Is Icahn Enterprises L.P. (IEP) a good stock to buy?
Everything we have tested points the right way. That is a reason to look closer, not a reason to buy — these are frequencies about groups of companies in the past, not a statement about this one.
What each rating means, in numbers
Can it survive? — Middling. Safer than 48% of the companies we cover, judged on the warning signs that came before companies that really did fail.
Cash it pays you — High. For every $100 of share price, the business threw off about $25.2 of spare cash a year, averaged over the last three years. Higher is better: the cheap fifth on this measure ran about 7.7 points a year ahead of the dear fifth, 2011 to 2025.
Business quality — Middling. Passes 4 of the 7 health checks we can measure — things like making a profit, turning it into cash, and not piling on debt. Across 131,000 company-quarters the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% against 1.4% for the strongest, in every era and all twelve sectors.
How wild is the price? — Very calm. The share price swings about 22% in a typical year, which puts it in the calmest fifth. Out of every 100 companies that swung like this, about 0.3 went bankrupt within the year. Across the three periods we tested that ran from 0.1% to 0.7%.
What "tested" means here, and why there is no score out of 100
Tested means the read was measured against what actually happened afterwards, on a history that keeps the companies that were later delisted, using only figures that had been filed on the day they are used. Survival was ranked on companies that really did fail. What an owner keeps was tested across the universe from 2011 to 2025.
The full record of everything we have tested is on the research pages.
Which benchmark. Over the period we tested, the median listed company returned +5.8% a year while the S&P 500 returned about +13.9% — the index is weighted by size and was carried by a handful of enormous winners. So "beats the index" and "beats the other companies you could have bought" are different questions. Where a read says it picks better companies, it means the second one. None of these gets you an index fund's return, and we would rather say that than imply otherwise.
The quality read is the strongest thing we have tested: 131,000 company-quarters across 5,300 companies, where the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% against 1.4% for the strongest, holding in every era and all twelve sectors. It still says less likely to break, not likely to beat the market — every band in that study lost to the index at the median, because the median listed company does.
Each read is shown on its own rather than merged into a single score, so you can see which part is strong and which is weak instead of taking an average on trust.
▾ What goes into the smart-money reading
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend, DCF applicability). See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
Chance the S&P 500 falls 10% or more in the next three months.
Counted from every day since 2006. Says nothing about IEP — see the board for how it is measured.
📍 Where to start on this page, and what to look at first
How to read IEP (holding company)
A holding company is worth the sum of its parts plus its investment portfolio — value it on book value / sum-of-parts, not a single DCF.
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Sum-of-parts / book value lens ↓
Price-to-book and the value of the underlying businesses/holdings are the right yardstick.
Is Icahn Enterprises L.P. (IEP) overvalued?
Macro: Neutral / mid-cycleHard to say from one number: for a commodity producer our value is a mid-cycle reference, and the price sits 30% below it.
IEP trades at $6.56 vs an estimated intrinsic value of $9.42 — a 30.4% below our mid-cycle reference value. Low confidence: commodity prices and normalized margins dominate this result. IEP is a cyclical commodity producer (Petroleum Refining), so a single growth-DCF is the wrong tool — its profits rise and fall with the commodity price. We value it off normalized, mid-cycle cash flow, which is why the modeled growth reads near 0%: we deliberately don't extrapolate growth from a possibly-elevated base. A premium here usually just means today's price sits above mid-cycle worth — common when the commodity is near a cycle high (near a trough the same model would read "cheap"). On its own that's not a sell signal — judge it against its peers and where you think the cycle is heading.
Not investment advice. The model can be wrong. Verify the assumptions in the sections below and consider consulting a licensed advisor for significant decisions.
What return would IEP pay as a bond?
Treat the share as a bond: the "coupon" is the cash an owner could take out this year, and unlike a real bond that coupon can grow. Fix today's price and a conservative growth path, and the only unknown left is the return. That number is comparable across every kind of company — which is the point.
Plainly: at $6.56, IEP pays a 25.2% owner-earnings coupon today. If that coupon grows 0.0% a year for five years and then settles toward 2.5%, and a buyer in year 10 pays 15× that year's owner earnings, the whole trade returns about 31.9% a year — 26.7 points more than a Treasury with none of the business risk. By year 5 the coupon on today's price would be 25.2% (the "yield on cost" Buffett talks about). Our DCF demanded 8.2% for a business this risky; this read clears that bar, which is the same conclusion the verdict above reaches by a different route.
Who owns IEP, and how it moves
From the SEC's own filings: every fund manager over $100M reports its holdings each quarter, and every officer and director reports theirs. Each point is what was public at the time.
89 institutions reported holding it at the latest quarter-end. Above 100% is not a mistake in the filings: when a fund lends shares to a short seller, the fund and whoever buys the borrowed shares can both report them.
Riskier than 52% of the stocks we cover
What this rating means, and what it does not
What this rank is — Middling. Riskier than 52% of the companies we cover. Out of every 100 companies ranked here, about 0.2% went bankrupt within the year, against 0.6% for the average company we cover. The rank comes from a model trained on every US filing since 2012, including 823 companies that really did fail, and scored each year by a version that had not seen that year.
What it is not — Not a trade. We tested shorting these names and buying puts, spreads, straddles and condors on them at real option prices, 2010-2025. Every version lost money: the market already prices the distress and the survivors squeeze. A high rank is a reason to read the filings and to size for a total loss, not a reason to bet against the company. A low rank says the balance sheet is calm, not that the price is sensible.
▾ The numbers, the logic, and why not to trade on it
The logic. A model trained on every US filing since 2012 — including 823 companies that went bankrupt or stopped trading under a dollar — ranks each covered stock by its chance of failing in the next year, from its latest filing, price history and credit conditions. The rank is a position among peers; the table is a count of what happened to stocks in each position, scored each year by a model that had not seen that year.
| Rank band | went bankrupt within 12 months | fell 80% or more (or failed) within 12 months | fell 50% or more (or failed) within 6 months |
|---|---|---|---|
| All covered stocks (average) | 0.59% | 4.21% | 8.51% |
| Energy (sector average) | 2.40% | 10.09% | 15.14% |
| riskiest 1% | 16.4% | 33.0% | 45.5% |
| next 2% (97-99) | 5.9% | 24.9% | 38.2% |
| next 2% (95-97) | 3.4% | 21.2% | 33.8% |
| next 5% (90-95) | 1.6% | 15.1% | 27.3% |
| next 15% (75-90) | 0.8% | 8.5% | 17.8% |
| next 25% (50-75) ← this stock | 0.2% | 2.7% | 6.2% |
| safest half | <0.1% | 0.5% | 2.1% |
Why not to trade on it. We tested shorting these names and buying puts, spreads, straddles and condors on them at real option prices, 2010–2025: every version lost money. The market already prices the distress, and the survivors squeeze. Use a high rank to read the filings and to size for a total loss — not to bet against the company. A low rank says the balance sheet is calm, not that the price is sensible.
Scored from the most recent SEC filing we had (dated 2026-05-07), which can be a quarterly report newer than the yearly figures used elsewhere on this page; scores last updated 2026-09-18. Within Energy: rank 51 of 100. Rough one-year odds for this stock alone: bankruptcy 0.1%, an 80% fall 2.1% (the model overstates the middle of the range).
▾ The logic, and why not to buy on it
The logic. Trained on 2,900 acquisitions since 2012, the model leans on size (small), age, retained earnings, asset growth, volatility and how many deals the sector has just seen. Announcement = the day the stock jumped, not the day the paperwork was filed.
| top 1% | 15.4% acquired within a year |
| next 2% (97-99) | 10.3% acquired within a year |
| next 2% (95-97) | 9.0% acquired within a year |
| next 5% (90-95) | 7.3% acquired within a year |
| next 15% (75-90) ← this stock | 6.4% acquired within a year |
| next 25% (50-75) | 4.8% acquired within a year |
| bottom half | 3.0% acquired within a year |
Why not to buy on it. A takeover paid a median +22% on the day — but even in the top band about 6 in 7 companies are not bought, and those lag. Buying the whole top list returned what the S&P 500 did (2012–2023), and adding "cheap" or "beaten-down" filters did not change that. Read it as context for a thesis you already have, never as the thesis.
Who expects what from IEP
The price implies one growth rate and our model produces another — and both have been scored against what actually happened. Beside them: how the analysts covering this company rate it, and how accurate their earnings estimates have proved.
What each number is, and which has been tested
The market — -4.3% over 5 years. The growth implied by today's price. Tested: median miss of 8.3 points a year against realised five-year growth.
Us — 0.0% over 5 years. Tested across 3,279 past filings: a median miss of 4.8 points a year against realised five-year growth, better than both the market and a naive carry-forward.
Analysts (their record here) — Usually wrong. Over the last 4 quarters, the consensus earnings estimate for this company missed by a median of 313.7% either way, and ran too HIGH, so the company kept missing on average (1 beats, 3 misses). This is NEXT-QUARTER earnings, which companies guide analysts toward - they are supposed to be good at it. It says nothing about long-run growth, which nobody guides.
Analyst data from Finnhub, snapshotted recently. Their forward estimates are behind a paywall we have not bought, so what is shown is their rating and their measured track record on this company — not their forecast. Nothing here is used anywhere in our valuation: feeding an unscored forecast into the model would undo the one growth result we have actually tested.
What cash-flow improvement must the market believe? Reverse DCF — Instead of asking "what is this stock worth?", asks "what growth rate is the current market price already assuming?"
Why it matters: It crystallizes the bull thesis as a single number you can argue with. If the market expects 40% growth for 10 years and you do not believe that, the stock is overvalued.
Reference: 10–15% = sustainable for strong companies · 20–25% = exceptional · 30%+ = historically very rare
Reverse DCF treats today's price as correct and solves for the cash-flow path that justifies it. For a cyclical, read the result as the annual improvement in through-cycle free cash flow the price requires — which could come from higher realized commodity prices, margin recovery, lower input costs, more volume, or reduced capex, not just organic growth. The starting base is our normalized mid-cycle median, not last year's number.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation → must improve by:
▾ Exactly how this 5-year figure is computed
Forecast length: 5 years at the solved rate, then a linear fade to terminal growth over years 6-10 — the same shape the DCF above uses
Terminal growth after the fade: 2.5%
Discount rate: 8.2% (the rate the model used)
Price used: $6.56 — the live price shown on this page (not frozen)
Method: solve for the constant annual growth rate that makes the discounted 10-year FCF stream + terminal value equal today's price.
The market is pricing in shrinking cash flow — often a sign of undervaluation, and sometimes of a dying business. Check leverage, the cash-flow trend and the health screens below to tell those apart.
For reference: The market is pricing in a material multi-year contraction in cash flow (≈10.5%/yr) — a significant decline, not a flat business.
▾ How we computed this · Reality check thresholds · Assumptions
- Starting FCF/share: $0.78 (mid-cycle estimate (median operating cash flow less estimated maintenance capex and stock compensation — by design NOT the table's FCF, which deducts every year's full capex))
- Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation →: 8.2% — standard 8-12%; 9-10% matches S&P 500 historical return - Terminal Growth RateTerminal Growth Rate — The growth rate we assume the company holds forever, after the explicit 10-year forecast period ends.
Why it matters: It anchors the long-tail value. Cannot mathematically exceed long-term GDP growth or the company eventually becomes larger than the global economy.
Reference: 2–3% (matches long-term US GDP growth) · Above 4% is mathematically problematic
Full explanation →: 2.5% — matches long-term GDP growth - Forecast horizon: 10 years explicit + terminal perpetuity
| ≤ 0% | Priced for decline — likely undervalued OR dying business |
| 5-12% | Reasonable; sustainable for quality businesses |
| 12-18% | Demanding — strong execution required |
| 18-25% | Exceptional — few companies sustain for a decade |
| 25-35% | Heroic — historically very rare |
| 35%+ | Borderline impossible at scale |
Sustaining 30%+ cash-flow growth for a full decade at scale is exceedingly rare — the bar is brutally high.
Use the interactive calculator below to change the discount rate, growth and terminal-growth assumptions and watch the value move.
What this rating means
What the rating says — Cheap, but fragile. The price sits below every model's range — but this looks like the market correctly pricing in an unprofitable latest year, not a free lunch. Read the Financial Health section before treating this as a bargain: cheap stocks are usually cheap for a reason.
What it does not say — Not a forecast. This shows where today's price sits against several different ways of valuing the business. Where the methods disagree, the spread itself is the useful part - it tells you how much the answer depends on which one you trust.
Football field: where does the price sit?
Both bars below come from our own cash-flow model — one tries a range of growth rates, one shows our three scenarios. A third bar comparing IEP with similar companies appears only when there are enough close peers to trust it, and there aren't here. So this shows how much the answer depends on growth, not a set of independent checks.
Industry multiples sourced from: sector: Energy. See the Peer Basket section below for the peer comparison and its limited-comparables caveat.
How does IEP stack up against its closest peers?
We take the 8 same- or closely-related-industry companies closest in size to IEP and check what investors are paying for each dollar of their revenue (or profits). If IEP is much more expensive on the same yardstick, that's a red flag — unless you have a specific reason it deserves a premium. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
0.6x / 0.9x / 1.7x |
| EV / EBITEV / EBITDA — Enterprise value divided by earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. Why it matters: A classic "what would a private buyer pay" multiple — used in M&A. Strips out tax and capital-structure noise. Reference: 8–12x for mature businesses · 15–25x for growth · Below 5x often signals distress Full explanation → |
17.9x / 23.7x / 30.8x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 same-industry peers; implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CLMT | Calumet, Inc. /DE | Petroleum Refining | $5.0B | 1.7x | 29.3x | 66.2x | 0.1% |
| SUNC | SunocoCorp LLC | Petroleum Refining | $3.4B | 0.7x | — | 17.9x | 14.3% |
| CVI | CVR ENERGY INC | Petroleum Refining | $3.3B | 0.7x | — | 27.7x | 6.4% |
| DK | Delek US Holdings, Inc. | Petroleum Refining | $2.7B | 0.6x | — | 19.8x | 6.3% |
| PBF | PBF Energy Inc. | Petroleum Refining | $8.3B | 0.4x | — | — | 1.8% |
| SUN | Sunoco LP | Petroleum Refining | $15.4B | 1.1x | — | 30.8x | 2.1% |
| YPF | YPF SOCIEDAD ANONIMA | Petroleum Refining | $19.5B | 1.1x | 3.8x | — | 12.9% |
| IMO | IMPERIAL OIL LTD | Petroleum Refining | $60.3B | 1.9x | — | — | 4.7% |
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
What these health ratings mean, in numbers
Business quality — Middling. Passes 4 of the 7 health checks we can measure — making a profit, turning it into cash, not piling on debt, not issuing shares. Across 131,000 company-quarters the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% within a year against 1.4% for the strongest, and that held in every era and all twelve sectors. It says "less likely to break", not "likely to beat the market".
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
Insurance/investment holding companies (e.g. Berkshire) sit on huge securities portfolios and float liabilities — Altman Z reads that capital structure as "distress" even with tens of billions in earnings and cash. See the Sum-of-Parts / Book Value lens above instead.
Why it matters: High score = fundamentals improving. Low score = deteriorating. Especially powerful for filtering cheap stocks: cheap + high F-score historically outperforms; cheap + low F-score is often a value trap.
Reference: 7–9 = strong · 4–6 = mediocre · 0–3 = weak
Full explanation →
Piotroski F's checks (operating cash flow, gross-margin trend, current ratio, asset turnover) assume an industrial cost structure, so they misread asset-heavy or financial businesses like this one — a healthy REIT, utility, pipeline, BDC/fund or holding company can score low for reasons that aren't weakness. See the sector lens above for the metrics that actually matter.
Plain English: the company holds about $1,450M in cash and is burning roughly $313M/year in operations. At that pace, the cash lasts 4.6 yrs before it must raise capital (diluting shareholders), take on debt, or cut spending.
Assumes constant burn and ignores financing/asset sales. For pre-profit biotech and growth companies, this matters more than a DCF — a great drug pipeline is worthless if they run out of money before approval.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 8.2%, the figure our model used for IEP. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: the calculator opens at our published value of $9.42 — it is initialised to the same scenario-weighted result, so the two match exactly on load. The moment you move a slider, the value below becomes a single-path what-if at your assumptions (not the three-scenario weighting), which is why it can differ from the headline once you've touched it.
8.2% — beta-based (CAPM), from this stock's BetaBeta — How much the stock moves when the overall market moves. 1.0 = moves with the market; 1.5 = moves 50% more than the market.
Why it matters: Higher beta = more volatile = should demand higher discount rate. Low beta stocks (utilities, consumer staples) move less.
Reference: Most stocks 0.5–1.5 · Defensives ~0.3 · High-vol tech ~1.5–2.0
Full explanation → of 0.67. The safe Treasury rate plus a premium scaled by how much more (or less) volatile the stock is than the market.
11.0% — sector/quality tier. A simpler hurdle set by industry and business durability: lower for stable, wide-moat companies; higher for speculative or micro-caps.
The headline value and this calculator start at 8.2% — the beta-based rate. Drag the slider to the other rate to see the full range.
IEP is valued with a sum-of-parts model. The calculator above starts from that published value and shows how it moves with the discount rate and long-run growth; it does not rebuild the model year by year. The sector lens shows the measures that matter most for this kind of business.
Move any slider above to recompute this against your own assumptions.
⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
IEP is estimated to be undervalued by 21% by the model, trading at $7.44 against an intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation → of $9.42. The market likely discounts IEP due to declining revenue, negative operating cash flow, and a history of unprofitability, with only 0/5 profitable years. The primary quantifiable risk is the negative historical FCFFree Cash Flow (FCF) — Operating cash flow minus capital spending: cash left after a company covers operating costs, taxes and interest and reinvests in the business — but BEFORE repaying debt principal or paying dividends. The cash actually available to investors.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation → decline of 1.6%, which the model floors at 0%.
As of 4 months ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation → of $527.00M used in the model.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation →.
- Return to positive operating cash flow in upcoming filings
- Stabilization or growth in revenue figures
- Improvement in net income profitability
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Still unprofitable at -$299.0M — loss narrowing.
- Revenue fell -4% to $9.66B.
- Free cash flow is negative at -$654.0M — the cash burn widened vs last year.
Management & Leadership
Carl Icahn serves as the Chairman of Icahn Enterprises L.P., a role he has held for decades, making him a central figure in the company's strategic direction and investment activities. Gail Golden is the current CEO.
Names marked "per latest SEC filing" come from Form 4 / Item 408 filings and take precedence over our AI-compiled roster when they differ.
What They Make
Icahn Enterprises L.P. is a diversified holding company engaged in various sectors including investment, energy, automotive, food packaging, metals, and real estate. Its primary customers are businesses and consumers across these diverse industries.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
The market prices IEP at a 30.4% discount, likely reflecting significant concerns about its financial health. This is supported by declining revenue at -3.9%/yr over four years, negative operating cash flow in the latest period, and a history of unprofitability, with net income negative in the latest period and only 0/5 profitable years. The bearish trend and low RSI of 34.3 further indicate investor apprehension.
Three Scenarios, Weighted
| Scenario | IV | Upside from today's price | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | $8.10 | 23.5% | 40% |
| Base | $9.58 | 46.0% | 35% |
| Optimistic | $11.30 | 72.3% | 25% |
| Weighted | $9.42 | 43.6% | 100% |
Reading the last column: it is the move from today's price to each value (IV ÷ price − 1). The headline "premium/discount to model IV" measures the same gap from the value's side (price ÷ IV − 1), so the two percentages differ in size and sign by construction — e.g. a price 8% above value is a value 7.4% below price.
What has to be true
Today's price implies flat-to-slightly-declining cash flow (implied growth ≈ -4.3%/yr) — so historical growth anchors don't apply here. The real question isn't "can it grow like Apple did" but "is the decline the market is pricing in real, or an overreaction?" The Financial Health trend and the Reverse-DCF above are the right lenses for that.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
The company's capital allocation includes distributions to unitholders, funded by its diversified operations and, when necessary, through asset sales or debt financing.
Normalized FCF High
Cyclical/commodity sector (Petroleum Refining) with negative current FCF: normalized FCF uses multi-year median to smooth through the cycle.
Show advanced inputs
| Revenue Growth | -3.9% |
| Historical Fcf Growth | 225.5% |
| Sector Default | 4.0% |
| Best Estimate | -1.6% |
| Method | blend(70% revenue_cagr, 30% sector) |
| Growth Basis | total |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings cash-flow model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project its revenue segments independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Revenue has been declining at -3.9%/yr over four years, from $11338M to $9658M.
Geography & Markets
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)34.3NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BearishLine below signalThe fast trend is below the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently downward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (3 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (3)
- Cyclical sector: using normalized cash flow (median OCF minus estimated maintenance capex).
- Median OCF: $832.00M, est. maintenance capex: $305.00M, normalized FCF: $527.00M.
- Historical FCF growth is negative (-1.6%) - likely reflects commodity cycle peak. Flooring at 0%.
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From Icahn Enterprises L.P.'s SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 9.7B | -299.0M | $-0.44 |
| 2024 | 10.0B | -445.0M | $-0.66 |
| 2023 | 10.9B | -684.0M | $-1.02 |
| 2022 | 14.2B | -183.0M | $-0.27 |
| 2021 | 11.3B | -518.0M | $-0.77 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC & adj. | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | -313.0M | 341.0M | — | -654.0M |
| 2024 | 832.0M | 280.0M | — | 552.0M |
| 2023 | 3.7B | 303.0M | — | 3.4B |
| 2022 | 1.1B | 338.0M | — | 717.0M |
| 2021 | 321.0M | 305.0M | — | 16.0M |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF's starting value is a mid-cycle estimate (median operating cash flow less estimated maintenance capex and stock compensation — by design NOT the table's FCF, which deducts every year's full capex), not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 14.2B |
| Total Liabilities | 10.8B |
| Equity | — |
Similar companies worth a look
Same sector and industry, similar fundamentals shape. Verify everything yourself — this list is computed mechanically and does not reflect our judgment about whether any of these are a good investment.
The questions people ask about IEP
Is Icahn Enterprises L.P. (IEP) a good stock to buy?
Icahn Enterprises L.P. (IEP) trades about 30% below our $9.42 estimate of what the business is worth, so the price is not the obstacle. The questions are why it is cheap: check the failure-warning checks, the debt, and whether insiders are buying, all on this page. This is educational research from SEC filings, not investment advice.
Is Icahn Enterprises L.P. (IEP) overvalued?
No, by our measure. Icahn Enterprises L.P. (IEP) trades at $6.56, about 30% below our estimate of $9.42 for what the business is worth. This is educational research from SEC filings, not investment advice.
What is IEP's intrinsic value?
Our model estimates IEP is worth about $9.42 per share, built from the cash the business is expected to generate, taken from its SEC filings. The market price is $6.56.
What growth is priced into IEP?
Working backwards from today's price, the market expects IEP's cash flow per share to shrink by roughly 4.3% a year over the next five years. Compare that with the company's actual record on this page.
Where do these numbers come from?
From Icahn Enterprises L.P.'s own SEC filings (10-K and 10-Q), Form 4 insider filings and daily market prices. Every figure on the page links to how it was calculated, and the model's weak spots are listed next to its results.