Pangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd. (PANL) Stock Analysis
Pangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd.
▾ What's in the 42/100 risk score? (higher = riskier)
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend). See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
How to read PANL
We are not publishing an intrinsic value for this one — the section below says exactly why. Everything on this page that comes straight from the filings and the tape is still here; treat the missing valuation as a known gap, not as a verdict on the business.
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Reported earnings & margins ↓
What the company actually reported — unaffected by the valuation being held.
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Balance sheet & book value ↓
Assets, liabilities and equity as filed.
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Who's selling & betting against it ↓
Insider and short-interest behaviour needs no valuation model.
The share count we read for PANL looks wrong — common for multi-class / founder-controlled filers that report shares per share-class. That makes per-share figures (including intrinsic value) misleading, so we suppressed them. The company's total financials below are sound.
What to use instead: Lean on the totals — revenue, net income, cash flow — and the balance sheet. Multi-class share counts are being corrected; once fixed, the per-share valuation returns automatically.
This note is only about the single DCF fair-value number — PANL's full financial statements, health scores, and written analysis are all below.
Riskier than 59% of the stocks we cover
A model trained on every US filing since 2012 — including the 823 companies that went bankrupt or stopped trading under a dollar — ranks each covered stock by its chance of failing in the next year. This is a position among peers, not a prediction about this company alone. Below is what happened to stocks that sat in the same position in past years.
▾ Every band, and what happened to the stocks in it
| Rank band | went bankrupt within 12 months | fell 80% or more (or failed) within 12 months | fell 50% or more (or failed) within 6 months |
|---|---|---|---|
| All covered stocks (average) | 0.59% | 4.21% | 8.51% |
| Other (construction, transport, services) (sector average) | 0.48% | 3.35% | 7.44% |
| riskiest 1% | 16.4% of 1,749 | 33.0% of 1,998 | 45.5% of 2,239 |
| next 2% (97-99) | 5.9% of 3,360 | 24.9% of 3,985 | 38.2% of 4,461 |
| next 2% (95-97) | 3.4% of 3,409 | 21.2% of 3,984 | 33.8% of 4,462 |
| next 5% (90-95) | 1.6% of 8,443 | 15.1% of 9,965 | 27.3% of 11,155 |
| next 15% (75-90) | 0.8% of 25,328 | 8.5% of 29,884 | 17.8% of 33,459 |
| next 25% (50-75) ← this stock | 0.2% of 36,310 | 2.7% of 49,810 | 6.2% of 55,771 |
| safest half | <0.1% of 92,256 | 0.5% of 99,617 | 2.1% of 111,538 |
Counts are stock-quarters 2012–2025, scored each year by a model that had not seen that year. The rank is recomputed from each company's latest filing (this one: 2026-05-12); table generated 2026-09-17. Calibrated one-year odds for this stock alone: bankruptcy 0.1%, 80%+ fall 0.7%, 50%+ fall in six months 3.0% — treat these as rougher than the band counts; the model overstates the middle of the range. For comparison, the classic Altman Z-score here is 1.91; on the same data the Altman ranking caught 26% of bankruptcies in its riskiest 5%, this one 59%.
What this is not. It is not a trade. We tested shorting these names and buying puts on them at real option prices (2010–2025): every version lost money, because the market already prices the distress and the survivors squeeze. A high rank is a reason to read the filings and to size a position for the chance of a total loss — not a reason to bet against the company. A low rank says the balance sheet and the market are calm; it says nothing about whether the price is sensible.
⚠ We found no genuine same-industry (Deep Sea Foreign Transportation of Freight) comparables at all — fewer than the 4 we require for a reliable median. The 8 names in the table below therefore include 8 broader Industrials names marked fallback, whose business models and margins differ — which is why any median below is computed over that wider set, not over true comparables. So we do not derive a peer-implied share value here. Read the multiples as rough context only.
How does PANL stack up against its closest peers?
Ideally we compare PANL only to same-industry peers, but too few exist in our universe right now, so the basket below mixes in broader-sector names. Treat the multiples as rough context, not a valuation. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
0.8x / 1.3x / 1.9x |
| EV / EBITEV / EBITDA — Enterprise value divided by earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. Why it matters: A classic "what would a private buyer pay" multiple — used in M&A. Strips out tax and capital-structure noise. Reference: 8–12x for mature businesses · 15–25x for growth · Below 5x often signals distress Full explanation → |
7.2x / 12.0x / 27.5x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 peers (broad — see caveat); implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TSSI | TSS, Inc. | Consulting ·fallback | $463M | 1.9x | 14.7x | 75.4x | 14.7% |
| VRRM | VERRA MOBILITY Corp | Transportation Services ·fallback | $685M | 1.7x | — | 7.2x | 15.3% |
| ULH | UNIVERSAL LOGISTICS HOLDINGS, INC. | Trucking ·fallback | $420M | 0.8x | — | — | 14.2% |
| VELO | Velo3D, Inc. | Special Industry Machinery ·fallback | $716M | 16.2x | — | — | 0.0% |
| UP | Wheels Up Experience Inc. | Air Courier ·fallback | $320M | 1.3x | — | — | — |
| EFTY | ETOILES CAPITAL GROUP CO., LTD | Consulting ·fallback | $287M | 89.2x | — | — | 1.0% |
| TWIN | TWIN DISC INC | Industrial Machinery ·fallback | $241M | 0.8x | 2.9x | 27.5x | 3.8% |
| VTOL | Bristow Group Inc. | Air Courier ·fallback | $1.2B | 1.3x | — | 12.0x | 3.2% |
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
The Z-score needs working capital, retained earnings, EBIT, sales and total assets from the latest balance sheet, and at least one of those isn't reported in machine-readable form here — common for foreign private issuers. We leave it blank rather than compute a distress verdict from an estimated input. It doesn't affect the reported figures in the financial tables below.
▾ The checks — what passed, what didn't (and what we couldn't measure)
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✓ Positive net incomeNet income $19.4M in FY2025.
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✓ Positive operating cash flowOperating cash flow $53.7M (was $65.7M the prior year).
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✓ Cash flow backs up reported profitOperating cash flow $53.7M vs net income $19.4M.
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✗ Return on assets improvingReturn on assets 2.1% vs 3.1% a year ago.Why this matters: Is the company squeezing more profit out of each dollar of assets than last year? Rising = getting more efficient; falling = the opposite.
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✓ Debt load (vs assets)Long-term debt is 12.3% of assets vs 13.8% a year ago ($114.1M of $928.1M assets).
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✗ Short-term liquidity (current ratio)Current ratio 1.69x vs 1.76x a year ago.Why this matters: The current ratio compares assets it can turn to cash within a year against bills due within a year. Below 1.0 means it may struggle to cover near-term obligations.
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✗ Share count (dilution)Share count rose 40.5% (46.0M → 64.7M year-over-year).Why this matters: Issuing lots of new shares splits the pie into more pieces, shrinking your slice. Stable or falling share count protects existing owners.
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· Pricing power (gross margin) (n/a — data not reported; not scored)
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✓ Sales per asset (asset turnover)Asset turnover 0.68x vs 0.57x a year ago.
Missing data is never counted as a pass or a fail — it's shown as n/a and excluded from the denominator. Each check compares the company against its own prior year.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 10.0%, the figure our model used for PANL. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: no headline intrinsic value is published for this stock (the valuation is held for a data-quality reason — see the notes above). The calculator below is a what-if tool: the values it produces are your assumptions played out, not our estimate.
A full intrinsic value isn't shown for PANL because the valuation is currently held for a data-quality reason (see the guardrail notes above). The reverse-DCF reading still works — it needs only the price and cash flow — but we won't publish a forward value until the underlying data passes our checks.
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⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
A standard discounted cash flowDCF — Discounted Cash Flow — sums up all future cash a business will produce, adjusted for the fact that future dollars are worth less than dollars today.
Why it matters: It is the most fundamentally honest valuation method when applicable — but only works for companies with predictable, positive cash flow.
Reference: Best for: mature, profitable businesses. Fails for: pre-profit growth, banks, REITs.
Full explanation → (DCF) valuation is not meaningful for Pangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd. because the model indicates declining revenue over the past four years, despite positive net income and operating cash flow. Investors are likely betting on a turnaround in revenue growth or margin expansion beyond what trailing cash flows currently support. The market may be assigning value to the company's strategic positioning in niche dry bulk shipping routes, which is not fully captured by a backward-looking cash flow model. The #1 quantifiable risk is the continued decline in revenue, which could erode profitability.
As of 3 months ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Quarterly revenue growth turning positive
- Reduction in long-term debt
- Announcement of new long-term shipping contracts
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Revenue grew +18% to $632.0M.
- Free cash flow fell to $49.6M.
- Net income fell -33% to $19.4M.
Management & Leadership
Edward Coll has served as the CEO of Pangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd. since its inception, also holding the position of Chairman. He founded the company, bringing extensive experience in the dry bulk shipping industry. The executive team focuses on operational efficiency and strategic fleet management.
What They Make
Pangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd. provides comprehensive dry bulk shipping and logistics services, including cargo loading, discharge, and stevedoring. Its customers are primarily industrial clients requiring specialized transportation for bulk commodities.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
What we use instead: earnings (P/E, EV/EBIT), book value (P/B) — computed from the figures this company does report, shown in the sections below. Those numbers are unaffected by the missing cash-flow data.
The market is likely pricing PANL based on expectations for future revenue stabilization and potential margin expansion, given its consistent profitability and positive operating cash flow over the last five years. The model's implied price is 9.6x its intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation →, suggesting the market may be assigning value to its ability to navigate niche shipping markets and secure long-term contracts, which is not fully reflected in the historical revenue decline.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
Growth / Revenue DCF
Extreme market premium (P/FCF 120x): market is pricing future growth far beyond current FCF. Using revenue/margin model.
Show advanced inputs
| Revenue Growth | 2.0% |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project its revenue segments independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Revenue has been declining at -3.1%/yr over the past four years, from $718M to $632M, despite consistent profitability.
Geography & Markets
Pangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd. operates globally, serving a diverse international client base in the deep sea foreign transportation of freight. Exact geographic revenue mix is not available from current data sources.
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)44.1NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BearishLine below signalThe fast trend is below the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently downward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (6 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (5)
- Revenue/margin projection model used - trailing FCF may understate growth runway at current scale.
- Terminal growth (3%) capped to 1.6% (80% of near-term growth 2%).
- Price is far above the model output - market may be pricing optionality, narrative catalysts, or margin expansion beyond what trailing cash flows support.
- Extreme valuation (P/IV withheld — see the note above); output dominated by data/units issue (often a multi-class share-count mismatch). Suppressed.
- DATA UNAVAILABLE: per-share values suppressed due to missing/unreliable shares data.
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From Pangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd.'s SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 632.0M | 19.4M | $0.30 |
| 2024 | 536.5M | 28.9M | $0.63 |
| 2023 | 499.3M | 26.3M | $0.58 |
| 2022 | 699.7M | 79.5M | $1.76 |
| 2021 | 718.1M | 67.2M | $1.50 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
Capital expenditure isn't tagged in this filer's machine-readable data (the CapEx column shows "—"). The free-cash-flow column is therefore operating cash flow less stock-based compensation only — an upper bound on true owner earnings, not the real figure. Companies that report capex under a custom label (some large IFRS filers do) look better here than they are.
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC & adj. | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 53.7M | — | 4.1M | 49.6M |
| 2024 | 65.7M | — | 2.8M | 62.9M |
| 2023 | 53.8M | — | 2.1M | 51.7M |
| 2022 | 134.8M | — | 1.8M | 133.0M |
| 2021 | 61.7M | — | 2.1M | 59.6M |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: 53.7M − — − 4.1M (SBC & adj.) = 49.6M. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF's starting value is a projected from revenue × terminal margin, not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 928.1M |
| Total Liabilities | 498.8M (derived) |
| Equity | 429.3M |
| Total Debt | 114.1M |
