% applied (small/micro-cap — harder to exit, demand a margin).
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From Bandwidth Inc.'s SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 753.8M | -12.9M | $-0.43 |
| 2024 | 748.5M | -6.5M | $-0.24 |
| 2023 | 601.1M | -16.3M | $-0.64 |
| 2022 | 573.2M | 19.6M | $-0.48 |
| 2021 | 490.9M | -27.4M | $-1.09 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
Capital expenditure isn't tagged in this filer's machine-readable data (the CapEx column shows "—"). The free-cash-flow column is therefore operating cash flow less stock-based compensation only — an upper bound on true owner earnings, not the real figure. Companies that report capex under a custom label (some large IFRS filers do) look better here than they are.
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC & adj. | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 89.5M | — | 52.3M | 37.2M |
| 2024 | 83.9M | — | 48.4M | 35.5M |
| 2023 | 39.0M | — | 37.0M | 2.0M |
| 2022 | 34.9M | — | 20.7M | 14.3M |
| 2021 | 40.8M | — | 14.5M | 26.3M |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: 89.5M − — − 52.3M (SBC & adj.) = 37.2M. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 1.1B |
| Total Liabilities | 652.7M |
| Equity | 400.0M |
| Total Debt | 247.6M |
Similar companies worth a look
Same sector and industry, similar fundamentals shape. Verify everything yourself — this list is computed mechanically and does not reflect our judgment about whether any of these are a good investment.