DuPont de Nemours, Inc. (DD) Stock Analysis
DuPont de Nemours, Inc.
▾ What's in the 48/100 risk score? (higher = riskier)
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend). It excludes the Altman Z score, whose retained-earnings input this filer does not report separately. See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
How to read DD (pre-profit growth)
This company is reinvesting instead of generating profit, so a standard DCF cannot price it. The useful question is whether the growth the market is paying for is achievable — and whether the company can fund itself until then.
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Reverse-DCF — the growth the price demands ↓
It shows exactly how fast the business must grow to justify today's price. Compare that to what comparable companies have actually achieved.
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Cash runway ↓
Can it reach profitability before it has to raise money and dilute shareholders?
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Interactive calculator ↓
Set your own growth + margin assumptions and see what the business would be worth if you are right.
Our models couldn't converge on an intrinsic value for DD they trust, given its current filings. We show no number rather than a misleading one.
What to use instead: Use the Reverse-DCF, the peer multiples in the Football Field, and the financial statements below as your signal.
This note is only about the single DCF fair-value number — DD's full financial statements, health scores, and written analysis are all below.
⚠ We found only 2 genuine same-industry (Plastic Materials) comparables — fewer than the 4 we require for a reliable median. The 8 names in the table below therefore include 6 broader Basic Materials names marked fallback, whose business models and margins differ — which is why any median below is computed over that wider set, not over true comparables. So we do not derive a peer-implied share value here. Read the multiples as rough context only.
How does DD stack up against its closest peers?
Ideally we compare DD only to same-industry peers, but too few exist in our universe right now, so the basket below mixes in broader-sector names. Treat the multiples as rough context, not a valuation. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
2.6x / 4.7x / 6.2x |
| EV / Gross ProfitEV / Gross Profit — Enterprise value divided by gross profit — the multiple paid for what each dollar of sales contributes after direct costs. Why it matters: More refined than EV/Sales for high-margin businesses (software, marketplaces) where gross margin is the real economic engine. Reference: 8–15x for SaaS · 15–25x for hypergrowth software · >30x demanding Full explanation → |
7.5x / 17.0x / 35.9x |
| EV / EBITEV / EBITDA — Enterprise value divided by earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. Why it matters: A classic "what would a private buyer pay" multiple — used in M&A. Strips out tax and capital-structure noise. Reference: 8–12x for mature businesses · 15–25x for growth · Below 5x often signals distress Full explanation → |
13.6x / 24.0x / 44.2x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 peers (broad — see caveat); implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DOW | DOW INC. | Plastic Materials | $24.3B | 0.6x | — | — | 11.8% |
| ALB | ALBEMARLE CORP | Plastic Materials | $20.8B | 4.7x | 35.9x | — | 2.5% |
| WPM | Wheaton Precious Metals Corp. | Gold & Silver Mining ·fallback | $70.0B suspect | 30.2x | 41.9x | 44.2x | 0.5% |
| SBSW | Sibanye Stillwater Ltd | Gold & Silver Mining ·fallback | $35.5B | 6.2x | — | — | 4.1% |
| TS | TENARIS SA | Steel ·fallback | $30.8B | 2.6x | 7.5x | 13.6x | 6.5% |
| SQM | CHEMICAL & MINING CO OF CHILE INC | Mining & Quarrying of Nonm ·fallback | $22.6B | — | 17.0x | — | — |
| SCCO | SOUTHERN COPPER CORP/ | Metal Mining ·fallback | $161.4B | 12.5x | — | 24.0x | 2.1% |
| SIM | GRUPO SIMEC, S.A.B. de C.V. | Steel ·fallback | $13.8B | — | — | — | — |
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
We can't produce a trustworthy Altman Z here: retained earnings weren't separately reported in our data, so a core input would have to be fabricated. Rather than show a categorical "distress" verdict from an invented number, we mark it unavailable. Judge financial health from the leverage, cash position, and the measurable Piotroski checks instead.
▾ The checks — what passed, what didn't (and what we couldn't measure)
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✗ Positive net incomeNet income -$779.0M in FY2025.Why this matters: Does the company actually earn a profit? Sustained losses eventually force it to raise money — diluting you — or take on debt.
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✓ Positive operating cash flowOperating cash flow $560.0M (was $765.0M the prior year).
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✓ Cash flow backs up reported profitOperating cash flow $560.0M vs net income -$779.0M.
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✗ Return on assets improvingReturn on assets -3.6% vs 1.9% a year ago.Why this matters: Is the company squeezing more profit out of each dollar of assets than last year? Rising = getting more efficient; falling = the opposite.
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✓ Debt load (vs assets)Long-term debt is 14.5% of assets vs 14.5% a year ago ($3,134.0M of $21,575.0M assets).
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✗ Short-term liquidity (current ratio)Current ratio 2.42x vs 3.78x a year ago.Why this matters: The current ratio compares assets it can turn to cash within a year against bills due within a year. Below 1.0 means it may struggle to cover near-term obligations.
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✓ Share count (dilution)Share count held roughly flat (419.2M → 417.5M year-over-year).
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· Pricing power (gross margin) (n/a — data not reported; not scored)
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✓ Sales per asset (asset turnover)Asset turnover 0.32x vs 0.18x a year ago.
Missing data is never counted as a pass or a fail — it's shown as n/a and excluded from the denominator. Each check compares the company against its own prior year.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 10.0%, the figure our model used for DD. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: no headline intrinsic value is published for this stock (the valuation is held for a data-quality reason — see the notes above). The calculator below is a what-if tool: the values it produces are your assumptions played out, not our estimate.
A full intrinsic value isn't shown for DD because the valuation is currently held for a data-quality reason (see the guardrail notes above). The reverse-DCF reading still works — it needs only the price and cash flow — but we won't publish a forward value until the underlying data passes our checks.
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⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
The market appears to be paying for the company's consistent positive operating cash flow and significant debt reduction. The biggest risk that our model's base assumptions prove too high is that revenue continues its declining trend, which has been -14.1%/yr over the past four years.
As of 3 days ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation → from its current positive level of $189.0 million. Net income was negative in the latest fiscal year, indicating potential profitability challenges.
- Stabilization or growth in quarterly revenue figures
- Improvement in net income profitability
- Further reduction in total debt
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Revenue grew +2% to $6.85B.
- Free cash flow fell to $189.0M.
- Swung to a loss of -$779.0M (from a profit the prior year).
Management & Leadership
Edward D. Breen serves as the Executive Chairman and CEO of DuPont de Nemours, Inc. (information from public sources, not the latest filing). Other key executives include Lori Koch as Chief Financial Officer and Antonella Bertram as Chief Human Resources Officer. Limited executive data available.
What They Make
DuPont de Nemours, Inc. manufactures and sells a wide range of specialty materials, chemicals, and related products. Their paying customers are primarily industrial and commercial businesses across various sectors requiring advanced materials and solutions.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
What we use instead: earnings (P/E, EV/EBIT), book value (P/B), dividend yield & payout — computed from the figures this company does report, shown in the sections below. Those numbers are unaffected by the missing cash-flow data.
The market prices DD at a premium of +1381.8%, likely reflecting optimism about its ability to generate positive operating cash flow, which has been consistent for 5/5 years, and its substantial long-term debt reduction from $10,632M to $3.2 billion. The market may be assigning value to potential future innovations in specialty materials or strategic portfolio adjustments, which is not in the model. This pricing implies a significant future per-share cash flow growth of 55.7% annually, despite recent revenue declines.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
The company has reduced its long-term debt from $10.6B to $3.2 billion. No specific dividend or buyback rates are available from the provided data.
Normalized FCF
Cyclical/commodity sector (Plastic Materials): normalized FCF uses 5-year median to smooth peak/trough distortions.
Show advanced inputs
| Revenue Growth | -14.1% |
| Historical Fcf Growth | -33.9% |
| Sector Default | 5.0% |
| Sector Default Source | Basic Materials sector default |
| Best Estimate | -8.4% |
| Method | blend(70% revenue_cagr, 30% sector) |
| Growth Basis | total |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project production volumes, realized commodity prices and unit cash costs independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Revenue has been declining at -14.1%/yr over the past four years.
Geography & Markets
DuPont de Nemours, Inc. operates globally, with a significant presence in North America, Europe, and Asia. Exact geographic revenue mix percentages are not available from current data sources.
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)29.2OversoldHeavily sold off recently — sometimes a bounce setup, sometimes a falling knife.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BearishLine below signalThe fast trend is below the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently downward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (7 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (4)
- Median OCF: $845.00M, est. maintenance capex: $333.00M, normalized SBC: $57.00M, normalized owner-earnings FCF: $455.00M.
- Historical FCF growth is negative (-8.3%) - likely reflects commodity cycle peak. Flooring at 0%.
- Price is far above the model output - market may be pricing optionality, narrative catalysts, or margin expansion beyond what trailing cash flows support.
- Extreme valuation gap (P/IV withheld — see the note above): result may be dominated by model assumptions, share count issues, or sector-specific dynamics. Treat as low confidence.
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From DuPont de Nemours, Inc.'s SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 6.8B | -779.0M | $-1.86 |
| 2024 | 6.7B | 703.0M | $1.68 |
| 2023 | 6.6B | 423.0M | $0.94 |
| 2022 | 13.0B | 5.9B | $11.75 |
| 2021 | 12.6B | 6.5B | $11.89 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 560.0M | 333.0M | 38.0M | 189.0M |
| 2024 | 765.0M | 285.0M | 56.0M | 424.0M |
| 2023 | 845.0M | 302.0M | 57.0M | 486.0M |
| 2022 | 1.2B | 662.0M | 75.0M | 512.0M |
| 2021 | 1.8B | 788.0M | 67.0M | 991.0M |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: 560.0M − 333.0M − 38.0M (stock-based comp) = 189.0M. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF's starting value is a mid-cycle estimate (median operating cash flow less estimated maintenance capex and stock compensation — by design NOT the table's FCF, which deducts every year's full capex), not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 21.6B |
| Total Liabilities | 7.5B |
| Equity | 13.9B |
| Total Debt | 3.2B |
Similar companies worth a look
Same sector and industry, similar fundamentals shape. Verify everything yourself — this list is computed mechanically and does not reflect our judgment about whether any of these are a good investment.