Blackstone Inc. (BX) Stock Analysis
Blackstone Inc.
Nothing we have tested argues against it, and one check argues for it.
What each rating means, in numbers
Can it survive? — Safe. Safer than 83% of the companies we cover, judged on the warning signs that came before companies that really did fail.
Cash it pays you — Fair. For every $100 of share price, the business threw off about $4.5 of spare cash last year. Higher is better: the cheap fifth on this measure ran about 7.7 points a year ahead of the dear fifth, 2011 to 2025.
Business quality — Middling. Passes 4 of the 7 health checks we can measure — things like making a profit, turning it into cash, and not piling on debt. Across 131,000 company-quarters the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% against 1.4% for the strongest, in every era and all twelve sectors.
How wild is the price? — Average. The share price swings about 39% in a typical year, which puts it in the middling. Out of every 100 companies that swung like this, about 1.5 went bankrupt within the year. Across the three periods we tested that ran from 0.2% to 3.0%.
What "tested" means here, and why there is no score out of 100
Tested means the read was measured against what actually happened afterwards, on a history that keeps the companies that were later delisted, using only figures that had been filed on the day they are used. Survival was ranked on companies that really did fail. What an owner keeps was tested across the universe from 2011 to 2025.
The full record of everything we have tested is on the research pages.
Which benchmark. Over the period we tested, the median listed company returned +5.8% a year while the S&P 500 returned about +13.9% — the index is weighted by size and was carried by a handful of enormous winners. So "beats the index" and "beats the other companies you could have bought" are different questions. Where a read says it picks better companies, it means the second one. None of these gets you an index fund's return, and we would rather say that than imply otherwise.
The quality read is the strongest thing we have tested: 131,000 company-quarters across 5,300 companies, where the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% against 1.4% for the strongest, holding in every era and all twelve sectors. It still says less likely to break, not likely to beat the market — every band in that study lost to the index at the median, because the median listed company does.
Each read is shown on its own rather than merged into a single score, so you can see which part is strong and which is weak instead of taking an average on trust.
▾ What goes into the smart-money reading
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend, DCF applicability). It excludes the Altman Z score, whose retained-earnings input this filer does not report separately. See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
📍 Where to start on this page, and what to look at first
How to read BX (holding company)
A holding company is worth the sum of its parts plus its investment portfolio — value it on book value / sum-of-parts, not a single DCF.
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Sum-of-parts / book value lens ↓
Price-to-book and the value of the underlying businesses/holdings are the right yardstick.
BX earns management fees and carried interest. Under GAAP, much of that economics doesn't show up as free cash flow, so a cash-flow DCF structurally reads "overvalued" for firms like this — analysts value them on distributable earnings and fee-related earnings instead. Treat our DCF number as a conservative floor, lean on the peer comparison, P/E and dividend yield, and read the filings' distributable-earnings figures.
Who owns BX, and how it moves
From the SEC's own filings: every fund manager over $100M reports its holdings each quarter, and every officer and director reports theirs. Each point is what was public at the time.
2,145 institutions reported holding it at the latest quarter-end.
Safer than 83% of the stocks we cover
What this rating means, and what it does not
What this rank is — Safe. Safer than 83% of the companies we cover. Out of every 100 companies ranked here, about <0.1% went bankrupt within the year, against 0.6% for the average company we cover. The rank comes from a model trained on every US filing since 2012, including 823 companies that really did fail, and scored each year by a version that had not seen that year.
What it is not — Not a trade. We tested shorting these names and buying puts, spreads, straddles and condors on them at real option prices, 2010-2025. Every version lost money: the market already prices the distress and the survivors squeeze. A high rank is a reason to read the filings and to size for a total loss, not a reason to bet against the company. A low rank says the balance sheet is calm, not that the price is sensible.
▾ The numbers, the logic, and why not to trade on it
The logic. A model trained on every US filing since 2012 — including 823 companies that went bankrupt or stopped trading under a dollar — ranks each covered stock by its chance of failing in the next year, from its latest filing, price history and credit conditions. The rank is a position among peers; the table is a count of what happened to stocks in each position, scored each year by a model that had not seen that year.
| Rank band | went bankrupt within 12 months | fell 80% or more (or failed) within 12 months | fell 50% or more (or failed) within 6 months |
|---|---|---|---|
| All covered stocks (average) | 0.59% | 4.21% | 8.51% |
| Finance (sector average) | 0.13% | 1.25% | 3.09% |
| riskiest 1% | 16.4% | 33.0% | 45.5% |
| next 2% (97-99) | 5.9% | 24.9% | 38.2% |
| next 2% (95-97) | 3.4% | 21.2% | 33.8% |
| next 5% (90-95) | 1.6% | 15.1% | 27.3% |
| next 15% (75-90) | 0.8% | 8.5% | 17.8% |
| next 25% (50-75) | 0.2% | 2.7% | 6.2% |
| safest half ← this stock | <0.1% | 0.5% | 2.1% |
Why not to trade on it. We tested shorting these names and buying puts, spreads, straddles and condors on them at real option prices, 2010–2025: every version lost money. The market already prices the distress, and the survivors squeeze. Use a high rank to read the filings and to size for a total loss — not to bet against the company. A low rank says the balance sheet is calm, not that the price is sensible.
Scored from the filing of 2026-05-11; table generated 2026-09-18. Within Finance: rank 23 of 100. Rough one-year odds for this stock alone: bankruptcy 0.1%, an 80% fall 0.9% (the model overstates the middle of the range).
▾ The logic, and why not to buy on it
The logic. Trained on 2,900 acquisitions since 2012, the model leans on size (small), age, retained earnings, asset growth, volatility and how many deals the sector has just seen. Announcement = the day the stock jumped, not the day the paperwork was filed.
| top 1% | 15.4% acquired within a year |
| next 2% (97-99) | 10.3% acquired within a year |
| next 2% (95-97) | 9.0% acquired within a year |
| next 5% (90-95) | 7.3% acquired within a year |
| next 15% (75-90) | 6.4% acquired within a year |
| next 25% (50-75) | 4.8% acquired within a year |
| bottom half ← this stock | 3.0% acquired within a year |
Why not to buy on it. A takeover paid a median +22% on the day — but even in the top band about 6 in 7 companies are not bought, and those lag. Buying the whole top list returned what the S&P 500 did (2012–2023), and adding "cheap" or "beaten-down" filters did not change that. Read it as context for a thesis you already have, never as the thesis.
What growth must the market believe? Reverse DCF — Instead of asking "what is this stock worth?", asks "what growth rate is the current market price already assuming?"
Why it matters: It crystallizes the bull thesis as a single number you can argue with. If the market expects 40% growth for 10 years and you do not believe that, the stock is overvalued.
Reference: 10–15% = sustainable for strong companies · 20–25% = exceptional · 30%+ = historically very rare
Traditional DCF asks "what is this stock worth?" Reverse DCF flips it: it treats today's price as correct and solves for the growth rate that justifies it. In plain terms — if our model is right about everything else, the company's cash flow would have to grow (or shrink) by this much every year for the next 5 years for today's price to make sense. If that required growth looks unrealistic, the price is stretched; if it looks easy to beat, the price may be cheap.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation → must grow at:
▾ Exactly how this 5-year figure is computed
Forecast length: 5 years at the solved rate, then a linear fade to terminal growth over years 6-10 — the same shape the DCF above uses
Terminal growth after the fade: 2.5%
Discount rate: 11.9% (the rate the model used)
Price used: $111.75 — the live price shown on this page (not frozen)
Method: solve for the constant annual growth rate that makes the discounted 10-year FCF stream + terminal value equal today's price.
An above-average expectation for five years. Achievable for a genuinely strong business that executes well.
For reference: Exceptional is not a compliment here — sustaining mid-teens cash-flow growth for ten straight years is rare at scale. The price is betting on a top-tier outcome.
▾ How we computed this · Reality check thresholds · Assumptions
- Starting FCF/share: $3.98 (TTM)
- Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation →: 11.9% — standard 8-12%; 9-10% matches S&P 500 historical return - Terminal Growth RateTerminal Growth Rate — The growth rate we assume the company holds forever, after the explicit 10-year forecast period ends.
Why it matters: It anchors the long-tail value. Cannot mathematically exceed long-term GDP growth or the company eventually becomes larger than the global economy.
Reference: 2–3% (matches long-term US GDP growth) · Above 4% is mathematically problematic
Full explanation →: 2.5% — matches long-term GDP growth - Forecast horizon: 10 years explicit + terminal perpetuity
| ≤ 0% | Priced for decline — likely undervalued OR dying business |
| 5-12% | Reasonable; sustainable for quality businesses |
| 12-18% | Demanding — strong execution required |
| 18-25% | Exceptional — few companies sustain for a decade |
| 25-35% | Heroic — historically very rare |
| 35%+ | Borderline impossible at scale |
Sustaining 30%+ cash-flow growth for a full decade at scale is exceedingly rare — the bar is brutally high.
Use the interactive calculator below to change the discount rate, growth and terminal-growth assumptions and watch the value move.
What this rating means
What the rating says — Above every method. The current price sits ABOVE the high end of every method. The market is paying a premium to all of these lenses — it expects materially better growth or margins than the models assume.
What it does not say — Not a forecast. This shows where today's price sits against several different ways of valuing the business. Where the methods disagree, the spread itself is the useful part - it tells you how much the answer depends on which one you trust.
Football field: where does the price sit?
Different valuation methods produce different fair-value ranges depending on assumptions. Plotting them together lets you see at a glance whether the current price is reasonable across approaches, or only one specific lens.
Industry multiples sourced from: broad market average (sector unknown). See the Peer Basket section below for the peer comparison and its limited-comparables caveat.
How does BX stack up against its closest peers?
We take the 7 same-industry companies most similar to BX (similar size) and check what investors are paying for each dollar of their revenue (or profits). If BX is much more expensive on the same yardstick, that's a red flag — unless you have a specific reason it deserves a premium. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
2.4x / 3.1x / 8.2x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 7 same-industry peers; implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (7)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KKR | KKR & Co. Inc. | Asset Management | $86.1B | 4.4x | — | — | 2.1% |
| BAM | Brookfield Asset Management Ltd. | Asset Management | $95.2B | 19.8x | — | — | 2.1% |
| APO | Apollo Global Management, Inc. | Asset Management | $73.3B | 2.7x | — | — | 0.6% |
| AMP | AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC | Asset Management | $45.3B | 2.4x | — | — | 15.8% |
| ARES | Ares Management Corp | Asset Management | $39.1B | 8.2x | — | — | 1.2% |
| TROW | PRICE T ROWE GROUP INC | Asset Management | $22.4B | 3.1x | — | 10.2x | 5.5% |
| KKRT | KKR & Co. Inc. | Asset Management | $20.7B | 1.1x | — | — | 0.0% |
Valued like a holding company, not an operating business
BX is structured as a holding company with multiple operating subsidiaries and/or a large equity portfolio. Standard DCF on consolidated free cash flow misses the value of investments + cash on the balance sheet. The relevant anchor is book value per share — what each share owns of the underlying assets.
Why it matters: Per-share metrics are the only way to fairly compare two companies with different share counts.
▾ Why book value matters more than DCF for conglomerates
Caveats: book value uses historical cost — understates appreciated equity holdings. A premium of 30-60% to book is historically normal for well-managed conglomerates.
▾ View top 10 holdings
| Company | Value | % of portfolio |
|---|---|---|
| CHENIERE ENERGY PARTNERS L P | $6.2B | 19.0% |
| STATE STR SPDR S&P 500 ETF | $3.6B | 10.9% |
| SPACE EXPLORATION TECHN CORP | $2.7B | 8.1% |
| DIGITAL RLTY TR INC | $2.2B | 6.7% |
| COREBRIDGE FINL INC | $1.8B | 5.4% |
| LEGENCE CORP | $1.7B | 5.1% |
| FIRSTENERGY CORP | $1.4B | 4.2% |
| WILLIAMS COS INC | $1.3B | 3.9% |
| TARGA RES CORP | $1.0B | 2.9% |
| ENTERPRISE PRODS PARTNERS L | $0.9B | 2.7% |
Source: SEC Form 13F-HR · 45-day quarterly reporting lag · Top 10 of 515 positions shown.
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
What these health ratings mean, in numbers
Business quality — Middling. Passes 4 of the 7 health checks we can measure — making a profit, turning it into cash, not piling on debt, not issuing shares. Across 131,000 company-quarters the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% within a year against 1.4% for the strongest, and that held in every era and all twelve sectors. It says "less likely to break", not "likely to beat the market".
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
Insurance/investment holding companies (e.g. Berkshire) sit on huge securities portfolios and float liabilities — Altman Z reads that capital structure as "distress" even with tens of billions in earnings and cash. See the Sum-of-Parts / Book Value lens above instead.
Why it matters: High score = fundamentals improving. Low score = deteriorating. Especially powerful for filtering cheap stocks: cheap + high F-score historically outperforms; cheap + low F-score is often a value trap.
Reference: 7–9 = strong · 4–6 = mediocre · 0–3 = weak
Full explanation →
Piotroski F's checks (operating cash flow, gross-margin trend, current ratio, asset turnover) assume an industrial cost structure, so they misread asset-heavy or financial businesses like this one — a healthy REIT, utility, pipeline, BDC/fund or holding company can score low for reasons that aren't weakness. See the sector lens above for the metrics that actually matter.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 11.9%, the figure our model used for BX. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: the calculator opens at our published value of $25.63 — it is initialised to the same scenario-weighted result, so the two match exactly on load. The moment you move a slider, the value below becomes a single-path what-if at your assumptions (not the three-scenario weighting), which is why it can differ from the headline once you've touched it.
11.9% — beta-based (CAPM), from this stock's BetaBeta — How much the stock moves when the overall market moves. 1.0 = moves with the market; 1.5 = moves 50% more than the market.
Why it matters: Higher beta = more volatile = should demand higher discount rate. Low beta stocks (utilities, consumer staples) move less.
Reference: Most stocks 0.5–1.5 · Defensives ~0.3 · High-vol tech ~1.5–2.0
Full explanation → of 1.34. The safe Treasury rate plus a premium scaled by how much more (or less) volatile the stock is than the market.
10.0% — sector/quality tier. A simpler hurdle set by industry and business durability: lower for stable, wide-moat companies; higher for speculative or micro-caps.
The headline value and this calculator start at 11.9% — the beta-based rate. Drag the slider to the other rate to see the full range.
A full intrinsic value isn't shown for BX because it's valued with a sum-of-parts model this quick calculator doesn't replicate — see our published value above and the sector lens for the right metrics.
Move any slider above to recompute this against your own assumptions.
⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
Blackstone Inc. is deeply overvalued, with the market price at a +336.0% premium to the model's intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation →. The market appears to be paying up for future growth and quality, despite a -10.6%/yr revenue decline over the last four years. The market may be assigning value to potential expansion into new alternative asset classes or strategic acquisitions, which is not in the model. The number one quantifiable risk is the significant stock-based compensation, which equals 32% of pre-SBCSBC (Stock-Based Compensation) — Paying employees with company shares instead of cash.
Why it matters: It's a real cost — it dilutes your ownership — so we subtract it from free cash flow even though accounting rules add it back, which would otherwise flatter cash-heavy tech companies.
Reference: Can be 10–30% of revenue at high-growth software firms.
Full explanation → free cash flowFree Cash Flow (FCF) — Operating cash flow minus capital spending: cash left after a company covers operating costs, taxes and interest and reinvests in the business — but BEFORE repaying debt principal or paying dividends. The cash actually available to investors.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation →.
As of 4 months ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Growth in assets under management (AUM)
- Trends in fee-related earnings
- Changes in long-term debt levels
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Revenue grew +9% to $14.45B.
- Free cash flow rose to $3.10B.
- Net income grew +9% to $3.02B.
Nothing was clearly worsening year-over-year.
Management & Leadership
Stephen A. Schwarzman is the Chairman and CEO of Blackstone, a role he has held since co-founding the firm in 1985. Jon Gray serves as President and Chief Operating Officer, overseeing the firm's day-to-day operations and strategic initiatives.
What They Make
Blackstone is a global alternative asset manager that invests capital on behalf of institutional and individual investors. They manage a diverse portfolio of assets, including private equity, real estate, credit, and hedge fund solutions.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
The market prices BX at a premium of +356.4% to the model, likely due to its consistent profitability (net income positive 5/5 yrs) and positive operating cash flow (positive 5/5 yrs), which suggest a durable business model. The market may be assigning value to the firm's ability to attract and manage large pools of capital in a growing alternative asset management sector, which is not in the model.
Three Scenarios, Weighted
| Scenario | IV | Upside from today's price | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | $22.37 | -80.0% | 40% |
| Base | $26.02 | -76.7% | 35% |
| Optimistic | $30.28 | -72.9% | 25% |
| Weighted | $25.63 | -77.1% | 100% |
Reading the last column: it is the move from today's price to each value (IV ÷ price − 1). The headline "premium/discount to model IV" measures the same gap from the value's side (price ÷ IV − 1), so the two percentages differ in size and sign by construction — e.g. a price 8% above value is a value 7.4% below price.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
Free Cash Flow DCF High
Standard FCF DCF: positive free cash flow in a sector suited for cash-flow-based valuation.
Show advanced inputs
| Revenue Growth | -10.6% |
| Eps Growth | -17.0% |
| Historical Fcf Growth | -1.4% |
| Sector Default | 8.0% |
| Best Estimate | -5.0% |
| Method | blend(70% revenue_cagr, 30% sector) |
| Growth Basis | total |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project net interest income and fee-income lines independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Revenue has been declining at -10.6%/yr over the last four years, from $22577M to $14450M.
Geography & Markets
Blackstone operates globally, with a significant presence in North America, Europe, and Asia, serving a diverse international client base. Exact geographic segment splits are not available from current data sources.
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)44.7NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BearishLine below signalThe fast trend is below the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently downward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (3 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (3)
- Stock-based compensation equals 32% of pre-SBC free cash flow; FCF used here is net of SBC (a real shareholder-dilution cost), so it is lower than the headline GAAP cash-flow figure.
- Terminal growth (3%) capped to 0% (80% of near-term growth -5%, floored to 0%).
- Price is 4.6x model IV - market may be pricing optionality, narrative catalysts, or margin expansion beyond what trailing cash flows support.
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From Blackstone Inc.'s SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 14.5B | 3.0B | $3.87 |
| 2024 | 13.2B | 2.8B | $3.62 |
| 2023 | 8.0B | 1.4B | $1.84 |
| 2022 | 8.5B | 1.7B | $2.36 |
| 2021 | 22.6B | 5.9B | $8.13 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC & adj. | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 4.7B | 115.7M | 1.4B | 3.1B |
| 2024 | 3.5B | 61.4M | 1.2B | 2.3B |
| 2023 | 4.1B | 224.2M | 987.5M | 2.8B |
| 2022 | 6.3B | 235.5M | 846.3M | 5.3B |
| 2021 | 4.0B | 64.3M | 637.4M | 3.3B |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: 4.7B − 115.7M − 1.4B (SBC & adj.) = 3.1B. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 47.7B |
| Total Liabilities | 25.8B |
| Equity | 8.7B |
| Total Debt | 12.6B |
Similar companies worth a look
Same sector and industry, similar fundamentals shape. Verify everything yourself — this list is computed mechanically and does not reflect our judgment about whether any of these are a good investment.