Is VERRA MOBILITY Corp (VRRM) a good stock to buy?
Our tested checks disagree with each other, so the answer depends on something further down the page rather than on any one measure.
What each rating means, in numbers
Can it survive? — Middling. Safer than 48% of the companies we cover, judged on the warning signs that came before companies that really did fail.
Cash it pays you — High. For every $100 of share price, the business threw off about $27.3 of spare cash last year. Higher is better: the cheap fifth on this measure ran about 7.7 points a year ahead of the dear fifth, 2011 to 2025.
Business quality — Excellent. Passes 8 of the 8 health checks we can measure — things like making a profit, turning it into cash, and not piling on debt. Across 131,000 company-quarters the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% against 1.4% for the strongest, in every era and all twelve sectors.
How wild is the price? — Very wild. The share price swings about 90% in a typical year, which puts it in the most volatile fifth. Out of every 100 companies that swung like this, about 8.6 went bankrupt within the year. Across the three periods we tested that ran from 3.7% to 11.5%.
What "tested" means here, and why there is no score out of 100
Tested means the read was measured against what actually happened afterwards, on a history that keeps the companies that were later delisted, using only figures that had been filed on the day they are used. Survival was ranked on companies that really did fail. What an owner keeps was tested across the universe from 2011 to 2025.
The full record of everything we have tested is on the research pages.
Which benchmark. Over the period we tested, the median listed company returned +5.8% a year while the S&P 500 returned about +13.9% — the index is weighted by size and was carried by a handful of enormous winners. So "beats the index" and "beats the other companies you could have bought" are different questions. Where a read says it picks better companies, it means the second one. None of these gets you an index fund's return, and we would rather say that than imply otherwise.
The quality read is the strongest thing we have tested: 131,000 company-quarters across 5,300 companies, where the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% against 1.4% for the strongest, holding in every era and all twelve sectors. It still says less likely to break, not likely to beat the market — every band in that study lost to the index at the median, because the median listed company does.
Each read is shown on its own rather than merged into a single score, so you can see which part is strong and which is weak instead of taking an average on trust.
▾ What goes into the smart-money reading
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend). It excludes the Altman Z score, whose retained-earnings input this filer does not report separately. See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
Chance the S&P 500 falls 10% or more in the next three months.
Counted from every day since 2006. Says nothing about VRRM — see the board for how it is measured.
📍 Where to start on this page, and what to look at first
How to read VRRM
We are not publishing an intrinsic value for this one — the section below says exactly why. Everything on this page that comes straight from the filings and the tape is still here; treat the missing valuation as a known gap, not as a verdict on the business.
-
1
Reported earnings & margins ↓
What the company actually reported — unaffected by the valuation being held.
-
2
Balance sheet & book value ↓
Assets, liabilities and equity as filed.
-
3
Who's selling & betting against it ↓
Insider and short-interest behaviour needs no valuation model.
Our models couldn't converge on an intrinsic value for VRRM they trust, given its current filings. We show no number rather than a misleading one.
What to use instead: Use the Reverse-DCF, the peer multiples in the Football Field, and the financial statements below as your signal.
This note is only about the single DCF fair-value number — VRRM's full financial statements, health scores, and written analysis are all below.
Who owns VRRM, and how it moves
From the SEC's own filings: every fund manager over $100M reports its holdings each quarter, and every officer and director reports theirs. Each point is what was public at the time.
315 institutions reported holding it at the latest quarter-end. Above 100% is not a mistake in the filings: when a fund lends shares to a short seller, the fund and whoever buys the borrowed shares can both report them.
Riskier than 52% of the stocks we cover
What this rating means, and what it does not
What this rank is — Middling. Riskier than 52% of the companies we cover. Out of every 100 companies ranked here, about 0.2% went bankrupt within the year, against 0.6% for the average company we cover. The rank comes from a model trained on every US filing since 2012, including 823 companies that really did fail, and scored each year by a version that had not seen that year.
What it is not — Not a trade. We tested shorting these names and buying puts, spreads, straddles and condors on them at real option prices, 2010-2025. Every version lost money: the market already prices the distress and the survivors squeeze. A high rank is a reason to read the filings and to size for a total loss, not a reason to bet against the company. A low rank says the balance sheet is calm, not that the price is sensible.
▾ The numbers, the logic, and why not to trade on it
The logic. A model trained on every US filing since 2012 — including 823 companies that went bankrupt or stopped trading under a dollar — ranks each covered stock by its chance of failing in the next year, from its latest filing, price history and credit conditions. The rank is a position among peers; the table is a count of what happened to stocks in each position, scored each year by a model that had not seen that year.
| Rank band | went bankrupt within 12 months | fell 80% or more (or failed) within 12 months | fell 50% or more (or failed) within 6 months |
|---|---|---|---|
| All covered stocks (average) | 0.59% | 4.21% | 8.51% |
| Other (construction, transport, services) (sector average) | 0.48% | 3.35% | 7.44% |
| riskiest 1% | 16.4% | 33.0% | 45.5% |
| next 2% (97-99) | 5.9% | 24.9% | 38.2% |
| next 2% (95-97) | 3.4% | 21.2% | 33.8% |
| next 5% (90-95) | 1.6% | 15.1% | 27.3% |
| next 15% (75-90) | 0.8% | 8.5% | 17.8% |
| next 25% (50-75) ← this stock | 0.2% | 2.7% | 6.2% |
| safest half | <0.1% | 0.5% | 2.1% |
Why not to trade on it. We tested shorting these names and buying puts, spreads, straddles and condors on them at real option prices, 2010–2025: every version lost money. The market already prices the distress, and the survivors squeeze. Use a high rank to read the filings and to size for a total loss — not to bet against the company. A low rank says the balance sheet is calm, not that the price is sensible.
Scored from the filing of 2026-05-07; table generated 2026-09-18. Within Other (construction, transport, services): rank 52 of 100. Rough one-year odds for this stock alone: bankruptcy 0.1%, an 80% fall 2.1% (the model overstates the middle of the range). On the same data, the Altman Z score caught 26% of bankruptcies in its riskiest 5%; this rank caught 59%.
▾ The logic, and why not to buy on it
The logic. Trained on 2,900 acquisitions since 2012, the model leans on size (small), age, retained earnings, asset growth, volatility and how many deals the sector has just seen. Announcement = the day the stock jumped, not the day the paperwork was filed.
| top 1% | 15.4% acquired within a year |
| next 2% (97-99) | 10.3% acquired within a year |
| next 2% (95-97) | 9.0% acquired within a year |
| next 5% (90-95) | 7.3% acquired within a year |
| next 15% (75-90) ← this stock | 6.4% acquired within a year |
| next 25% (50-75) | 4.8% acquired within a year |
| bottom half | 3.0% acquired within a year |
Why not to buy on it. A takeover paid a median +22% on the day — but even in the top band about 6 in 7 companies are not bought, and those lag. Buying the whole top list returned what the S&P 500 did (2012–2023), and adding "cheap" or "beaten-down" filters did not change that. Read it as context for a thesis you already have, never as the thesis.
⚠ We found only 2 genuine same-industry (Transportation Services) comparables — fewer than the 4 we require for a reliable median. The 8 names in the table below therefore include 6 broader Industrials names marked fallback, whose business models and margins differ — which is why any median below is computed over that wider set, not over true comparables. So we do not derive a peer-implied share value here. Read the multiples as rough context only.
How does VRRM stack up against its closest peers?
Ideally we compare VRRM only to same-industry peers, but too few exist in our universe right now, so the basket below mixes in broader-sector names. Treat the multiples as rough context, not a valuation. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
1.1x / 1.1x / 2.1x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 peers (broad — see caveat); implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SPCE | Virgin Galactic Holdings, Inc | Transportation Services | $622M | 613.0x | — | — | — |
| GMRS | GMR Solutions Inc. | Transportation Services | $243M | — | — | — | — |
| ULH | UNIVERSAL LOGISTICS HOLDINGS, INC. | Trucking ·fallback | $428M | 0.8x | — | — | 17.0% |
| HTZ | HERTZ GLOBAL HOLDINGS, INC | Auto Rental & Leasing ·fallback | $549M | 2.1x | — | — | 261.5% |
| TWIN | TWIN DISC INC | Industrial Machinery ·fallback | $376M | 1.1x | 4.0x | 22.6x | 3.8% |
| VELO | Velo3D, Inc. | Special Industry Machinery ·fallback | $716M | 16.2x | — | — | 0.0% |
| EFTY | ETOILES CAPITAL GROUP CO., LTD | Consulting ·fallback | $287M | 89.2x | — | — | 1.0% |
| TSSI | TSS, Inc. | Consulting ·fallback | $262M | 1.1x | 8.6x | 44.3x | 4.4% |
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
What these health ratings mean, in numbers
Business quality — Excellent. Passes 8 of the 8 health checks we can measure — making a profit, turning it into cash, not piling on debt, not issuing shares. Across 131,000 company-quarters the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% within a year against 1.4% for the strongest, and that held in every era and all twelve sectors. It says "less likely to break", not "likely to beat the market".
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
We can't produce a trustworthy Altman Z here: retained earnings weren't separately reported in our data, so a core input would have to be fabricated. Rather than show a categorical "distress" verdict from an invented number, we mark it unavailable. The classic manufacturing-calibrated model also fits asset-light businesses like this one poorly. Judge financial health from the leverage, cash position, and the measurable Piotroski checks instead.
▾ The checks — what passed, what didn't (and what we couldn't measure)
-
✓ Positive net incomeNet income $136.6M in FY2025.
-
✓ Positive operating cash flowOperating cash flow $255.8M (was $223.6M the prior year).
-
✓ Cash flow backs up reported profitOperating cash flow $255.8M vs net income $136.6M.
-
✓ Return on assets improvingReturn on assets 8.3% vs 1.9% a year ago.
-
✓ Debt load (vs assets)Long-term debt is 62.1% of assets vs 64.1% a year ago ($1,021.2M of $1,645.7M assets).
-
✓ Short-term liquidity (current ratio)Current ratio 2.09x vs 1.97x a year ago.
-
✓ Share count (dilution)Share count declined 3.7% (165.1M → 159.0M year-over-year), so the no-dilution check passed. (One-year change; the multi-year buyback pace can differ.)
-
· Pricing power (gross margin) (n/a — data not reported; not scored)
-
✓ Sales per asset (asset turnover)Asset turnover 0.08x vs 0.07x a year ago.
Missing data is never counted as a pass or a fail — it's shown as n/a and excluded from the denominator. Each check compares the company against its own prior year.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 10.0%, the figure our model used for VRRM. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: no headline intrinsic value is published for this stock (the valuation is held for a data-quality reason — see the notes above). The calculator below is a what-if tool: the values it produces are your assumptions played out, not our estimate.
A full intrinsic value isn't shown for VRRM because the valuation is currently held for a data-quality reason (see the guardrail notes above). The reverse-DCF reading still works — it needs only the price and cash flow — but we won't publish a forward value until the underlying data passes our checks.
—
⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
A standard discounted cash flowDCF — Discounted Cash Flow — sums up all future cash a business will produce, adjusted for the fact that future dollars are worth less than dollars today.
Why it matters: It is the most fundamentally honest valuation method when applicable — but only works for companies with predictable, positive cash flow.
Reference: Best for: mature, profitable businesses. Fails for: pre-profit growth, banks, REITs.
Full explanation → (DCF) valuation is not meaningful for Verra Mobility due to its history of acquisitions contaminating revenue growth figures, making organic growth difficult to ascertain. While the company is profitable and generates positive operating cash flow of $255.8 million, its valuation is likely driven by expectations for future growth in its core business segments, rather than a precise cash flow forecast. Investors are betting on continued expansion in its services, supported by a healthy current ratio of 2.09. The biggest risk to our own assumptions is that the underlying business growth, which is modeled at +7.8%, may not materialize as expected, especially given the historical revenue growth contamination.
As of 13 days ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Quarterly organic revenue growth rates
- Trends in operating cash flow
- Further reductions in total debt
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Revenue grew +15% to $133.0M.
- Net income grew +334% to $136.6M.
- Free cash flow fell to $111.5M.
Management & Leadership
Jonathan Keyser serves as the Interim President and CEO, leading Verra Mobility's strategic direction. Craig C Conti is the Chief Financial Officer, overseeing the company's financial operations. Stacey Moser is the Chief Customer Officer, and Hiten M Patel is the Chief Accounting Officer.
Interim President and CEO — Chief Executive Officer
Chief Financial Officer
What They Make
Verra Mobility provides smart mobility technology solutions, primarily focusing on tolling, violations, and vehicle registration services. Their paying customers are typically government agencies, rental car companies, and fleet operators.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
What we use instead: earnings (P/E, EV/EBIT), book value (P/B) — computed from the figures this company does report, shown in the sections below. Those numbers are unaffected by the missing cash-flow data.
The market is likely pricing Verra Mobility based on its consistent profitability and positive operating cash flow of $255.8 million, alongside expectations for continued growth in its specialized mobility solutions. Despite historical revenue growth being influenced by acquisitions, the market is probably focused on the company's ability to expand its service offerings and client base, rather than a precise discounted cash flowDCF — Discounted Cash Flow — sums up all future cash a business will produce, adjusted for the fact that future dollars are worth less than dollars today.
Why it matters: It is the most fundamentally honest valuation method when applicable — but only works for companies with predictable, positive cash flow.
Reference: Best for: mature, profitable businesses. Fails for: pre-profit growth, banks, REITs.
Full explanation → model.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
The company does not pay dividends or engage in buybacks that are added to per-share growth; it funds its operations and growth initiatives, while also reducing its nominal long-term debt from $1207M to $1.0 billion.
Free Cash Flow DCF
Owner-earnings FCF DCF: positive free cash flow (operating cash flow − capex − stock-based comp) in a sector suited for cash-flow-based valuation.
Show advanced inputs
| Revenue Growth | 12.0% |
| Eps Growth | 35.3% |
| Historical Fcf Growth | -7.8% |
| Sector Default | 6.0% |
| Sector Default Source | Industrials sector default |
| Best Estimate | 7.8% |
| Method | blend(30% revenue_cagr, 70% sector) (buybacks ~3.8%/yr: per-share support, not added to growth) |
| Growth Basis | total |
| Business Growth | 7.8% |
| Buyback Rate | 3.8% |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project its revenue segments independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
The company has shown revenue growing at 35%/yr over four years, from $40M to $133.0 million.
Geography & Markets
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)26.6OversoldHeavily sold off recently — sometimes a bounce setup, sometimes a falling knife.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BearishLine below signalThe fast trend is below the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently downward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (7 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (7)
- Historical revenue growth is contaminated by likely acquisitions (2022: revenue jumped +136%). The reported 35%/yr CAGR treats those deals as organic growth, so we did NOT use it. Forward growth is based on the median of the clean, non-deal years (~12%/yr) instead.
- The company retires ~3.8%/yr of its shares (a multi-year CAGR), but we do NOT add that to the growth rate: buybacks at fair value are value-neutral per current share, and adding them would double-count the same cash the DCF already values. We also do not model future buyback ACCRETION: repurchases below intrinsic value CAN raise value per remaining share, but only if they continue, are funded after debt service, and are made below intrinsic value — excluding that potential benefit keeps the model conservative.
- Illiquidity discount 7% applied (small/micro-cap — harder to exit, demand a margin).
- Unusually high net margin (103% of revenue) — plausible for royalty/streaming-style economics, but verify the revenue concept covers the consolidated business.
- Statement inconsistency: operating cash flow materially exceeds revenue in 3 of the last 3 years — a real income statement cannot do this persistently. Revenue is likely a segment or partial concept, not the consolidated total. Valuation held until the data is repaired.
- VALUATION HELD (STATEMENT_INCONSISTENT): per-share values suppressed due to an internally inconsistent income statement (revenue likely under-scoped).
- Extreme valuation gap (P/IV withheld — see the note above): result may be dominated by model assumptions, share count issues, or sector-specific dynamics. Treat as low confidence.
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From VERRA MOBILITY Corp's SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 133.0M | 136.6M | $0.85 |
| 2024 | 116.0M | 31.4M | $0.19 |
| 2023 | 103.6M | 57.0M | $0.36 |
| 2022 | 94.3M | 92.5M | $0.50 |
| 2021 | 40.0M | 41.4M | $0.25 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 255.8M | 119.1M | 25.2M | 111.5M |
| 2024 | 223.6M | 70.9M | 23.0M | 129.8M |
| 2023 | 206.1M | 57.0M | 17.5M | 131.6M |
| 2022 | 218.3M | 48.2M | 16.7M | 153.5M |
| 2021 | 193.2M | 25.0M | 13.8M | 154.4M |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: 255.8M − 119.1M − 25.2M (stock-based comp) = 111.5M. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 1.6B |
| Total Liabilities | 1.4B |
| Equity | 293.0M |
| Total Debt | 1.0B |
Similar companies worth a look
Same sector and industry, similar fundamentals shape. Verify everything yourself — this list is computed mechanically and does not reflect our judgment about whether any of these are a good investment.
The questions people ask about VRRM
Is VERRA MOBILITY Corp (VRRM) a good stock to buy?
We do not publish a single fair value for VERRA MOBILITY Corp, because one number would not be reliable for this business (the page explains why). Judge it on what today's price assumes, its financial-health checks and what insiders are doing, all shown here from SEC filings. This is educational research from SEC filings, not investment advice.
Is VERRA MOBILITY Corp (VRRM) overvalued?
A single fair-value number is not reliable for VERRA MOBILITY Corp, so we do not call it overvalued or undervalued. The page shows what growth today's price assumes and how the company's finances look instead. This is educational research from SEC filings, not investment advice.
What growth is priced into VRRM?
Working backwards from today's price, the market is counting on roughly -15.4% a year growth in VRRM's cash flow over the next decade. Compare that with the company's actual record on this page.
Where do these numbers come from?
From VERRA MOBILITY Corp's own SEC filings (10-K and 10-Q), Form 4 insider filings and daily market prices. Every figure on the page links to how it was calculated, and the model's weak spots are listed next to its results.