PERMA FIX ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES INC (PESI) Stock Analysis
PERMA FIX ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES INC
▾ What's in the 60/100 risk score? (higher = riskier)
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend). It excludes the Altman Z score, whose retained-earnings input this filer does not report separately. See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
How to read PESI (regulated utility)
A regulator sets what a utility can earn, so its value tracks book value, dividend yield and payout — not a free-market DCF.
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Utility lens (P/B, yield, payout) ↓
These are the metrics utility-fund managers actually use.
Standard DCF doesn't fit PESI well — but that's expected for this kind of business. The Utility Valuation Lens below uses the metrics actually used by analysts who value hazardous waste management. Reverse DCF + Football Field also work as cross-checks.
⚠ We found no genuine same-industry (Hazardous Waste Management) comparables at all — fewer than the 4 we require for a reliable median. The 8 names in the table below therefore include 8 broader Utilities names marked fallback, whose business models and margins differ — which is why any median below is computed over that wider set, not over true comparables. So we do not derive a peer-implied share value here. Read the multiples as rough context only.
How does PESI stack up against its closest peers?
Ideally we compare PESI only to same-industry peers, but too few exist in our universe right now, so the basket below mixes in broader-sector names. Treat the multiples as rough context, not a valuation. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
2.4x / 4.1x / 9.2x |
| EV / EBITEV / EBITDA — Enterprise value divided by earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. Why it matters: A classic "what would a private buyer pay" multiple — used in M&A. Strips out tax and capital-structure noise. Reference: 8–12x for mature businesses · 15–25x for growth · Below 5x often signals distress Full explanation → |
20.9x / 25.5x / 33.4x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 peers (broad — see caveat); implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WAVE | Eco Wave Power Global AB (publ) | Electric Utilities ·fallback | $349M | 9,171.3x | 15,841.4x | — | 3.0% |
| SMC | Summit Midstream Corp | Gas Utilities ·fallback | $284M | 2.4x | — | — | 3.0% |
| PCYO | PURE CYCLE CORP | Water Utilities ·fallback | $249M | 9.8x | 16.0x | 33.4x | 3.0% |
| YORW | YORK WATER CO | Water Utilities ·fallback | $485M | 9.2x | — | 25.5x | 2.9% |
| MNTK | Montauk Renewables, Inc. | Combined Utility Services ·fallback | $248M | 1.4x | — | 294.2x | 3.0% |
| RGCO | RGC RESOURCES INC | Gas Utilities ·fallback | $240M | 4.1x | — | 20.9x | 3.6% |
| OPTT | Ocean Power Technologies, Inc. | Electric Utilities ·fallback | $531M | 145.2x | — | — | 3.0% |
| OIO | OIO Group | Refuse Systems ·fallback | $689M | — | — | — | 3.0% |
Regulated rate-base economics
Regulated utilities earn a state-approved "allowed ROE" (typically 9-10%) on their regulated rate base. The business is engineered for stability — DCF can't price that properly because earnings are administratively set, not free-market. The right metrics are P/B, dividend yield, and payout ratio — what most utility-fund managers actually look at.
Note: For utilities, ROE comfortably above the regulator's allowed ROE (~9-10%) is the sign of operational efficiency. Big premium to book (>2×) generally requires accelerating rate-base growth — common drivers: grid modernization, renewables transition, or population/load growth in service area.
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
Regulated utilities carry high leverage backed by long-life assets and regulator-set rate-base returns — Altman Z flags both as distress signals even when the business is stable. See the Utility Lens above for the metrics that matter (P/B, dividend yield, payout ratio).
Why it matters: High score = fundamentals improving. Low score = deteriorating. Especially powerful for filtering cheap stocks: cheap + high F-score historically outperforms; cheap + low F-score is often a value trap.
Reference: 7–9 = strong · 4–6 = mediocre · 0–3 = weak
Full explanation →
Piotroski F's checks (operating cash flow, gross-margin trend, current ratio, asset turnover) assume an industrial cost structure, so they misread asset-heavy or financial businesses like this one — a healthy REIT, utility, pipeline, BDC/fund or holding company can score low for reasons that aren't weakness. See the sector lens above for the metrics that actually matter.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 10.0%, the figure our model used for PESI. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: no headline intrinsic value is published for this stock (the valuation is held for a data-quality reason — see the notes above). The calculator below is a what-if tool: the values it produces are your assumptions played out, not our estimate.
A full intrinsic value isn't shown for PESI because the valuation is currently held for a data-quality reason (see the guardrail notes above). The reverse-DCF reading still works — it needs only the price and cash flow — but we won't publish a forward value until the underlying data passes our checks.
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⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
The market appears to be paying for potential future growth or margin expansion not reflected in its trailing cash flows, despite a bearish trend and declining revenue. The primary quantifiable risk is the negative operating cash flow, which has been positive only one out of the last five years.
As of 3 months ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Next quarter's revenue growth rate
- Operating cash flow turning positive
- Changes in long-term debt levels
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Revenue grew +4% to $61.7M.
- Free cash flow is negative at -$16.3M — the cash burn narrowed vs last year.
- Gross margin improved to 10% (+10 pts).
- Still unprofitable at -$13.8M — loss narrowing.
Nothing was clearly worsening year-over-year.
Management & Leadership
Stephen P. Swinson has served as the CEO and Chairman of Perma-Fix Environmental Services, Inc. since 1991. Dr. Louis F. Centofanti is the Executive Vice President and Chief Technology Officer, with Mark J. Duff serving as the Chief Financial Officer.
What They Make
Perma-Fix Environmental Services provides environmental and waste management services, specializing in the treatment and disposal of hazardous and radioactive waste for government and commercial clients.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
What we use instead: earnings (P/E, EV/EBIT), book value (P/B) — computed from the figures this company does report, shown in the sections below. Those numbers are unaffected by the missing cash-flow data.
The market prices PESI at a premium of +273.9% to the model's intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation →, potentially assigning value to future regulatory changes or new technology adoption in hazardous waste management, which is not in the model. This optimism persists despite revenue declining by -3.9%/yr over four years and operating cash flow being negative in the latest period, suggesting investors anticipate a significant turnaround or unmodeled optionality.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
The company has no dividend data and funds itself through operations, though operating cash flow was negative in the latest period, and long-term debt is rising.
Dividend Discount
Utility (Hazardous Waste Management): dividend discount model - growth is regulated and yield is the primary driver.
Show advanced inputs
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project rate-base growth, allowed ROE and dividend growth independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Revenue has been declining at -3.9%/yr over the last four years, from $72M to $62M.
Geography & Markets
Perma-Fix Environmental Services primarily operates within the United States, providing its specialized waste management services to clients across various regions. Specific geographic revenue mix percentages are not available from current data sources.
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)42.4NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BullishLine above signalThe fast trend is above the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently upward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (4 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (4)
- No dividend data. Assuming 3% yield.
- Price is far above the model output - market may be pricing optionality, narrative catalysts, or margin expansion beyond what trailing cash flows support.
- Illiquidity discount 15% applied (small/micro-cap — harder to exit, demand a margin).
- Dividend data sparse; DDM using estimated yield. Confidence reduced.
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From PERMA FIX ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES INC's SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 61.7M | -13.8M | $-0.75 |
| 2024 | 59.1M | -20.0M | $-1.33 |
| 2023 | 89.7M | 485,000 | $0.04 |
| 2022 | 70.6M | -3.8M | $-0.29 |
| 2021 | 72.2M | 835,000 | $0.07 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC & adj. | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | -10.8M | 4.7M | 818,000 | -16.3M |
| 2024 | -14.7M | 3.4M | 656,000 | -18.8M |
| 2023 | 6.5M | 1.7M | 548,000 | 4.2M |
| 2022 | -553,000 | 1.0M | 408,000 | -2.0M |
| 2021 | -6.8M | 1.6M | 250,000 | -8.7M |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: -10.8M − 4.7M − 818,000 (SBC & adj.) = -16.3M. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF's starting value is a TTM dividend, not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 88.0M |
| Total Liabilities | 37.9M |
| Equity | 50.1M |
| Total Debt | 1.9M |
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