CONSTELLIUM SE (CSTM) Stock Analysis
CONSTELLIUM SE
▾ What's in the 47/100 risk score? (higher = riskier)
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend, DCF applicability). It excludes the the Altman Z score, whose retained-earnings input this filer does not report separately, which relies on a proxied (estimated) input. See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
How to read CSTM (cyclical commodity producer)
A miner or energy producer earns whatever the commodity price is, so a single DCF swings with the cycle. Judge it against peers and where you think the commodity cycle is heading.
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EV/Sales peer comparison ↓
How the price compares to similar producers is more meaningful than a through-cycle DCF.
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Interactive calculator (test cycle assumptions) ↓
Flex the growth/discount inputs to see how sensitive the value is to where we are in the cycle.
Miners, metals and energy producers earn whatever the commodity price is at the time. A discounted-cash-flow model leans on recent cash flow, so it swings with the cycle: right now CSTM trades well above our through-cycle DCF — typical when commodity prices (and therefore profits) are near a cycle high. That isn't necessarily "overvalued"; the market is paying for current pricing power, reserves and asset value the cash-flow model doesn't capture.
For this business type, lean on the EV/Sales peer comparison and Reverse-DCF below (how today's price compares to similar producers and what growth it implies), and weigh the commodity-price outlook. Treat the DCF number as a rough mid-cycle reference, not a buy/sell trigger.
Is now a good time to buy CSTM?
Macro: Neutral / mid-cycleCSTM trades at $29.60 vs an estimated intrinsic value of $10.34 — a +186.3% above our mid-cycle reference value. Low confidence: commodity prices and normalized margins dominate this result. CSTM is a cyclical commodity producer (Secondary Smelting & Refining of Nonferrous Metals), so a single growth-DCF is the wrong tool — its profits rise and fall with the commodity price. We value it off normalized, mid-cycle cash flow, which is why the modeled growth reads near 0%: we deliberately don't extrapolate growth from a possibly-elevated base. A premium here usually just means today's price sits above mid-cycle worth — common when the commodity is near a cycle high (near a trough the same model would read "cheap"). On its own that's not a sell signal — judge it against its peers and where you think the cycle is heading.
Not investment advice. The model can be wrong. Verify the assumptions in the sections below and consider consulting a licensed advisor for significant decisions.
What cash-flow improvement must the market believe? Reverse DCF — Instead of asking "what is this stock worth?", asks "what growth rate is the current market price already assuming?"
Why it matters: It crystallizes the bull thesis as a single number you can argue with. If the market expects 40% growth for 10 years and you do not believe that, the stock is overvalued.
Reference: 10–15% = sustainable for strong companies · 20–25% = exceptional · 30%+ = historically very rare
Reverse DCF treats today's price as correct and solves for the cash-flow path that justifies it. For a cyclical, read the result as the annual improvement in through-cycle free cash flow the price requires — which could come from higher realized commodity prices, margin recovery, lower input costs, more volume, or reduced capex, not just organic growth. The starting base is our normalized mid-cycle median, not last year's number.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation → must improve by:
▾ Exactly how this 10-year figure is computed
Forecast length: 10 years, single flat growth rate (no fade)
Terminal growth after year 10: 2.4%
Discount rate: 13.7% (the rate the model used)
Price used: $29.60 — the live price shown on this page (not frozen)
Method: solve for the constant annual growth rate that makes the discounted 10-year FCF stream + terminal value equal today's price.
Few companies sustain 18-25% CAGR for a decade. A handful of historical compounders did — typically while still relatively small. Achieving this at mega-cap scale (\$500B+) is dramatically harder because the base is already enormous.
For reference: Exceptional is not a compliment here — sustaining mid-teens cash-flow growth for ten straight years is rare at scale. The price is betting on a top-tier outcome.
▾ How we computed this · Reality check thresholds · Assumptions
- Starting FCF/share: $1.12 (normalized multi-year median)
- Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation →: 13.7% — standard 8-12%; 9-10% matches S&P 500 historical return - Terminal Growth RateTerminal Growth Rate — The growth rate we assume the company holds forever, after the explicit 10-year forecast period ends.
Why it matters: It anchors the long-tail value. Cannot mathematically exceed long-term GDP growth or the company eventually becomes larger than the global economy.
Reference: 2–3% (matches long-term US GDP growth) · Above 4% is mathematically problematic
Full explanation →: 2.4% — matches long-term GDP growth - Forecast horizon: 10 years explicit + terminal perpetuity
| ≤ 0% | Priced for decline — likely undervalued OR dying business |
| 5-12% | Reasonable; sustainable for quality businesses |
| 12-18% | Demanding — strong execution required |
| 18-25% | Exceptional — few companies sustain for a decade |
| 25-35% | Heroic — historically very rare |
| 35%+ | Borderline impossible at scale |
Sustaining 30%+ cash-flow growth for a full decade at scale is exceedingly rare — the bar is brutally high.
Use the interactive calculator below to change the discount rate, growth and terminal-growth assumptions and watch the value move.
Football field: where does the price sit?
Different valuation methods produce different fair-value ranges depending on assumptions. Plotting them together lets you see at a glance whether the current price is reasonable across approaches, or only one specific lens.
Industry multiples sourced from: broad market average (sector unknown). See the Peer Basket section below for the peer comparison and its limited-comparables caveat.
⚠ We found no genuine same-industry (Secondary Smelting & Refining of Nonferrous Metals) comparables at all — fewer than the 4 we require for a reliable median. The 8 names in the table below therefore include 8 broader Basic Materials names marked fallback, whose business models and margins differ — which is why any median below is computed over that wider set, not over true comparables. So we do not derive a peer-implied share value here. Read the multiples as rough context only.
How does CSTM stack up against its closest peers?
Ideally we compare CSTM only to same-industry peers, but too few exist in our universe right now, so the basket below mixes in broader-sector names. Treat the multiples as rough context, not a valuation. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
1.6x / 1.8x / 3.0x |
| EV / Gross ProfitEV / Gross Profit — Enterprise value divided by gross profit — the multiple paid for what each dollar of sales contributes after direct costs. Why it matters: More refined than EV/Sales for high-margin businesses (software, marketplaces) where gross margin is the real economic engine. Reference: 8–15x for SaaS · 15–25x for hypergrowth software · >30x demanding Full explanation → |
3.4x / 6.1x / 17.9x |
| EV / EBITEV / EBITDA — Enterprise value divided by earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. Why it matters: A classic "what would a private buyer pay" multiple — used in M&A. Strips out tax and capital-structure noise. Reference: 8–12x for mature businesses · 15–25x for growth · Below 5x often signals distress Full explanation → |
5.3x / 18.1x / 23.4x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 peers (broad — see caveat); implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UUUU | ENERGY FUELS INC | Mining & Quarrying of Nonm ·fallback | $4.6B | 79.3x | — | — | 0.1% |
| SKE | Skeena Resources Ltd | Gold & Silver Mining ·fallback | $3.7B | — | — | — | — |
| SON | SONOCO PRODUCTS CO | Paperboard Containers ·fallback | $4.8B | 0.7x | 3.4x | 5.3x | 7.1% |
| SXT | SENSIENT TECHNOLOGIES CORP | Industrial Organic Chemica ·fallback | $4.8B | 3.0x | — | 23.4x | 1.4% |
| SMG | SCOTTS MIRACLE-GRO CO | Agricultural Chemicals ·fallback | $3.4B | 1.6x | 5.3x | 15.4x | 7.9% |
| USLM | UNITED STATES LIME & MINERALS INC | Mining & Quarrying of Nonm ·fallback | $3.3B | 8.8x | 17.9x | 20.7x | 1.9% |
| SA | SEABRIDGE GOLD INC | Gold & Silver Mining ·fallback | $3.1B | — | — | — | — |
| TTAM | Titan America SA | Mining & Quarrying of Nonm ·fallback | $3.0B | 1.8x | 6.8x | — | 6.0% |
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
We can't produce a trustworthy Altman Z here: retained earnings weren't separately reported in our data, so a core input would have to be fabricated. Rather than show a categorical "distress" verdict from an invented number, we mark it unavailable. Judge financial health from the leverage, cash position, and the measurable Piotroski checks instead.
▾ The checks — what passed, what didn't (and what we couldn't measure)
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✓ Positive net incomeNet income $273.0M in the latest year.
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✓ Positive operating cash flowOperating cash flow $489.0M (was $301.0M the prior year).
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✓ Cash flow backs up reported profitOperating cash flow $489.0M vs net income $273.0M.
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✓ Return on assets improvingReturn on assets 5.1% vs 1.2% a year ago.
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✓ Debt load (vs assets)Long-term debt is 0.0% of assets vs 0.0% a year ago ($0.0M now).
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✓ Short-term liquidity (current ratio)Current ratio 1.29x vs 1.27x a year ago.
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✓ Share count (dilution)Share count declined 4.1% (148.0M → 141.9M year-over-year), so the no-dilution check passed. (This 1-year change differs from the ~4%/yr multi-year buyback CAGR the DCF cites.)
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· Pricing power (gross margin) (n/a — data not reported; not scored)
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✓ Sales per asset (asset turnover)Asset turnover 1.58x vs 1.55x a year ago.
Missing data is never counted as a pass or a fail — it's shown as n/a and excluded from the denominator. Each check compares the company against its own prior year.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 13.7%, the figure our model used for CSTM. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: at default inputs this calculator mirrors the headline model's three-scenario weighting (conservative/base/optimistic, 40/35/25), so its opening value should land close to the headline intrinsic value of $10.34. A small gap is rounding; a large one would be a data problem — and we check for it below.
13.7% — beta-based (CAPM), from this stock's BetaBeta — How much the stock moves when the overall market moves. 1.0 = moves with the market; 1.5 = moves 50% more than the market.
Why it matters: Higher beta = more volatile = should demand higher discount rate. Low beta stocks (utilities, consumer staples) move less.
Reference: Most stocks 0.5–1.5 · Defensives ~0.3 · High-vol tech ~1.5–2.0
Full explanation → of 1.67. The safe Treasury rate plus a premium scaled by how much more (or less) volatile the stock is than the market.
10.0% — sector/quality tier. A simpler hurdle set by industry and business durability: lower for stable, wide-moat companies; higher for speculative or micro-caps.
The headline value and this calculator start at 13.7% — the beta-based rate. Drag the slider to the other rate to see the full range.
+186.3%
At the default assumptions the flat path lands near our published value of $10.34. Move any slider to recompute it with your own.
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⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
Constellium SE is deep_overvalued by 231.3%, with the market pricing in an implied growth rate of 27.1% versus the model's 3.0%. The market may be assigning value to potential future demand for lightweight aluminum solutions in the automotive sector, driven by EV adoption and fuel efficiency mandates, which is not in the model. The primary quantifiable risk is the significant gap between implied and modeled growth rates, suggesting high future expectations. The market may also be assigning value to potential for increased recycling and circular economy initiatives in the aluminum industry, which is not in the model.
As of 2 months ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Quarterly revenue growth rates
- Operating cash flow trends
- Announcements of new contracts or product innovations
The trend, in plain numbers (2024 → 2025)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Revenue grew +15% to $8.45B.
- Free cash flow turned positive at $140.0M.
- Net income grew +388% to $273.0M.
Nothing clearly worsening year-over-year.
Management & Leadership
Jean-Marc Germain has served as the Chief Executive Officer of Constellium SE since 2016. He has overseen the company's operations in aluminum products for various industries. Limited executive data available beyond the CEO.
What They Make
Constellium SE produces and transforms aluminum products for a variety of industries, including aerospace, automotive, and packaging. Their customers are primarily manufacturers in these sectors.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
The market prices Constellium SE at a premium of +231.3%, implying a 27.1% growth rate compared to the model's 3.0%. This optimism is likely supported by the company's consistent positive net income and operating cash flow over the last four years, indicating financial stability despite flat revenue. The bullish trend (RSI 58.8) also suggests investor confidence in future prospects.
Three Scenarios, Weighted
| Scenario | IV | vs Price | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | $9.02 | -69.5% | 40% |
| Base | $10.50 | -64.5% | 35% |
| Optimistic | $12.22 | -58.7% | 25% |
| Weighted | $10.34 | -65.1% | 100% |
What has to be true (historical comparison)
To justify today's price, CSTM's owner-earnings cash flow must grow to roughly 3.3× its current level over 5 years. If profit margins and share count stay roughly constant, that is equivalent to about the same multiple of revenue. Each card below is a real company that grew revenue at a comparable magnitude — possibly in a different industry; the point is the growth magnitude required and its historical base rate, not that CSTM resembles these businesses. The green/amber line shows whether that company cleared or fell short of the bar, and the tag on the right shows how it actually fared afterward (succeeded, faded, or wiped out).
Lost $720M on $1.6B revenue. The market priced in dominance of online retail. Took 9 years for the share price to make a new high but ultimately compounded 170x in revenue.
IPO'd at a $20B+ valuation on $1B revenue and a $1.2B loss. Bears called it bloated consulting; the bull case was government + AIP. Outcome still being written.
Real business, big profits, but ~80x P/E. Stock took 17 years to make a new all-time high. The business compounded the whole time; the valuation took a long break.
Anchors are hand-curated 10-K snapshots. We surface the three whose 5-year revenue growth most-closely brackets the rate required to justify the current price. Source: SEC EDGAR.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
The company funds its operations through positive operating cash flow, and long-term debt has risen from $0M to $39M, suggesting some external financing or reinvestment.
Normalized FCF High
Cyclical/commodity sector (Secondary Smelting & Refining of Nonferrous Metals): normalized FCF uses 5-year median to smooth peak/trough distortions.
Show advanced inputs
| RevenueGrowth | -0.3% |
| EpsGrowth | -3.6% |
| HistoricalFcfGrowth | 55.4% |
| SectorDefault | 5.0% |
| BestEstimate | 3.0% |
| Method | blend(70% revenue_cagr, 30% sector) |
| GrowthBasis | total |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project production volumes, realized commodity prices and unit cash costs independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Revenue has been roughly flat, declining -0.3%/yr over the last three years, from $8532M to $8449M.
Geography & Markets
Constellium SE operates globally, with significant presence in Europe and North America, serving diverse industrial clients. Exact geographic revenue mix is not available from current data sources.
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)58.8NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BearishLine below signalThe fast trend is below the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently downward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (4 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (4)
- Cyclical sector: using normalized cash flow (median OCF minus estimated maintenance capex).
- Median OCF: $398.50M, est. maintenance capex: $239.10M, normalized FCF: $159.40M.
- Terminal growth (2.5%) capped to 2.4% (80% of near-term growth 3%).
- Price is 3.3x model IV - market may be pricing optionality, narrative catalysts, or margin expansion beyond what trailing cash flows support.
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From CONSTELLIUM SE's SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 8.4B | 273.0M | $1.92 |
| 2024 | 7.3B | 56.0M | $0.38 |
| 2023 | 7.8B | 152.0M | $1.03 |
| 2022 | 8.5B | 315.0M | $2.10 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC & adj. | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 489.0M | 330.0M | 19.0M | 140.0M |
| 2024 | 301.0M | 413.0M | 25.0M | -137.0M |
| 2023 | 432.0M | 366.0M | 22.0M | 44.0M |
| 2022 | 365.0M | 289.0M | 18.0M | 58.0M |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: 489.0M − 330.0M − 19.0M (SBC & adj.) = 140.0M. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF's starting value is a normalized multi-year median, not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 5.4B |
| Total Liabilities | 4.4B |
| Equity | 952.0M |
| Total Debt | 39.0M |