RADIAN GROUP INC (RDN) Stock Analysis
RADIAN GROUP INC
Everything we have tested points the right way. That is a reason to look closer, and it is not a reason to buy: these are historical frequencies about groups of companies, not a statement about this one.
What "tested" means here, and why there is no score out of 100
Tested means the read was measured against what actually happened afterwards, on a history that keeps the companies that were later delisted, using only figures that had been filed on the day they are used. Survival was ranked on companies that really did fail. What an owner keeps was tested across the universe from 2011 to 2025. A valuation finding appears only when the cheap fifth of that business type beat the index — 156 of the 206 combinations we tried did not.
Not tested means we compute it and find it useful, but we have never measured whether it predicts anything. Our own model valuation is in that category, and it will stay there until we rebuild what our model said on each past date — today's valuation cannot be checked against the past.
Measures that were tested and did not hold are taken out of this block entirely and written up in the retirement register — what they were, how they were tested, and how they failed. The price trend is one of them: across 193,000 company-quarters the gap was 3.8 points, it reversed in 2017–2021, and the strong group still lost to the index.
Which benchmark. Over the period we tested, the median listed company returned +5.8% a year while the S&P 500 returned about +13.9% — the index is weighted by size and was carried by a handful of enormous winners. So "beats the index" and "beats the other companies you could have bought" are different questions. Where a read says it picks better companies, it means the second one. None of these gets you an index fund's return, and we would rather say that than imply otherwise.
The quality read is the strongest thing we have tested: 131,000 company-quarters across 5,300 companies, where the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% against 1.4% for the strongest, holding in every era and all twelve sectors. It still says less likely to break, not likely to beat the market — every band in that study lost to the index at the median, because the median listed company does.
There is no single score because we have not tested one. Combining these reads into one number implies somebody checked that the combination works, and nobody has. When that test exists, a number can appear here.
▾ The old 22/100 risk score, and why we stopped showing it
We tested this score across 213,282 company-quarters and it did not work. The fifth it called safest returned 1.5 points worse than the fifth it called riskiest, and the "riskiest" fifth went bankrupt slightly less often. It is shown here only so the number you may have seen before is explained rather than silently removed. The full entry →
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend, DCF applicability). It excludes the Altman Z score, whose retained-earnings input this filer does not report separately. See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
Chance the S&P 500 falls 10% or more in the next three months.
Counted from every day since 2006. Says nothing about RDN — see the board for how it is measured.
📍 Where to start on this page, and what to look at first
How to read RDN (bank / insurer)
Banks and insurers are valued on what they earn on their capital, not on free cash flow — a normal DCF misleads here.
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1
Bank / Insurance lens (P/TBV + ROE) ↓
Price-to-tangible-book versus return-on-equity is how analysts actually judge a bank cheap or rich.
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2
Financial-health screens ↓
Watch the trend in profitability and asset quality, not the (not-applicable) bankruptcy score.
Is now a good time to buy RDN?
Macro: Neutral / mid-cycleRDN trades at $34.32 vs an estimated intrinsic value of $55.51 — a 38.2% discount to model IV.
Not investment advice. The model can be wrong. Verify the assumptions in the sections below and consider consulting a licensed advisor for significant decisions.
What return would RDN pay as a bond?
Not measurable here. Banks and insurers have no owner-earnings coupon in the operating sense — their deposits and float are the business. The bank lens (book value + return on equity) is the comparable read. See the cross-company ranking →
Safer than 97% of the stocks we cover
▾ The numbers, the logic, and why not to trade on it
The logic. A model trained on every US filing since 2012 — including 823 companies that went bankrupt or stopped trading under a dollar — ranks each covered stock by its chance of failing in the next year, from its latest filing, price history and credit conditions. The rank is a position among peers; the table is a count of what happened to stocks in each position, scored each year by a model that had not seen that year.
| Rank band | went bankrupt within 12 months | fell 80% or more (or failed) within 12 months | fell 50% or more (or failed) within 6 months |
|---|---|---|---|
| All covered stocks (average) | 0.59% | 4.21% | 8.51% |
| Finance (sector average) | 0.13% | 1.25% | 3.09% |
| riskiest 1% | 16.4% | 33.0% | 45.5% |
| next 2% (97-99) | 5.9% | 24.9% | 38.2% |
| next 2% (95-97) | 3.4% | 21.2% | 33.8% |
| next 5% (90-95) | 1.6% | 15.1% | 27.3% |
| next 15% (75-90) | 0.8% | 8.5% | 17.8% |
| next 25% (50-75) | 0.2% | 2.7% | 6.2% |
| safest half ← this stock | <0.1% | 0.5% | 2.1% |
Why not to trade on it. We tested shorting these names and buying puts, spreads, straddles and condors on them at real option prices, 2010–2025: every version lost money. The market already prices the distress, and the survivors squeeze. Use a high rank to read the filings and to size for a total loss — not to bet against the company. A low rank says the balance sheet is calm, not that the price is sensible.
Scored from the filing of 2026-05-11; table generated 2026-09-18. Within Finance: rank 5 of 100. Rough one-year odds for this stock alone: bankruptcy <0.1%, an 80% fall 0.3% (the model overstates the middle of the range).
▾ The logic, and why not to buy on it
The logic. Trained on 2,900 acquisitions since 2012, the model leans on size (small), age, retained earnings, asset growth, volatility and how many deals the sector has just seen. Announcement = the day the stock jumped, not the day the paperwork was filed.
| top 1% | 15.4% acquired within a year |
| next 2% (97-99) | 10.3% acquired within a year |
| next 2% (95-97) | 9.0% acquired within a year |
| next 5% (90-95) | 7.3% acquired within a year |
| next 15% (75-90) | 6.4% acquired within a year |
| next 25% (50-75) | 4.8% acquired within a year |
| bottom half ← this stock | 3.0% acquired within a year |
Why not to buy on it. A takeover paid a median +22% on the day — but even in the top band about 6 in 7 companies are not bought, and those lag. Buying the whole top list returned what the S&P 500 did (2012–2023), and adding "cheap" or "beaten-down" filters did not change that. Read it as context for a thesis you already have, never as the thesis.
Football field: where does the price sit?
Different valuation methods produce different fair-value ranges depending on assumptions. Plotting them together lets you see at a glance whether the current price is reasonable across approaches, or only one specific lens.
Industry multiples sourced from: industry similar to Insurance. See the Peer Basket section below for the peer comparison and its limited-comparables caveat.
How does RDN stack up against its closest peers?
We take the 5 same-industry companies most similar to RDN (similar size) and check what investors are paying for each dollar of their revenue (or profits). If RDN is much more expensive on the same yardstick, that's a red flag — unless you have a specific reason it deserves a premium. For a leveraged business, FCF yield (in the table) is usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
1.0x / 4.0x / 4.4x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 5 same-industry peers; implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MTG | MGIC INVESTMENT CORP | Specialty Insurance | $5.3B | — | 12.5% |
| ESNT | Essent Group Ltd. | Specialty Insurance | $5.3B | — | 11.9% |
| AGO | ASSURED GUARANTY LTD | Specialty Insurance | $3.3B | — | 13.9% |
| NMIH | NMI Holdings, Inc. | Specialty Insurance | $2.7B | — | 13.7% |
| ORI | OLD REPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL CORP | Specialty Insurance | $9.0B | — | 10.0% |
| WTM | WHITE MOUNTAINS INSURANCE GROUP LT | Property & Casualty Insura ·fallback | $5.1B | — | 21.1% |
| YCL | ProShares Trust II | Investment Banking ·fallback | $5.4B | — | 31.8% |
| WDH | Waterdrop Inc. | Insurance Brokers ·fallback | $5.5B | 104.1x | 1.3% |
How to value an insurer (not a bank, not a DCF)
An insurer collects premiums today and pays claims later. The money held in between — the float — is invested, so the balance sheet is full of investments that belong, eventually, to policyholders. That makes free-cash-flow DCF meaningless and enterprise value actively misleading. What matters is the book value of shareholder equity, the return earned on it, and whether book value per share compounds year after year. For property & casualty underwriters, the combined ratio says whether the insurance itself made money before any investment income.
Why it matters: For banks and insurers, book value is the regulatory capital they earn returns on. P/B is the cleanest comparison: 1.0× means buying the bank at the same price the accountants say it's worth.
Reference: 0.8–1.2× = fair for average bank · 1.5–2.0× = solid franchise · >2.5× = premium · <0.8× = potentially cheap or distress
Full explanation →
Why it matters: For a bank, ROE is the engine. A bank earning 15% on equity will compound book value at ~15%/year if it retains earnings. Combined with P/B, ROE tells you whether a premium price is supported by returns.
Reference: <8% = weak · 10–12% = solid · 15%+ = excellent · >20% sustained = exceptional franchise
Full explanation →
Why it matters: High P/E = market expects fast growth or you are overpaying. Low P/E = market expects slow growth or the stock is cheap (sometimes for good reason).
Reference: 12–20 for mature businesses · 25–50 for growth · 80+ for speculative
Full explanation →
This lens skips Altman Z and Piotroski (both validated on industrial companies) and skips enterprise value entirely — an insurer's investments back policy liabilities and are not surplus cash. The things to check in the 10-K are reserve development (did past years' claims cost more than reserved?), the investment portfolio's credit quality, and catastrophe exposure.
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
Altman Z was calibrated on industrial firms and doesn't apply to insurers — the balance sheet is dominated by investments held against policy liabilities, not working capital. See the Insurance Valuation Lens above for price-to-book, return on equity, book-value growth and the combined ratio — the measures analysts in that industry actually use.
Why it matters: High score = fundamentals improving. Low score = deteriorating. Especially powerful for filtering cheap stocks: cheap + high F-score historically outperforms; cheap + low F-score is often a value trap.
Reference: 7–9 = strong · 4–6 = mediocre · 0–3 = weak
Full explanation →
Piotroski F was built for non-financial firms (gross margin, asset turnover and current ratio all assume an industrial cost structure). For insurers the equivalent quality signals are the combined ratio, reserve development and investment-portfolio credit quality — see the Insurance Valuation Lens above.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 9.0%, the figure our model used for RDN. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: the calculator opens at our published value of $55.51 — it is initialised to the same scenario-weighted result, so the two match exactly on load. The moment you move a slider, the value below becomes a single-path what-if at your assumptions (not the three-scenario weighting), which is why it can differ from the headline once you've touched it.
7.5% — beta-based (CAPM), from this stock's BetaBeta — How much the stock moves when the overall market moves. 1.0 = moves with the market; 1.5 = moves 50% more than the market.
Why it matters: Higher beta = more volatile = should demand higher discount rate. Low beta stocks (utilities, consumer staples) move less.
Reference: Most stocks 0.5–1.5 · Defensives ~0.3 · High-vol tech ~1.5–2.0
Full explanation → of 0.55. The safe Treasury rate plus a premium scaled by how much more (or less) volatile the stock is than the market.
10.0% — sector/quality tier. A simpler hurdle set by industry and business durability: lower for stable, wide-moat companies; higher for speculative or micro-caps.
The headline value and this calculator start at 9.0% — the mid-point of the two. Drag the slider to the other rate to see the full range.
A full intrinsic value isn't shown for RDN because it's valued with a bank residual-income model this quick calculator doesn't replicate — see our published value above and the sector lens for the right metrics.
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⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
Radian Group Inc. appears deeply undervalued by the model, trading at a 38.2% discount to its intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation → of $55.51. The market likely discounts RDN due to its declining revenue, which has fallen by 2.6% annually over the past four years. The primary quantifiable risk is the continued revenue decline.
As of 3 months ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Quarterly revenue growth rates
- Trends in new mortgage insurance written
- Changes in housing market conditions
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Free cash flow turned positive at $71.0M.
- Net income fell -4% to $582.6M.
Roughly flat: Revenue was flat -1% to $1.20B.
Management & Leadership
Radian Group Inc. is led by CEO Michael J. McMahon, who has been with the company for several years. He oversees the company's mortgage insurance and services operations.
What They Make
Radian Group Inc. provides mortgage insurance and a range of mortgage and real estate services to lenders, investors, and servicers. Their primary customers are financial institutions involved in residential mortgage lending.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
The market prices RDN at a 38.2% discount to the model's intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation →, likely reflecting concerns over its declining revenue, which has decreased by 2.6% per year over the last four years. Despite positive net income and operating cash flow, the market appears to be weighing the backward-looking revenue trend heavily, suggesting a cautious outlook on future growth.
Three Scenarios, Weighted
| Scenario | IV | Upside from today's price | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | $45.38 | 32.2% | 40% |
| Base | $57.63 | 67.9% | 35% |
| Optimistic | $68.76 | 100.3% | 25% |
| Weighted | $55.51 | 61.7% | 100% |
Reading the last column: it is the move from today's price to each value (IV ÷ price − 1). The headline "premium/discount to model IV" measures the same gap from the value's side (price ÷ IV − 1), so the two percentages differ in size and sign by construction — e.g. a price 8% above value is a value 7.4% below price.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
Radian Group Inc. funds itself through its positive operating cash flow and has a history of returning capital to shareholders through dividends and share repurchases.
Residual Income High
Balance-sheet financial (Specialty Insurance): residual income model - book value is meaningful anchor.
Show advanced inputs
| Sector Default | 8.0% |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project premium growth, underwriting (combined ratio) and investment income independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Revenue has been declining at an average of -2.6% per year over the last four years, though net income has been positive for 5 out of 5 years.
Geography & Markets
Radian Group Inc. primarily operates within the United States, providing mortgage insurance and related services across various regions. Exact geographic segment percentages are not available from current data sources.
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)36.0NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BearishLine below signalThe fast trend is below the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently downward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (3 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (3)
- Financial sector: using residual income model. IV = Book Value + PV(excess earnings).
- Discount rate floored from 7.5% to 9.0% (financial sector minimum).
- Growth clamped from 8% to 7% (must be < discount rate 9%).
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From RADIAN GROUP INC's SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 1.2B | 582.6M | $4.14 |
| 2024 | 1.2B | 604.4M | $3.92 |
| 2023 | 1.2B | 603.1M | $3.77 |
| 2022 | 1.2B | 742.9M | $4.35 |
| 2021 | 1.3B | 600.7M | $3.16 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC & adj. | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 119.9M | 4.2M | 44.7M | 71.0M |
| 2024 | -663.6M | 1.6M | 38.5M | -703.6M |
| 2023 | 529.4M | 8.5M | 41.1M | 479.8M |
| 2022 | 388.3M | 17.7M | 38.1M | 332.6M |
| 2021 | 557.1M | 12.6M | 28.4M | 516.1M |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: 119.9M − 4.2M − 44.7M (SBC & adj.) = 71.0M. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF's starting value is a EPS basis (residual-income model), not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 8.1B |
| Total Liabilities | 3.3B |
| Equity | 4.8B |