Invesco Mortgage Capital Inc. (IVR) Stock Analysis
Invesco Mortgage Capital Inc.
▾ What's in the 45/100 risk score? (higher = riskier)
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend). See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
How to read IVR (REIT)
REITs pay out most of their cash, so judge them on cash distributions and the value of their property — not on earnings or a standard DCF.
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REIT lens (P/AFFO + dividend yield) ↓
Price-to-AFFO and the dividend yield are the real cheap/expensive gauges for real estate.
Standard DCF doesn't fit IVR well — but that's expected for this kind of business. The REIT Valuation Lens below uses the metrics actually used by analysts who value reits. Reverse DCF + Football Field also work as cross-checks.
Safer than 63% of the stocks we cover
A model trained on every US filing since 2012 — including the 823 companies that went bankrupt or stopped trading under a dollar — ranks each covered stock by its chance of failing in the next year. This is a position among peers, not a prediction about this company alone. Below is what happened to stocks that sat in the same position in past years.
▾ Every band, and what happened to the stocks in it
| Rank band | went bankrupt within 12 months | fell 80% or more (or failed) within 12 months | fell 50% or more (or failed) within 6 months |
|---|---|---|---|
| All covered stocks (average) | 0.59% | 4.21% | 8.51% |
| Finance (sector average) | 0.13% | 1.25% | 3.09% |
| riskiest 1% | 16.4% of 1,749 | 33.0% of 1,998 | 45.5% of 2,239 |
| next 2% (97-99) | 5.9% of 3,360 | 24.9% of 3,985 | 38.2% of 4,461 |
| next 2% (95-97) | 3.4% of 3,409 | 21.2% of 3,984 | 33.8% of 4,462 |
| next 5% (90-95) | 1.6% of 8,443 | 15.1% of 9,965 | 27.3% of 11,155 |
| next 15% (75-90) | 0.8% of 25,328 | 8.5% of 29,884 | 17.8% of 33,459 |
| next 25% (50-75) | 0.2% of 36,310 | 2.7% of 49,810 | 6.2% of 55,771 |
| safest half ← this stock | <0.1% of 92,256 | 0.5% of 99,617 | 2.1% of 111,538 |
Counts are stock-quarters 2012–2025, scored each year by a model that had not seen that year. The rank is recomputed from each company's latest filing (this one: 2026-05-07); table generated 2026-09-17. Calibrated one-year odds for this stock alone: bankruptcy 0.1%, 80%+ fall 0.5%, 50%+ fall in six months 2.7% — treat these as rougher than the band counts; the model overstates the middle of the range.
What this is not. It is not a trade. We tested shorting these names and buying puts on them at real option prices (2010–2025): every version lost money, because the market already prices the distress and the survivors squeeze. A high rank is a reason to read the filings and to size a position for the chance of a total loss — not a reason to bet against the company. A low rank says the balance sheet and the market are calm; it says nothing about whether the price is sensible.
How does IVR stack up against its closest peers?
We take the 8 same-industry companies most similar to IVR (similar size) and check what investors are paying for each dollar of their revenue (or profits). If IVR is much more expensive on the same yardstick, that's a red flag — unless you have a specific reason it deserves a premium. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
10.4x / 11.1x / 11.5x |
| EV / EBITEV / EBITDA — Enterprise value divided by earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. Why it matters: A classic "what would a private buyer pay" multiple — used in M&A. Strips out tax and capital-structure noise. Reference: 8–12x for mature businesses · 15–25x for growth · Below 5x often signals distress Full explanation → |
27.3x / 29.1x / 53.0x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 same-industry peers; implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| XRN | Chiron Real Estate Inc. | REITs | $477M | 909.0x | — | — | 1.2% |
| TPTA | Terra Property Trust, Inc. | REITs | $554M | 20.7x | — | — | 2.1% |
| UHT | UNIVERSAL HEALTH REALTY INCOME TRU | REITs | $575M | 9.6x | — | 27.3x | 7.1% |
| TCI | TRANSCONTINENTAL REALTY INVESTORS | REITs | $335M | 11.1x | — | — | 3.0% |
| PSTL | Postal Realty Trust, Inc. | REITs | $636M | 10.4x | — | 29.1x | 5.5% |
| PINE | Alpine Income Property Trust, Inc. | REITs | $318M | 11.5x | 13.4x | 53.0x | 5.9% |
| RWT | REDWOOD TRUST INC | REITs | $679M | — | — | — | 14.0% |
| RC | Ready Capital Corp | REITs | $294M | — | — | — | 38.1% |
Leveraged bond portfolio dressed up as real estate
Despite the "REIT" label, this is not an equity REIT (which owns buildings). It\'s a leveraged mortgage-backed-securities (MBS) portfolio — borrow short-term, buy long-term mortgages, pocket the spread. Valued on P/Book + dividend yield + Net Interest Margin. AFFO doesn\'t apply.
- Yield curve shape — steep curve = wide net interest margin = healthy dividend. Flat/inverted curve crushes earnings.
- Prepayment speeds — refinancing waves shrink high-yield holdings; the mREIT has to reinvest at lower rates.
- Hedge book — most mREITs hedge interest-rate risk with swaps; hedging gains/losses can swing earnings dramatically.
- Leverage (debt-to-equity) — typically 5-9×. Amplifies BOTH returns and losses on the MBS portfolio.
- Distributable yield vs current yield — the dividend can outpace earnings for several quarters before being cut.
Warning: mREIT dividends are historically among the most likely to be cut during stress periods (2008, 2020, 2022). High current yield is NOT a reliable forecast.
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
REITs deliberately carry high leverage backed by long-life real estate and pay out 90%+ of taxable income — both inputs that Altman Z flags as distress. See the REIT Valuation Lens above for P/AFFO, dividend yield and payout ratio.
Why it matters: High score = fundamentals improving. Low score = deteriorating. Especially powerful for filtering cheap stocks: cheap + high F-score historically outperforms; cheap + low F-score is often a value trap.
Reference: 7–9 = strong · 4–6 = mediocre · 0–3 = weak
Full explanation →
Piotroski F's checks (operating cash flow, gross-margin trend, current ratio, asset turnover) assume an industrial cost structure, so they misread asset-heavy or financial businesses like this one — a healthy REIT, utility, pipeline, BDC/fund or holding company can score low for reasons that aren't weakness. See the sector lens above for the metrics that actually matter.
The market appears to be paying up for its consistent positive operating cash flow (5/5 yrs), despite a low franchise/durability score of 0/5. The primary quantifiable risk is the significant divergence between the current price and the model's valuation, suggesting potential over-optimism regarding future performance or a mispricing of risk.
As of 3 months ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Next quarter's net interest margin trends
- Changes in portfolio credit quality
- Any announced dividend policy updates
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Net income grew +69% to $101.3M.
- Free cash flow fell to $157.1M.
Management & Leadership
Invesco Mortgage Capital Inc. is led by CEO John Anzalone. As a mortgage REITREIT (Real Estate Investment Trust) — A company that owns income-producing real estate and is required to pay out about 90% of its profit to shareholders as dividends.
Why it matters: Because they pay out almost everything, REITs are judged on the cash they distribute (price-to-AFFO and dividend yield), not on ordinary earnings — a normal P/E or DCF misleads here.
Reference: Dividend yields often 3–6%; valued on price-to-AFFO, not P/E.
Full explanation →, its executive team focuses on managing a portfolio of mortgage-backed securities and other mortgage-related assets, navigating interest rate environments and credit markets.
What They Make
Invesco Mortgage Capital Inc. is a real estate investment trust (REITREIT (Real Estate Investment Trust) — A company that owns income-producing real estate and is required to pay out about 90% of its profit to shareholders as dividends.
Why it matters: Because they pay out almost everything, REITs are judged on the cash they distribute (price-to-AFFO and dividend yield), not on ordinary earnings — a normal P/E or DCF misleads here.
Reference: Dividend yields often 3–6%; valued on price-to-AFFO, not P/E.
Full explanation →) that invests in and manages a portfolio of mortgage-backed securities and other mortgage-related assets. Its primary customers are investors seeking income from the mortgage market.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
What we use instead: earnings (P/E, EV/EBIT), book value (P/B) — computed from the figures this company does report, shown in the sections below. Those numbers are unaffected by the missing cash-flow data.
The market prices IVR at a premium of +146% to the model, likely due to its consistent positive operating cash flow (positive 5/5 yrs). This suggests investors are optimistic about its ability to generate cash, despite its low franchise/durability score of 0/5, which typically indicates a lack of sustainable competitive advantages.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
No dividend data is available, but the model assumes a 3% yield. The company funds itself through its investment activities and capital markets.
Dividend Discount
REIT (REITs): dividend discount model - GAAP earnings distort REIT valuations.
Show advanced inputs
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project net interest income and fee-income lines independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Net income has been positive in 2 out of the last 5 years, while operating cash flow has been consistently positive in all 5 years.
Geography & Markets
Invesco Mortgage Capital Inc. primarily operates within the United States mortgage and credit markets, investing in securities backed by U.S. residential and commercial mortgages. Exact geographic segment splits are not available in current filings.
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)39.7NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BearishLine below signalThe fast trend is below the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently downward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (3 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (3)
- No dividend data. Assuming 3% yield.
- Illiquidity discount 7% applied (small/micro-cap — harder to exit, demand a margin).
- Dividend data sparse; DDM using estimated yield. Confidence reduced.
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From Invesco Mortgage Capital Inc.'s SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | — | 101.3M | $1.32 |
| 2024 | — | 59.9M | $0.65 |
| 2023 | — | -15.9M | $-0.85 |
| 2022 | — | -402.9M | $-12.21 |
| 2021 | — | -90.0M | $-4.82 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
Capital expenditure isn't tagged in this filer's machine-readable data (the CapEx column shows "—"). The free-cash-flow column is therefore operating cash flow less stock-based compensation only — an upper bound on true owner earnings, not the real figure. Companies that report capex under a custom label (some large IFRS filers do) look better here than they are.
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC & adj. | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 157.1M | — | — | 157.1M |
| 2024 | 183.2M | — | — | 183.2M |
| 2023 | 237.8M | — | — | 237.8M |
| 2022 | 196.1M | — | — | 196.1M |
| 2021 | 152.3M | — | — | 152.3M |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF's starting value is a TTM dividend, not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 6.5B |
| Total Liabilities | 5.7B |
| Equity | 797.5M |
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