CoreCivic, Inc. (CXW) Stock Analysis
CoreCivic, Inc.
Everything we have tested points the right way. That is a reason to look closer, not a reason to buy — these are frequencies about groups of companies in the past, not a statement about this one.
What each rating means, in numbers
Can it survive? — Very safe. Safer than 94% of the companies we cover, judged on the warning signs that came before companies that really did fail.
Business quality — Strong. Passes 7 of the 8 health checks we can measure — things like making a profit, turning it into cash, and not piling on debt. Across 131,000 company-quarters the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% against 1.4% for the strongest, in every era and all twelve sectors.
How wild is the price? — Average. The share price swings about 39% in a typical year, which puts it in the middling. Out of every 100 companies that swung like this, about 1.5 went bankrupt within the year. Across the three periods we tested that ran from 0.2% to 3.0%.
What "tested" means here, and why there is no score out of 100
Tested means the read was measured against what actually happened afterwards, on a history that keeps the companies that were later delisted, using only figures that had been filed on the day they are used. Survival was ranked on companies that really did fail. What an owner keeps was tested across the universe from 2011 to 2025.
The full record of everything we have tested is on the research pages.
Which benchmark. Over the period we tested, the median listed company returned +5.8% a year while the S&P 500 returned about +13.9% — the index is weighted by size and was carried by a handful of enormous winners. So "beats the index" and "beats the other companies you could have bought" are different questions. Where a read says it picks better companies, it means the second one. None of these gets you an index fund's return, and we would rather say that than imply otherwise.
The quality read is the strongest thing we have tested: 131,000 company-quarters across 5,300 companies, where the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% against 1.4% for the strongest, holding in every era and all twelve sectors. It still says less likely to break, not likely to beat the market — every band in that study lost to the index at the median, because the median listed company does.
Each read is shown on its own rather than merged into a single score, so you can see which part is strong and which is weak instead of taking an average on trust.
▾ What goes into the smart-money reading
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend). It excludes the Altman Z score, whose retained-earnings input this filer does not report separately. See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
Chance the S&P 500 falls 10% or more in the next three months.
Counted from every day since 2006. Says nothing about CXW — see the board for how it is measured.
📍 Where to start on this page, and what to look at first
How to read CXW (REIT)
REITs pay out most of their cash, so judge them on cash distributions and the value of their property — not on earnings or a standard DCF.
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1
REIT lens (P/AFFO + dividend yield) ↓
Price-to-AFFO and the dividend yield are the real cheap/expensive gauges for real estate.
Standard DCF doesn't fit CXW well — but that's expected for this kind of business. The REIT Valuation Lens below uses the metrics actually used by analysts who value reits. Reverse DCF + Football Field also work as cross-checks.
Who owns CXW, and how it moves
From the SEC's own filings: every fund manager over $100M reports its holdings each quarter, and every officer and director reports theirs. Each point is what was public at the time.
Safer than 95% of the stocks we cover
What this rating means, and what it does not
What this rank is — Very safe. Safer than 95% of the companies we cover. Out of every 100 companies ranked here, about <0.1% went bankrupt within the year, against 0.6% for the average company we cover. The rank comes from a model trained on every US filing since 2012, including 823 companies that really did fail, and scored each year by a version that had not seen that year.
What it is not — Not a trade. We tested shorting these names and buying puts, spreads, straddles and condors on them at real option prices, 2010-2025. Every version lost money: the market already prices the distress and the survivors squeeze. A high rank is a reason to read the filings and to size for a total loss, not a reason to bet against the company. A low rank says the balance sheet is calm, not that the price is sensible.
▾ The numbers, the logic, and why not to trade on it
The logic. A model trained on every US filing since 2012 — including 823 companies that went bankrupt or stopped trading under a dollar — ranks each covered stock by its chance of failing in the next year, from its latest filing, price history and credit conditions. The rank is a position among peers; the table is a count of what happened to stocks in each position, scored each year by a model that had not seen that year.
| Rank band | went bankrupt within 12 months | fell 80% or more (or failed) within 12 months | fell 50% or more (or failed) within 6 months |
|---|---|---|---|
| All covered stocks (average) | 0.59% | 4.21% | 8.51% |
| Finance (sector average) | 0.13% | 1.25% | 3.09% |
| riskiest 1% | 16.4% | 33.0% | 45.5% |
| next 2% (97-99) | 5.9% | 24.9% | 38.2% |
| next 2% (95-97) | 3.4% | 21.2% | 33.8% |
| next 5% (90-95) | 1.6% | 15.1% | 27.3% |
| next 15% (75-90) | 0.8% | 8.5% | 17.8% |
| next 25% (50-75) | 0.2% | 2.7% | 6.2% |
| safest half ← this stock | <0.1% | 0.5% | 2.1% |
Why not to trade on it. We tested shorting these names and buying puts, spreads, straddles and condors on them at real option prices, 2010–2025: every version lost money. The market already prices the distress, and the survivors squeeze. Use a high rank to read the filings and to size for a total loss — not to bet against the company. A low rank says the balance sheet is calm, not that the price is sensible.
Scored from the filing of 2026-05-08; table generated 2026-09-18. Within Finance: rank 7 of 100. Rough one-year odds for this stock alone: bankruptcy <0.1%, an 80% fall 0.3% (the model overstates the middle of the range).
▾ The logic, and why not to buy on it
The logic. Trained on 2,900 acquisitions since 2012, the model leans on size (small), age, retained earnings, asset growth, volatility and how many deals the sector has just seen. Announcement = the day the stock jumped, not the day the paperwork was filed.
| top 1% | 15.4% acquired within a year |
| next 2% (97-99) | 10.3% acquired within a year |
| next 2% (95-97) | 9.0% acquired within a year |
| next 5% (90-95) | 7.3% acquired within a year |
| next 15% (75-90) | 6.4% acquired within a year |
| next 25% (50-75) ← this stock | 4.8% acquired within a year |
| bottom half | 3.0% acquired within a year |
Why not to buy on it. A takeover paid a median +22% on the day — but even in the top band about 6 in 7 companies are not bought, and those lag. Buying the whole top list returned what the S&P 500 did (2012–2023), and adding "cheap" or "beaten-down" filters did not change that. Read it as context for a thesis you already have, never as the thesis.
How does CXW stack up against its closest peers?
We take the 8 same-industry companies most similar to CXW (similar size) and check what investors are paying for each dollar of their revenue (or profits). If CXW is much more expensive on the same yardstick, that's a red flag — unless you have a specific reason it deserves a premium. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
3.2x / 5.7x / 9.3x |
| EV / EBITEV / EBITDA — Enterprise value divided by earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. Why it matters: A classic "what would a private buyer pay" multiple — used in M&A. Strips out tax and capital-structure noise. Reference: 8–12x for mature businesses · 15–25x for growth · Below 5x often signals distress Full explanation → |
5.0x / 7.8x / 8.0x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 same-industry peers; implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RCD | Ready Capital Corp | REITs | $3.8B | — | — | — | 3.0% |
| IRT | INDEPENDENCE REALTY TRUST, INC. | REITs | $3.8B | 9.3x | — | — | 4.1% |
| SLG | SL GREEN REALTY CORP | REITs | $3.2B | 3.2x | — | 5.0x | 7.6% |
| REGCO | REGENCY CENTERS CORP | REITs | $4.0B | 5.7x | — | 7.8x | 12.6% |
| RWTN | REDWOOD TRUST INC | REITs | $3.1B | — | — | — | 3.0% |
| SKT | TANGER INC. | REITs | $4.1B | — | — | — | 3.0% |
| RWTQ | REDWOOD TRUST INC | REITs | $3.1B | — | — | — | 3.1% |
| REGCP | REGENCY CENTERS CORP | REITs | $4.3B | 5.8x | — | 8.0x | 11.9% |
Real-estate-specific metrics
REITs are valued on AFFO (Adjusted Funds from Operations) and dividend yield, not DCF. Reported depreciation isn't a real cash cost for real estate — properties typically hold or appreciate. The metrics below are the industry-standard yardsticks.
Note: Depreciation & Amortization line not available — using FCF/share as AFFO proxy. Directionally correct but understates true AFFO (true AFFO adds back D&A and subtracts only maintenance CapEx; FCF subtracts all CapEx).
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
What these health ratings mean, in numbers
Business quality — Strong. Passes 7 of the 8 health checks we can measure — making a profit, turning it into cash, not piling on debt, not issuing shares. Across 131,000 company-quarters the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% within a year against 1.4% for the strongest, and that held in every era and all twelve sectors. It says "less likely to break", not "likely to beat the market".
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
REITs deliberately carry high leverage backed by long-life real estate and pay out 90%+ of taxable income — both inputs that Altman Z flags as distress. See the REIT Valuation Lens above for P/AFFO, dividend yield and payout ratio.
Why it matters: High score = fundamentals improving. Low score = deteriorating. Especially powerful for filtering cheap stocks: cheap + high F-score historically outperforms; cheap + low F-score is often a value trap.
Reference: 7–9 = strong · 4–6 = mediocre · 0–3 = weak
Full explanation →
Piotroski F's checks (operating cash flow, gross-margin trend, current ratio, asset turnover) assume an industrial cost structure, so they misread asset-heavy or financial businesses like this one — a healthy REIT, utility, pipeline, BDC/fund or holding company can score low for reasons that aren't weakness. See the sector lens above for the metrics that actually matter.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 10.0%, the figure our model used for CXW. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: no headline intrinsic value is published for this stock (the valuation is held for a data-quality reason — see the notes above). The calculator below is a what-if tool: the values it produces are your assumptions played out, not our estimate.
A full intrinsic value isn't shown for CXW because the valuation is currently held for a data-quality reason (see the guardrail notes above). The reverse-DCF reading still works — it needs only the price and cash flow — but we won't publish a forward value until the underlying data passes our checks.
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⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
A standard discounted cash flowDCF — Discounted Cash Flow — sums up all future cash a business will produce, adjusted for the fact that future dollars are worth less than dollars today.
Why it matters: It is the most fundamentally honest valuation method when applicable — but only works for companies with predictable, positive cash flow.
Reference: Best for: mature, profitable businesses. Fails for: pre-profit growth, banks, REITs.
Full explanation → valuation is not meaningful for CoreCivic, Inc. because the model implies no positive equity value under its assumptions, as indicated by the 'INVARIANT: weighted IV is non-positive' flag. Investors are likely focused on the company's consistent positive operating cash flow and revenue growth, betting on its stability as a REITREIT (Real Estate Investment Trust) — A company that owns income-producing real estate and is required to pay out about 90% of its profit to shareholders as dividends.
Why it matters: Because they pay out almost everything, REITs are judged on the cash they distribute (price-to-AFFO and dividend yield), not on ordinary earnings — a normal P/E or DCF misleads here.
Reference: Dividend yields often 3–6%; valued on price-to-AFFO, not P/E.
Full explanation →. The #1 quantifiable risk is the model's inability to derive a positive equity value, suggesting fundamental valuation challenges.
As of 4 months ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Continued revenue growth above 4%
- Further reduction in long-term debt
- Maintenance of positive operating cash flow
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Revenue grew +13% to $2.21B.
- Net income grew +69% to $116.5M.
- Free cash flow fell to $25.1M.
Management & Leadership
Damon Hininger serves as the President and Chief Executive Officer of CoreCivic, Inc., a role he has held since 2009. He has been with the company for over 25 years, having previously served as Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer. David Garfinkle is the Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer.
What They Make
CoreCivic, Inc. is a diversified government solutions company that owns and manages correctional and detention facilities, as well as provides residential reentry centers. Its customers are primarily federal, state, and local government agencies.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
What we use instead: earnings (P/E, EV/EBIT), book value (P/B) — computed from the figures this company does report, shown in the sections below. Those numbers are unaffected by the missing cash-flow data.
The market's pricing for CoreCivic is likely driven by its consistent positive operating cash flow and revenue growth of 4.4%/yr over four years, suggesting a stable, if slow-growing, business. Despite these positive health signals, the valuation model struggles to find positive equity value, indicating that the market may be pricing in the REITREIT (Real Estate Investment Trust) — A company that owns income-producing real estate and is required to pay out about 90% of its profit to shareholders as dividends.
Why it matters: Because they pay out almost everything, REITs are judged on the cash they distribute (price-to-AFFO and dividend yield), not on ordinary earnings — a normal P/E or DCF misleads here.
Reference: Dividend yields often 3–6%; valued on price-to-AFFO, not P/E.
Full explanation →'s dividend potential and perceived stability rather than significant future growth or cash flow expansion.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
Dividend Discount
REIT (REITs): dividend discount model - GAAP earnings distort REIT valuations.
Show advanced inputs
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project net interest income and fee-income lines independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Revenue is growing at 4.4%/yr over four years, and net income has been positive in 4 out of the last 5 years.
Geography & Markets
CoreCivic, Inc. primarily operates within the United States, managing facilities and providing services to federal, state, and local government agencies across various states. Specific geographic mix percentages are not available from current data sources.
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)52.7NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BullishLine above signalThe fast trend is above the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently upward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (5 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (4)
- Dividend derived from cash-flow statement ($0/yr; SEC has no per-share dividend feed).
- INVARIANT: weighted IV is non-positive. Model may not be appropriate.
- Model implies no positive equity value under these assumptions. Valuation is speculative/low-confidence.
- Dividend data sparse; DDM using estimated yield. Confidence reduced.
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From CoreCivic, Inc.'s SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 2.2B | 116.5M | $1.08 |
| 2024 | 2.0B | 68.9M | $0.62 |
| 2023 | 1.9B | 67.6M | $0.59 |
| 2022 | 1.8B | 122.3M | $1.03 |
| 2021 | 1.9B | -51.9M | $-0.43 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC & adj. | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 194.6M | 141.8M | 27.7M | 25.1M |
| 2024 | 269.2M | 70.4M | 25.7M | 173.1M |
| 2023 | 231.9M | 67.7M | 20.8M | 143.4M |
| 2022 | 153.6M | 83.4M | 17.6M | 52.6M |
| 2021 | 263.2M | 81.5M | 18.7M | 163.0M |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: 194.6M − 141.8M − 27.7M (SBC & adj.) = 25.1M. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF's starting value is a TTM dividend, not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 3.3B |
| Total Liabilities | 1.9B |
| Equity | 1.4B |
| Total Debt | 1.2B |
Similar companies worth a look
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