Sphere 3D Corp. (ANY) Stock Analysis
Sphere 3D Corp.
▾ What's in the 36/100 risk score? (higher = riskier)
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend, DCF applicability). See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
The tested reads point the wrong way. The survival risk in particular is the kind that has preceded real failures, and no valuation makes that acceptable.
What "tested" means here, and why there is no score out of 100
Tested means the read was measured against what actually happened afterwards, on a history that keeps the companies that were later delisted, using only figures that had been filed on the day they are used. Survival was ranked on companies that really did fail. What an owner keeps was tested across the universe from 2011 to 2025. A valuation finding appears only when the cheap fifth of that business type beat the index — 156 of the 206 combinations we tried did not.
Not tested means we compute it and find it useful, but we have never measured whether it predicts anything. Our own model valuation is in that category. It is shown, and it does not decide the verdict.
There is no single score because we have not tested one. Combining five reads into one number implies somebody checked that the combination works, and nobody has. When that test exists, a number can appear here.
📍 Where to start on this page, and what to look at first
How to read ANY (speculative micro-cap)
No model can pin a precise fair value on a company this small — but that does not mean there is nothing to learn. The useful questions are what the price is betting on, and whether the company can survive long enough to deliver it.
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1
Reverse-DCF — what growth the price assumes ↓
The single most useful number here: it backs out the growth the market is paying for. If that figure is "historically unprecedented," the price is running on hype, not fundamentals.
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2
Cash runway ↓
A pre-profit micro-cap lives or dies on whether it can fund itself to profitability before running out of money and diluting you.
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3
The raw financial statements + the 10-K ↓
At this scale, the actual numbers, insider ownership, and share-count trend tell you more than any ratio.
Is now a good time to buy ANY?
Macro: Neutral / mid-cycleANY trades at $3.09 vs an estimated intrinsic value of $1.94 — a +59.7% premium to model IV.
Not investment advice. The model can be wrong. Verify the assumptions in the sections below and consider consulting a licensed advisor for significant decisions.
What return would ANY pay as a bond?
Not measurable here. Pre-profit: the coupon is projected, not earned. An equity bond needs a coupon that exists today. See the cross-company ranking →
Riskier than 93% of the stocks we cover
▾ The numbers, the logic, and why not to trade on it
The logic. A model trained on every US filing since 2012 — including 823 companies that went bankrupt or stopped trading under a dollar — ranks each covered stock by its chance of failing in the next year, from its latest filing, price history and credit conditions. The rank is a position among peers; the table is a count of what happened to stocks in each position, scored each year by a model that had not seen that year.
| Rank band | went bankrupt within 12 months | fell 80% or more (or failed) within 12 months | fell 50% or more (or failed) within 6 months |
|---|---|---|---|
| All covered stocks (average) | 0.59% | 4.21% | 8.51% |
| Finance (sector average) | 0.13% | 1.25% | 3.09% |
| riskiest 1% | 16.4% | 33.0% | 45.5% |
| next 2% (97-99) | 5.9% | 24.9% | 38.2% |
| next 2% (95-97) | 3.4% | 21.2% | 33.8% |
| next 5% (90-95) ← this stock | 1.6% | 15.1% | 27.3% |
| next 15% (75-90) | 0.8% | 8.5% | 17.8% |
| next 25% (50-75) | 0.2% | 2.7% | 6.2% |
| safest half | <0.1% | 0.5% | 2.1% |
Why not to trade on it. We tested shorting these names and buying puts, spreads, straddles and condors on them at real option prices, 2010–2025: every version lost money. The market already prices the distress, and the survivors squeeze. Use a high rank to read the filings and to size for a total loss — not to bet against the company. A low rank says the balance sheet is calm, not that the price is sensible.
Scored from the filing of 2026-05-18; table generated 2026-09-18. Within Finance: rank 96 of 100. Rough one-year odds for this stock alone: bankruptcy 1.5%, an 80% fall 16.2% (the model overstates the middle of the range). Altman Z here: -30.93; on the same data Altman caught 26% of bankruptcies in its riskiest 5%, this rank 59%.
▾ The logic, and why not to buy on it
The logic. Trained on 2,900 acquisitions since 2012, the model leans on size (small), age, retained earnings, asset growth, volatility and how many deals the sector has just seen. Announcement = the day the stock jumped, not the day the paperwork was filed.
| top 1% | 15.4% acquired within a year |
| next 2% (97-99) | 10.3% acquired within a year |
| next 2% (95-97) | 9.0% acquired within a year |
| next 5% (90-95) ← this stock | 7.3% acquired within a year |
| next 15% (75-90) | 6.4% acquired within a year |
| next 25% (50-75) | 4.8% acquired within a year |
| bottom half | 3.0% acquired within a year |
Why not to buy on it. A takeover paid a median +22% on the day — but even in the top band about 6 in 7 companies are not bought, and those lag. Buying the whole top list returned what the S&P 500 did (2012–2023), and adding "cheap" or "beaten-down" filters did not change that. Read it as context for a thesis you already have, never as the thesis.
What growth must the market believe? Reverse DCF — Instead of asking "what is this stock worth?", asks "what growth rate is the current market price already assuming?"
Why it matters: It crystallizes the bull thesis as a single number you can argue with. If the market expects 40% growth for 10 years and you do not believe that, the stock is overvalued.
Reference: 10–15% = sustainable for strong companies · 20–25% = exceptional · 30%+ = historically very rare
Traditional DCF asks "what is this stock worth?" Reverse DCF flips it: it treats today's price as correct and solves for the growth rate that justifies it. In plain terms — if our model is right about everything else, the company's cash flow would have to grow (or shrink) by this much every year for the next 10 years for today's price to make sense. If that required growth looks unrealistic, the price is stretched; if it looks easy to beat, the price may be cheap.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation → must grow at:
▾ Exactly how this 10-year figure is computed
Forecast length: 10 years, single flat growth rate (no fade)
Terminal growth after year 10: 3.0%
Discount rate: 15.6% (the rate the model used)
Price used: $3.09 — the live price shown on this page (not frozen)
Method: solve for the constant annual growth rate that makes the discounted 10-year FCF stream + terminal value equal today's price.
Within range of what a quality mature business can sustainably deliver. Not demanding.
For reference: Reasonable — sustainable for a quality business over time.
▾ How we computed this · Reality check thresholds · Assumptions
- Starting FCF/share: $0.25 (projected from revenue × terminal margin)
- Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation →: 15.6% — standard 8-12%; 9-10% matches S&P 500 historical return - Terminal Growth RateTerminal Growth Rate — The growth rate we assume the company holds forever, after the explicit 10-year forecast period ends.
Why it matters: It anchors the long-tail value. Cannot mathematically exceed long-term GDP growth or the company eventually becomes larger than the global economy.
Reference: 2–3% (matches long-term US GDP growth) · Above 4% is mathematically problematic
Full explanation →: 3.0% — matches long-term GDP growth - Forecast horizon: 10 years explicit + terminal perpetuity
| ≤ 0% | Priced for decline — likely undervalued OR dying business |
| 5-12% | Reasonable; sustainable for quality businesses |
| 12-18% | Demanding — strong execution required |
| 18-25% | Exceptional — few companies sustain for a decade |
| 25-35% | Heroic — historically very rare |
| 35%+ | Borderline impossible at scale |
Sustaining 30%+ cash-flow growth for a full decade at scale is exceedingly rare — the bar is brutally high.
Use the interactive calculator below to change the discount rate, growth and terminal-growth assumptions and watch the value move.
⚠ At today's price, the market values ANY at about 0.5× its annual sales — a typical established company trades around 1–3×. Standard industry multiples (the bars below) collapse toward $0 at this scale, so they aren't the useful read. For a micro-cap with sales, lean on the Reverse-DCF (what revenue growth that price implies), the Momentum trend, and cash runway — see 📍 What to focus on.
Football field: where does the price sit?
Different valuation methods produce different fair-value ranges depending on assumptions. Plotting them together lets you see at a glance whether the current price is reasonable across approaches, or only one specific lens.
Industry multiples sourced from: broad market average (sector unknown). See the Peer Basket section below for the peer comparison and its limited-comparables caveat.
How to read a company this small
This is a crypto-mining operation, not a traditional business. The SEC may have classified it as "Financial Services" but the economics are completely different from a bank.
- Bitcoin (or other crypto) price — the most important variable; mining revenue scales linearly with the coin price
- Hash rate / network difficulty — how much of the total mining capacity this company controls
- Cost of electricity — typically 60-80% of operating cost; cheap power = competitive edge
- Hardware refresh cycle — ASIC miners depreciate fast (2-3 years); CapEx is huge and recurring
- Balance-sheet crypto holdings — how much BTC sits on their balance sheet (HODL strategy)
- Capital structure — share issuance is constant; check for dilution
P/B, ROE, ROA, P/E — these are bank-style metrics that don't describe a crypto miner. Standard DCF projects revenue trajectory but crypto price is wildly volatile so projections are speculative.
The 10-K explains hash rate, fleet size, electricity cost per kWh, and crypto holdings. Quarterly reports show production numbers. Glassnode and CoinMetrics track on-chain economics.
Classified as Cryptocurrency Mining Company (confidence 90%). Disagree? An admin can override via the post edit screen.
⚠ Genuine comparables are scarce at this size, so peer multiples are unreliable here. Treat as rough context only — see 📍 What to focus on above.
How does ANY stack up against its closest peers?
Ideally we compare ANY only to same-industry peers, but too few exist in our universe right now, so the basket below mixes in broader-sector names. Treat the multiples as rough context, not a valuation. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
0.5x / 3.6x / 4.5x |
| EV / Gross ProfitEV / Gross Profit — Enterprise value divided by gross profit — the multiple paid for what each dollar of sales contributes after direct costs. Why it matters: More refined than EV/Sales for high-margin businesses (software, marketplaces) where gross margin is the real economic engine. Reference: 8–15x for SaaS · 15–25x for hypergrowth software · >30x demanding Full explanation → |
1.3x / 4.6x / 13.6x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 peers (broad — see caveat); implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| VRME | VerifyMe, Inc. | Financial Services | $8M | 0.5x | 1.3x | — | 7.2% |
| LMFA | LM FUNDING AMERICA, INC. | Financial Services | $5M | 0.5x | — | — | 63.1% |
| MDBH | MDB Capital Holdings, LLC | Financial Services | $19M | — | — | 3.9x | — |
| NCPL | Netcapital Inc. | Financial Services ·fallback | $9M | 13.0x | 13.6x | — | 0.4% |
| TBH | Brag House Holdings, Inc. | Financial Services ·fallback | $14M | — | — | — | — |
| SNTG | Sentage Holdings Inc. | Financial Services ·fallback | $6M | 81.4x | 89.3x | — | — |
| GRAN | Grande Group Ltd/HK | Financial Services ·fallback | $15M | 3.6x | 4.6x | 8.1x | 4.4% |
| SAIH | SAIHEAT Ltd | Financial Services ·fallback | $20M | 4.5x | — | — | 0.1% |
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
The Z-score needs working capital, retained earnings, EBIT, sales and total assets from the latest balance sheet, and at least one of those isn't reported in machine-readable form here — common for foreign private issuers. We leave it blank rather than compute a distress verdict from an estimated input. It doesn't affect the reported figures in the financial tables below.
▾ The checks — what passed, what didn't (and what we couldn't measure)
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✗ Positive net incomeNet income -$21.5M in FY2025.Why this matters: Does the company actually earn a profit? Sustained losses eventually force it to raise money — diluting you — or take on debt.
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✗ Positive operating cash flowOperating cash flow -$16.1M (was -$4.6M the prior year).Why this matters: Profit can be an accounting figure; cash from running the business is harder to fake. Negative operating cash flow means the core business consumes cash and must be funded externally.
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✓ Cash flow backs up reported profitOperating cash flow -$16.1M vs net income -$21.5M.
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✗ Return on assets improvingReturn on assets -85.5% vs -21.9% a year ago.Why this matters: Is the company squeezing more profit out of each dollar of assets than last year? Rising = getting more efficient; falling = the opposite.
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✓ Debt load (vs assets)The filing reports no interest-bearing debt in either year (total assets $25.1M).
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✓ Short-term liquidity (current ratio)Current ratio 4.82x vs 4.57x a year ago.
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✗ Share count (dilution)Share count rose 47.2% (2.0M → 2.9M year-over-year).Why this matters: Issuing lots of new shares splits the pie into more pieces, shrinking your slice. Stable or falling share count protects existing owners.
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· Pricing power (gross margin) (n/a — data not reported; not scored)
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✓ Sales per asset (asset turnover)Asset turnover 0.45x vs 0.38x a year ago.
Missing data is never counted as a pass or a fail — it's shown as n/a and excluded from the denominator. Each check compares the company against its own prior year.
Plain English: the company holds about $4M in cash and is burning roughly $16M/year in operations. At that pace, the cash lasts 3 mo before it must raise capital (diluting shareholders), take on debt, or cut spending.
Assumes constant burn and ignores financing/asset sales. For pre-profit biotech and growth companies, this matters more than a DCF — a great drug pipeline is worthless if they run out of money before approval.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 15.6%, the figure our model used for ANY. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: the calculator opens at our published value of $1.94 — it is initialised to the same scenario-weighted result, so the two match exactly on load. The moment you move a slider, the value below becomes a single-path what-if at your assumptions (not the three-scenario weighting), which is why it can differ from the headline once you've touched it.
15.6% — beta-based (CAPM), from this stock's BetaBeta — How much the stock moves when the overall market moves. 1.0 = moves with the market; 1.5 = moves 50% more than the market.
Why it matters: Higher beta = more volatile = should demand higher discount rate. Low beta stocks (utilities, consumer staples) move less.
Reference: Most stocks 0.5–1.5 · Defensives ~0.3 · High-vol tech ~1.5–2.0
Full explanation → of 2.02. The safe Treasury rate plus a premium scaled by how much more (or less) volatile the stock is than the market.
13.0% — sector/quality tier. A simpler hurdle set by industry and business durability: lower for stable, wide-moat companies; higher for speculative or micro-caps.
The headline value and this calculator start at 15.6% — the beta-based rate. Drag the slider to the other rate to see the full range.
+59.7%
At the default assumptions the flat path lands near our published value of $1.94. Move any slider to recompute it with your own.
Move any slider above to recompute this against your own assumptions.
⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
Sphere 3D Corp. is fairly valued, with the model estimating a 59.7% premium to its intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation →. The market may be assigning value to potential future growth in its data management and cloud solutions, which is not fully captured by its current negative operating cash flow. The primary quantifiable risk is its consistent negative net income, having been unprofitable in 0/5 years.
As of 3 months ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Next quarter's operating cash flow
- Trend in net income
- Revenue growth rate sustainability
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Revenue fell -33% to $11.2M.
- Free cash flow is negative at -$24.4M — the cash burn widened vs last year.
- Still unprofitable at -$21.5M — loss widening.
Nothing was clearly improving year-over-year.
Management & Leadership
Limited executive data available. Sphere 3D Corp. operates in the data management and cloud solutions space.
What They Make
Sphere 3D Corp. provides data management and desktop virtualization solutions, serving businesses seeking to optimize their IT infrastructure.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
The market prices Sphere 3D Corp. at a 59.7% premium to the model's intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation →, likely reflecting its consistent unprofitability (0/5 years profitable) and negative operating cash flow. While revenue is growing at 31.7% annually, the lack of positive net income and cash flow suggests the market is cautious about its path to sustainable profitability.
Three Scenarios, Weighted
| Scenario | IV | Upside from today's price | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | $0.45 | -85.4% | 40% |
| Base | $1.87 | -39.6% | 35% |
| Optimistic | $4.41 | 42.7% | 25% |
| Weighted | $1.94 | -37.4% | 100% |
Reading the last column: it is the move from today's price to each value (IV ÷ price − 1). The headline "premium/discount to model IV" measures the same gap from the value's side (price ÷ IV − 1), so the two percentages differ in size and sign by construction — e.g. a price 8% above value is a value 7.4% below price.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
The company has negative operating cash flow and likely funds its operations through equity raises or debt, as no dividends or buybacks are indicated.
Growth / Revenue DCF Medium
Negative free cash flow: revenue/margin growth model used - standard FCF DCF is unreliable for companies still scaling.
Show advanced inputs
| Revenue Growth | 31.7% |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project net interest income and fee-income lines independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Revenue has been growing at 31.7%/yr over 4 years, from $4M to $11M, but net income has been negative in all of the last 5 years.
Geography & Markets
Sphere 3D Corp. is a US-headquartered company, but specific geographic revenue mix is not available from current data sources.
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)53.5NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BearishLine below signalThe fast trend is below the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently downward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (3 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (2)
- FCF negative: revenue/margin growth model projects future cash flows from revenue trajectory.
- Illiquidity discount 25% applied (small/micro-cap — harder to exit, demand a margin).
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From Sphere 3D Corp.'s SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 11.2M | -21.5M | $-7.37 |
| 2024 | 16.6M | -9.5M | $-4.78 |
| 2023 | 21.9M | -23.3M | $-1.93 |
| 2022 | 6.1M | -192.9M | $-20.36 |
| 2021 | 3.7M | -17.3M | $-0.58 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC & adj. | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | -16.1M | 7.5M | 832,000 | -24.4M |
| 2024 | -4.6M | 8.9M | 2.8M | -16.4M |
| 2023 | -6.6M | 1.6M | 2.4M | -10.6M |
| 2022 | -30.8M | 17.6M | 8.5M | -56.9M |
| 2021 | -28.5M | 102.2M | 366,000 | -131.1M |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: -16.1M − 7.5M − 832,000 (SBC & adj.) = -24.4M. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF's starting value is a projected from revenue × terminal margin, not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 25.1M |
| Total Liabilities | 1.8M (derived) |
| Equity | 23.3M |
Similar companies worth a look
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