DIEBOLD NIXDORF, Inc (DBD) Stock Analysis
DIEBOLD NIXDORF, Inc
▾ What's in the 46/100 risk score? (higher = riskier)
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend). It excludes the the Altman Z score, whose retained-earnings input this filer does not report separately, which relies on a proxied (estimated) input. See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
How to read DBD
We are not publishing an intrinsic value for this one — the section below says exactly why. Everything on this page that comes straight from the filings and the tape is still here; treat the missing valuation as a known gap, not as a verdict on the business.
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Reported earnings & margins ↓
What the company actually reported — unaffected by the valuation being held.
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Balance sheet & book value ↓
Assets, liabilities and equity as filed.
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Who's selling & betting against it ↓
Insider and short-interest behaviour needs no valuation model.
The share count we read for DBD looks wrong — common for multi-class / founder-controlled filers that report shares per share-class. That makes per-share figures (including intrinsic value) misleading, so we suppressed them. The company's total financials below are sound.
What to use instead: Lean on the totals — revenue, net income, cash flow — and the balance sheet. Multi-class share counts are being corrected; once fixed, the per-share valuation returns automatically.
This note is only about the single DCF fair-value number — DBD's full financial statements, health scores, and written analysis are all below.
How does DBD stack up against its closest peers?
We take the 6 same-industry companies most similar to DBD (similar size) and check what investors are paying for each dollar of their revenue (or profits). If DBD is much more expensive on the same yardstick, that's a red flag — unless you have a specific reason it deserves a premium. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
0.8x / 1.7x / 2.2x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 6 same-industry peers; implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NATL | NCR Atleos Corp | Computer Hardware | $3.3B | 0.8x | — | 7.1x | 6.1% |
| ZEPP | Zepp Health Corp | Computer Hardware | $2.3B | 9.2x | 24.0x | — | 0.9% |
| XNDU | Xanadu Quantum Technologies Ltd | Computer Hardware | $3.5B | — | — | — | — |
| PBI | PITNEY BOWES INC /DE/ | Computer Hardware | $2.2B | 2.2x | — | — | 10.9% |
| OMCL | OMNICELL, INC. | Computer Hardware | $2.0B | 1.7x | 4.0x | 389.0x | 3.9% |
| VYX | NCR Voyix Corp | Computer Hardware | $991M | 0.8x | — | 80.6x | 20.1% |
| DGII | DIGI INTERNATIONAL INC | Computer Hardware ·fallback | $2.5B | 6.2x | 9.9x | 47.6x | 3.6% |
| EXTR | EXTREME NETWORKS INC | Computer Hardware ·fallback | $3.5B | 3.2x | 5.1x | 215.2x | 1.3% |
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
We can't produce a trustworthy Altman Z here: retained earnings weren't separately reported in our data, so a core input would have to be fabricated. Rather than show a categorical "distress" verdict from an invented number, we mark it unavailable. Judge financial health from the leverage, cash position, and the measurable Piotroski checks instead.
Why it matters: High score = fundamentals improving. Low score = deteriorating. Especially powerful for filtering cheap stocks: cheap + high F-score historically outperforms; cheap + low F-score is often a value trap.
Reference: 7–9 = strong · 4–6 = mediocre · 0–3 = weak
Full explanation →
▾ The checks — what passed, what didn't (and what we couldn't measure)
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✓ Positive net incomeNet income $94.6M in the latest year.
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✓ Positive operating cash flowOperating cash flow $300.7M (was $149.2M the prior year).
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✓ Cash flow backs up reported profitOperating cash flow $300.7M vs net income $94.6M.
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✓ Return on assets improvingReturn on assets 2.5% vs -0.5% a year ago.
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✓ Debt load (vs assets)Long-term debt is 24.3% of assets vs 26.2% a year ago ($938.5M now).
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✗ Short-term liquidity (current ratio)Current ratio 1.30x vs 1.32x a year ago.Why this matters: The current ratio compares assets it can turn to cash within a year against bills due within a year. Below 1.0 means it may struggle to cover near-term obligations.
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✓ Share count (dilution)Share count declined 1.1% (37.6M → 37.2M year-over-year), so the no-dilution check passed. (This 1-year change differs from the ~4%/yr multi-year buyback CAGR the DCF cites.)
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✓ Pricing power (gross margin)Gross margin 25.3% vs 24.5% a year ago.
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✗ Sales per asset (asset turnover)Asset turnover 0.99x vs 1.06x a year ago.Why this matters: Asset turnover measures how much revenue each dollar of assets generates. Rising = more productive use of the asset base.
Missing data is never counted as a pass or a fail — it's shown as n/a and excluded from the denominator. Each check compares the company against its own prior year.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 10.0%, the figure our model used for DBD. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: no headline intrinsic value is published for this stock (the valuation is held for a data-quality reason — see the notes above). The calculator below is a what-if tool: the values it produces are your assumptions played out, not our estimate.
A full intrinsic value isn't shown for DBD because the valuation is currently held for a data-quality reason (see the guardrail notes above). The reverse-DCF reading still works — it needs only the price and cash flow — but we won't publish a forward value until the underlying data passes our checks.
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⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
A standard discounted cash flowDCF — Discounted Cash Flow — sums up all future cash a business will produce, adjusted for the fact that future dollars are worth less than dollars today.
Why it matters: It is the most fundamentally honest valuation method when applicable — but only works for companies with predictable, positive cash flow.
Reference: Best for: mature, profitable businesses. Fails for: pre-profit growth, banks, REITs.
Full explanation → (DCF) valuation is not meaningful for Diebold Nixdorf due to its erratic free cash flowFree Cash Flow (FCF) — Operating cash flow minus capital spending: cash left after a company covers operating costs, taxes and interest and reinvests in the business — but BEFORE repaying debt principal or paying dividends. The cash actually available to investors.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation → and the fact that its latest FCF per share is less than 0.5% of the current price, making the output unreliable. Investors are likely focused on the company's ability to sustain positive operating cash flow and its efforts to reduce long-term debt. The primary quantifiable risk is the compressing gross margin, which could further erode profitability.
As of 2 months ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Stabilization or improvement in gross margin
- Continued reduction in long-term debt
- Any signs of revenue re-acceleration
The trend, in plain numbers (2024 → 2025)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Revenue grew +1% to $3.81B.
- Free cash flow rose to $288.6M.
- Gross margin improved to 25% (+1 pts).
- Swung to a profit of $94.6M (from a loss the prior year).
Nothing clearly worsening year-over-year.
Management & Leadership
Octavio Marquez has served as the President and CEO of Diebold Nixdorf since 2022, leading the company's strategic direction and global operations. He previously held various leadership roles within the company, focusing on global banking and retail segments.
What They Make
Diebold Nixdorf provides integrated self-service solutions, software, and services for financial institutions and retail customers globally. Their products include ATMs, point-of-sale systems, and related software and support services.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
What we use instead: earnings (P/E, EV/EBIT), book value (P/B) — computed from the figures this company does report, shown in the sections below. Those numbers are unaffected by the missing cash-flow data.
The market is likely pricing Diebold Nixdorf based on its recent return to positive net income and consistent positive operating cash flow (positive 4/5 years), despite roughly flat revenue. Investors are betting on continued debt reduction and the company's ability to leverage its existing customer base and service contracts for future stability, rather than strong growth or current cash flow generation.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
The company is retiring 4% of its shares per year, boosting per-share growth, and has been actively reducing its long-term debt.
Free Cash Flow DCF
Standard FCF DCF: positive free cash flow in a sector suited for cash-flow-based valuation.
Show advanced inputs
| RevenueGrowth | -0.6% |
| HistoricalFcfGrowth | 3.5322 |
| SectorDefault | 12.0% |
| BestEstimate | 3.2% |
| Method | blend(70% revenue_cagr, 30% sector)+buyback(4%) |
| GrowthBasis | total |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project product, services and recurring/cloud lines independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Revenue has been roughly flat over the last four years, declining by -0.6% annually, while net income was positive in the latest year after being profitable only 1/5 years.
Geography & Markets
Diebold Nixdorf operates globally, serving financial and retail customers across North America, Europe, Asia, and other international markets. Specific geographic revenue mix percentages are not available from current data sources.
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)59.5NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BullishLine above signalThe fast trend is above the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently upward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (6 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (6)
- Latest FCF ($0.3B) is 3.1x net income ($0.1B) - using 3yr avg FCF to reduce one-time inflation.
- Base metric ($0.24/sh) is <0.5% of price ($81) - FCF DCF output will be unreliable. Growth/revenue model would be more appropriate for this stock.
- Per-share growth boosted by buybacks: the company is retiring 4% of its shares per year, which adds directly to per-share growth on top of business growth. Final per-share growth used by the model: 7.2%/yr.
- Price is 22.2x model IV - market may be pricing optionality, narrative catalysts, or margin expansion beyond what trailing cash flows support.
- Extreme valuation (P/IV 22.1937x, IV $3.66 vs price $81.14); output dominated by data/units issue (often a multi-class share-count mismatch). Suppressed.
- DATA UNAVAILABLE: per-share values suppressed due to missing/unreliable shares data.
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From DIEBOLD NIXDORF, Inc's SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 3.8B | 94.6M | $2.54 |
| 2024 | 3.8B | -16.5M | $-0.44 |
| 2022 | 3.5B | -581.4M | $-7.36 |
| 2021 | 3.9B | -78.8M | $-1.01 |
| 2020 | 3.9B | -269.1M | $-3.47 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC & adj. | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 300.7M | — | 12.1M | 288.6M |
| 2024 | 149.2M | — | 9.7M | 139.5M |
| 2022 | -387.9M | — | 13.4M | -401.3M |
| 2021 | 123.3M | — | 13.8M | 109.5M |
| 2020 | 18.0M | — | 14.9M | 3.1M |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: 300.7M − — − 12.1M (SBC & adj.) = 288.6M. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF's starting value is a trailing 3-year average, not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 3.9B |
| Total Liabilities | 2.7B |
| Equity | 1.1B |
| Total Debt | 938.5M |