Is F&G Annuities & Life, Inc. (FGN) a good stock to buy?
Nothing we have tested argues against it, and one check argues for it.
What each rating means, in numbers
Business quality — Middling. Passes 4 of the 7 health checks we can measure — things like making a profit, turning it into cash, and not piling on debt. Across 131,000 company-quarters the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% against 1.4% for the strongest, in every era and all twelve sectors.
How wild is the price? — Very calm. The share price swings about 22% in a typical year, which puts it in the calmest fifth. Out of every 100 companies that swung like this, about 0.3 went bankrupt within the year. Across the three periods we tested that ran from 0.1% to 0.7%.
What "tested" means here, and why there is no score out of 100
Tested means the read was measured against what actually happened afterwards, on a history that keeps the companies that were later delisted, using only figures that had been filed on the day they are used. Survival was ranked on companies that really did fail. What an owner keeps was tested across the universe from 2011 to 2025.
The full record of everything we have tested is on the research pages.
Which benchmark. Over the period we tested, the median listed company returned +5.8% a year while the S&P 500 returned about +13.9% — the index is weighted by size and was carried by a handful of enormous winners. So "beats the index" and "beats the other companies you could have bought" are different questions. Where a read says it picks better companies, it means the second one. None of these gets you an index fund's return, and we would rather say that than imply otherwise.
The quality read is the strongest thing we have tested: 131,000 company-quarters across 5,300 companies, where the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% against 1.4% for the strongest, holding in every era and all twelve sectors. It still says less likely to break, not likely to beat the market — every band in that study lost to the index at the median, because the median listed company does.
Each read is shown on its own rather than merged into a single score, so you can see which part is strong and which is weak instead of taking an average on trust.
▾ What goes into the smart-money reading
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend, DCF applicability). It excludes the Altman Z score, whose retained-earnings input this filer does not report separately. See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
Chance the S&P 500 falls 10% or more in the next three months.
Counted from every day since 2006. Says nothing about FGN — see the board for how it is measured.
📍 Where to start on this page, and what to look at first
How to read FGN (bank / insurer)
Banks and insurers are valued on what they earn on their capital, not on free cash flow — a normal DCF misleads here.
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1
Bank / Insurance lens (P/TBV + ROE) ↓
Price-to-tangible-book versus return-on-equity is how analysts actually judge a bank cheap or rich.
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2
Financial-health screens ↓
Watch the trend in profitability and asset quality, not the (not-applicable) bankruptcy score.
Is F&G Annuities & Life, Inc. (FGN) overvalued?
Macro: Neutral / mid-cycleNo, by our measure: the price is about 68% below what we think the business is worth.
FGN trades at $22.58 vs an estimated intrinsic value of $70.62 — a 68.0% discount to model IV.
Not investment advice. The model can be wrong. Verify the assumptions in the sections below and consider consulting a licensed advisor for significant decisions.
What return would FGN pay as a bond?
Not measurable here. Banks and insurers have no owner-earnings coupon in the operating sense — their deposits and float are the business. The bank lens (book value + return on equity) is the comparable read. See the cross-company ranking →
What this rating means
What the rating says — Methods disagree. Methods disagree: the price is BELOW 1 of 2 method ranges (Our model's scenarios (conservative → optimistic; ◆ base, ● weighted 40/35/25)), while remaining inside the very wide If FCF grew -5%/yr → 13%/yr (flat 10-yr DCF sweep; model assumes 7.0%) band. That makes the read assumption-sensitive, not "fairly valued" — the verdict depends on which lens you trust.
What it does not say — Not a forecast. This shows where today's price sits against several different ways of valuing the business. Where the methods disagree, the spread itself is the useful part - it tells you how much the answer depends on which one you trust.
Football field: where does the price sit?
Both bars below come from our own cash-flow model — one tries a range of growth rates, one shows our three scenarios. A third bar comparing FGN with similar companies appears only when there are enough close peers to trust it, and there aren't here. So this shows how much the answer depends on growth, not a set of independent checks.
Industry multiples sourced from: industry similar to Insurance. See the Peer Basket section below for the peer comparison and its limited-comparables caveat.
How does FGN stack up against its closest peers?
We take the 8 same- or closely-related-industry companies closest in size to FGN and check what investors are paying for each dollar of their revenue (or profits). If FGN is much more expensive on the same yardstick, that's a red flag — unless you have a specific reason it deserves a premium. For a leveraged business, FCF yield (in the table) is usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
0.3x / 0.7x / 0.9x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 same-industry peers; implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FG | F&G Annuities & Life, Inc. | Life Insurance | $2.9B | — | 9.0% |
| BHF | Brighthouse Financial, Inc. | Life Insurance | $2.9B | — | 14.9% |
| GNW | GENWORTH FINANCIAL INC | Life Insurance | $3.3B | — | 6.3% |
| FGSN | F&G Annuities & Life, Inc. | Life Insurance | $2.7B | — | 9.8% |
| ATHS | Athene Holding Ltd. | Life Insurance | $5.0B | — | 54.2% |
| RZC | REINSURANCE GROUP OF AMERICA INC | Life Insurance | $1.7B | — | 69.7% |
| RZB | REINSURANCE GROUP OF AMERICA INC | Life Insurance | $1.7B | — | 69.9% |
| PFH | PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC | Life Insurance | $5.7B | — | 62.0% |
How to value an insurer (not a bank, not a DCF)
An insurer collects premiums today and pays claims later. The money held in between — the float — is invested, so the balance sheet is full of investments that belong, eventually, to policyholders. That makes free-cash-flow DCF meaningless and enterprise value actively misleading. What matters is the book value of shareholder equity, the return earned on it, and whether book value per share compounds year after year. For property & casualty underwriters, the combined ratio says whether the insurance itself made money before any investment income.
Why it matters: For banks and insurers, book value is the regulatory capital they earn returns on. P/B is the cleanest comparison: 1.0× means buying the bank at the same price the accountants say it's worth.
Reference: 0.8–1.2× = fair for average bank · 1.5–2.0× = solid franchise · >2.5× = premium · <0.8× = potentially cheap or distress
Full explanation →
Why it matters: For a bank, ROE is the engine. A bank earning 15% on equity will compound book value at ~15%/year if it retains earnings. Combined with P/B, ROE tells you whether a premium price is supported by returns.
Reference: <8% = weak · 10–12% = solid · 15%+ = excellent · >20% sustained = exceptional franchise
Full explanation →
Why it matters: High P/E = market expects fast growth or you are overpaying. Low P/E = market expects slow growth or the stock is cheap (sometimes for good reason).
Reference: 12–20 for mature businesses · 25–50 for growth · 80+ for speculative
Full explanation →
This lens skips Altman Z and Piotroski (both validated on industrial companies) and skips enterprise value entirely — an insurer's investments back policy liabilities and are not surplus cash. The things to check in the 10-K are reserve development (did past years' claims cost more than reserved?), the investment portfolio's credit quality, and catastrophe exposure.
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
What these health ratings mean, in numbers
Business quality — Middling. Passes 4 of the 7 health checks we can measure — things like making a profit, turning it into cash, and not piling on debt. Across 131,000 company-quarters the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% within a year against 1.4% for the strongest, and that held in every era and all twelve sectors. It says "less likely to break", not "likely to beat the market".
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
Altman Z was calibrated on industrial firms and doesn't apply to insurers — the balance sheet is dominated by investments held against policy liabilities, not working capital. See the Insurance Valuation Lens above for price-to-book, return on equity, book-value growth and the combined ratio — the measures analysts in that industry actually use.
Why it matters: High score = fundamentals improving. Low score = deteriorating. Especially powerful for filtering cheap stocks: cheap + high F-score historically outperforms; cheap + low F-score is often a value trap.
Reference: 7–9 = strong · 4–6 = mediocre · 0–3 = weak
Full explanation →
Piotroski F was built for non-financial firms (gross margin, asset turnover and current ratio all assume an industrial cost structure). For insurers the equivalent quality signals are the combined ratio, reserve development and investment-portfolio credit quality — see the Insurance Valuation Lens above.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 9.0%, the figure our model used for FGN. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: the calculator opens at our published value of $70.62 — it is initialised to the same scenario-weighted result, so the two match exactly on load. The moment you move a slider, the value below becomes a single-path what-if at your assumptions (not the three-scenario weighting), which is why it can differ from the headline once you've touched it.
7.5% — beta-based (CAPM), from this stock's BetaBeta — How much the stock moves when the overall market moves. 1.0 = moves with the market; 1.5 = moves 50% more than the market.
Why it matters: Higher beta = more volatile = should demand higher discount rate. Low beta stocks (utilities, consumer staples) move less.
Reference: Most stocks 0.5–1.5 · Defensives ~0.3 · High-vol tech ~1.5–2.0
Full explanation → of 0.55. The safe Treasury rate plus a premium scaled by how much more (or less) volatile the stock is than the market.
10.0% — sector/quality tier. A simpler hurdle set by industry and business durability: lower for stable, wide-moat companies; higher for speculative or micro-caps.
The headline value and this calculator start at 9.0% — the mid-point of the two. Drag the slider to the other rate to see the full range.
FGN is valued with a bank residual-income model. The calculator above starts from that published value and shows how it moves with the discount rate and long-run growth; it does not rebuild the model year by year. The sector lens shows the measures that matter most for this kind of business.
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⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
F&G Annuities & Life, Inc. (FGN) trades at a significant discount to the model, with an estimated 64.6% gap. The market likely discounts FGN due to its rising long-term debt, which has more than doubled over four years, and its low franchise durability score of 1/5. The primary quantifiable risk is the substantial increase in long-term debt from $977M to $2.2 billion.
As of 4 months ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Future long-term debt levels in upcoming filings
- Trends in net income and operating cash flow
- Changes in regulatory environment for annuities
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Free cash flow fell to $4.65B.
- Net income fell -59% to $265.0M.
Nothing was clearly improving year-over-year.
Roughly flat: Revenue was flat 0% to $5.73B.
Management & Leadership
F&G Annuities & Life, Inc. is led by Chris Maryanopolis as President and CEO. He has been in his role since 2022, guiding the company's strategy in the annuities and life insurance sector. The executive team focuses on expanding the company's financial product offerings.
What They Make
F&G Annuities & Life, Inc. provides annuities and life insurance products, primarily serving individuals seeking retirement planning and wealth accumulation solutions.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
FGN is priced at a 68.0% discount to the model, likely reflecting market concerns over its rising long-term debt, which has increased from $977M to $2.2 billion. This debt growth, coupled with a low franchise durability score of 1/5, suggests the market is factoring in potential risks despite positive revenue growth and operating cash flow.
Three Scenarios, Weighted
| Scenario | IV | Upside from today's price | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | $56.00 | 148.0% | 40% |
| Base | $75.94 | 236.3% | 35% |
| Optimistic | $86.57 | 283.4% | 25% |
| Weighted | $70.62 | 212.8% | 100% |
Reading the last column: it is the move from today's price to each value (IV ÷ price − 1). The headline "premium/discount to model IV" measures the same gap from the value's side (price ÷ IV − 1), so the two percentages differ in size and sign by construction — e.g. a price 8% above value is a value 7.4% below price.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
As a financial institution, FGN funds itself through premiums and investment income, with capital allocated to policyholder reserves and managing its rising long-term debt.
Residual Income High
Balance-sheet financial (Life Insurance): residual income model - book value is meaningful anchor.
Show advanced inputs
| Sector Default | 8.0% |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated residual-income (book value and returns) model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project premium growth, underwriting (combined ratio) and investment income independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Revenue has been growing at 9.6%/yr over four years, from $4.0 billion to $5.7 billion.
Geography & Markets
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)50.8NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BearishLine below signalThe fast trend is below the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently downward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (3 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (3)
- Financial sector: using residual income model. IV = Book Value + PV(excess earnings).
- Discount rate floored from 7.5% to 9.0% (financial sector minimum).
- Growth clamped from 8% to 7% (must be < discount rate 9%).
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From F&G Annuities & Life, Inc.'s SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 5.7B | 265.0M | $1.88 |
| 2024 | 5.7B | 639.0M | $4.88 |
| 2023 | 4.5B | -58.0M | $-0.47 |
| 2022 | 2.3B | 635.0M | $5.52 |
| 2021 | 4.0B | 1.2B | $11.81 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
Capital expenditure isn't tagged in this filer's machine-readable data (the CapEx column shows "—"). The free-cash-flow column is therefore operating cash flow less stock-based compensation only — an upper bound on true owner earnings, not the real figure. Companies that report capex under a custom label (some large IFRS filers do) look better here than they are.
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC & adj. | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 4.7B | — | 31.0M | 4.7B |
| 2024 | 6.0B | — | — | 6.0B |
| 2023 | 5.8B | — | — | 5.8B |
| 2022 | 3.2B | — | — | 3.2B |
| 2021 | 1.9B | — | — | 1.9B |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: 4.7B − — − 31.0M (SBC & adj.) = 4.7B. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF's starting value is a EPS basis (residual-income model), not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 98.4B |
| Total Liabilities | 93.5B |
| Equity | 4.8B |
| Total Debt | 2.2B |
Similar companies worth a look
Same sector and industry, similar fundamentals shape. Verify everything yourself — this list is computed mechanically and does not reflect our judgment about whether any of these are a good investment.
The questions people ask about FGN
Is F&G Annuities & Life, Inc. (FGN) a good stock to buy?
F&G Annuities & Life, Inc. (FGN) trades about 68% below our $70.62 estimate of what the business is worth, so the price is not the obstacle. The questions are why it is cheap: check the failure-warning checks, the debt, and whether insiders are buying, all on this page. This is educational research from SEC filings, not investment advice.
Is F&G Annuities & Life, Inc. (FGN) overvalued?
No, by our measure. F&G Annuities & Life, Inc. (FGN) trades at $22.58, about 68% below our estimate of $70.62 for what the business is worth. This is educational research from SEC filings, not investment advice.
What is FGN's intrinsic value?
Our model estimates FGN is worth about $70.62 per share, built from the cash the business is expected to generate, taken from its SEC filings. The market price is $22.58.
Where do these numbers come from?
From F&G Annuities & Life, Inc.'s own SEC filings (10-K and 10-Q), Form 4 insider filings and daily market prices. Every figure on the page links to how it was calculated, and the model's weak spots are listed next to its results.