NORTHERN TRUST CORP (NTRS) Stock Analysis
NORTHERN TRUST CORP
▾ What's in the 63/100 risk score? (higher = riskier)
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend, DCF applicability). It excludes the Altman Z score, whose retained-earnings input this filer does not report separately. See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
How to read NTRS (bank / insurer)
Banks and insurers are valued on what they earn on their capital, not on free cash flow — a normal DCF misleads here.
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Bank / Insurance lens (P/TBV + ROE) ↓
Price-to-tangible-book versus return-on-equity is how analysts actually judge a bank cheap or rich.
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Financial-health screens ↓
Watch the trend in profitability and asset quality, not the (not-applicable) bankruptcy score.
Is now a good time to buy NTRS?
Macro: Neutral / mid-cycleNTRS trades at $189.19 vs an estimated intrinsic value of $89.82 — a +110.6% premium to model IV.
Not investment advice. The model can be wrong. Verify the assumptions in the sections below and consider consulting a licensed advisor for significant decisions.
What return would NTRS pay as a bond?
Not measurable here. Banks and insurers have no owner-earnings coupon in the operating sense — their deposits and float are the business. The bank lens (book value + return on equity) is the comparable read. See the cross-company ranking →
Safer than 91% of the stocks we cover
A model trained on every US filing since 2012 — including the 823 companies that went bankrupt or stopped trading under a dollar — ranks each covered stock by its chance of failing in the next year. This is a position among peers, not a prediction about this company alone. Below is what happened to stocks that sat in the same position in past years.
▾ Every band, and what happened to the stocks in it
| Rank band | went bankrupt within 12 months | fell 80% or more (or failed) within 12 months | fell 50% or more (or failed) within 6 months |
|---|---|---|---|
| All covered stocks (average) | 0.59% | 4.21% | 8.51% |
| Finance (sector average) | 0.13% | 1.25% | 3.09% |
| riskiest 1% | 16.4% of 1,749 | 33.0% of 1,998 | 45.5% of 2,239 |
| next 2% (97-99) | 5.9% of 3,360 | 24.9% of 3,985 | 38.2% of 4,461 |
| next 2% (95-97) | 3.4% of 3,409 | 21.2% of 3,984 | 33.8% of 4,462 |
| next 5% (90-95) | 1.6% of 8,443 | 15.1% of 9,965 | 27.3% of 11,155 |
| next 15% (75-90) | 0.8% of 25,328 | 8.5% of 29,884 | 17.8% of 33,459 |
| next 25% (50-75) | 0.2% of 36,310 | 2.7% of 49,810 | 6.2% of 55,771 |
| safest half ← this stock | <0.1% of 92,256 | 0.5% of 99,617 | 2.1% of 111,538 |
Counts are stock-quarters 2012–2025, scored each year by a model that had not seen that year. The rank is recomputed from each company's latest filing (this one: 2026-05-01); table generated 2026-09-17. Calibrated one-year odds for this stock alone: bankruptcy 0.1%, 80%+ fall 0.3%, 50%+ fall in six months 2.7% — treat these as rougher than the band counts; the model overstates the middle of the range.
What this is not. It is not a trade. We tested shorting these names and buying puts on them at real option prices (2010–2025): every version lost money, because the market already prices the distress and the survivors squeeze. A high rank is a reason to read the filings and to size a position for the chance of a total loss — not a reason to bet against the company. A low rank says the balance sheet and the market are calm; it says nothing about whether the price is sensible.
Football field: where does the price sit?
Different valuation methods produce different fair-value ranges depending on assumptions. Plotting them together lets you see at a glance whether the current price is reasonable across approaches, or only one specific lens.
Industry multiples sourced from: industry: Banks. See the Peer Basket section below for the peer comparison and its limited-comparables caveat.
How does NTRS stack up against its closest peers?
We take the 8 same-industry companies most similar to NTRS (similar size) and check what investors are paying for each dollar of their revenue (or profits). If NTRS is much more expensive on the same yardstick, that's a red flag — unless you have a specific reason it deserves a premium. For a leveraged business, FCF yield (in the table) is usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 same-industry peers; implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SHG | SHINHAN FINANCIAL GROUP CO LTD | Banks | $30.1B | — | 8.2% |
| WF | WOORI FINANCIAL GROUP INC. | Banks | $51.3B | — | 4.2% |
| VYLD | JPMORGAN CHASE & CO | Banks | $77.9B | — | 70.5% |
| SMFG | SUMITOMO MITSUI FINANCIAL GROUP, I | Banks | $85.3B | — | — |
| VLYPN | VALLEY NATIONAL BANCORP | Banks | $14.3B | — | 4.1% |
| VLYPP | VALLEY NATIONAL BANCORP | Banks | $13.9B | — | 4.2% |
| VLYPO | VALLEY NATIONAL BANCORP | Banks | $13.9B | — | 4.2% |
| BNY | Bank of New York Mellon Corp | Banks | $95.7B | — | 5.6% |
How to value a bank (not a DCF question)
A bank's economic engine is the shareholder equity on its balance sheet — what the accountants say is left over after all loans, deposits, and liabilities are netted out. The bank earns a percentage on that equity each year (its ROE). So the two questions are: (1) what are you paying per dollar of equity (Price / Book)? and (2) how much is that equity actually earning (ROE)? Free cash flow doesn't work here — banks lend out their cash for a living.
Why it matters: For banks and insurers, book value is the regulatory capital they earn returns on. P/B is the cleanest comparison: 1.0× means buying the bank at the same price the accountants say it's worth.
Reference: 0.8–1.2× = fair for average bank · 1.5–2.0× = solid franchise · >2.5× = premium · <0.8× = potentially cheap or distress
Full explanation →
Premium to book — market expects above-average returns on this equity.
Why it matters: For a bank, ROE is the engine. A bank earning 15% on equity will compound book value at ~15%/year if it retains earnings. Combined with P/B, ROE tells you whether a premium price is supported by returns.
Reference: <8% = weak · 10–12% = solid · 15%+ = excellent · >20% sustained = exceptional franchise
Full explanation →
Why it matters: For banks especially, ROA isolates underwriting and operating efficiency from leverage. Two banks with identical ROE may have very different ROAs — one earning it cleanly, one earning it on borrowed money.
Reference: <0.8% = weak · 1.0–1.2% = solid · >1.5% = excellent (very rare for big banks)
Full explanation →
ROA differs from ROE because banks borrow ~10× their equity. Big asset base, smaller equity sliver.
Why it matters: High P/E = market expects fast growth or you are overpaying. Low P/E = market expects slow growth or the stock is cheap (sometimes for good reason).
Reference: 12–20 for mature businesses · 25–50 for growth · 80+ for speculative
Full explanation →
Note: this lens skips Altman Z-Score and Piotroski F-Score (validated on industrial companies, not banks). For deeper bank-specific health analysis: check the 10-K's Tier 1 capital ratio, Non-Performing Loan ratio, and CET1 — these are what regulators actually monitor.
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
Altman Z was calibrated on industrial firms and doesn't apply to banks or insurers — their balance sheets are dominated by loans/securities, not working capital. See the Bank Valuation Lens above for P/B, ROE and ROA — the metrics regulators and analysts actually use to assess bank solvency.
Why it matters: High score = fundamentals improving. Low score = deteriorating. Especially powerful for filtering cheap stocks: cheap + high F-score historically outperforms; cheap + low F-score is often a value trap.
Reference: 7–9 = strong · 4–6 = mediocre · 0–3 = weak
Full explanation →
Piotroski F was built for non-financial firms (gross margin, asset turnover, current ratio all assume an industrial cost structure). For banks, the equivalent quality signals are efficiency ratio, net interest margin, and provision coverage — see the Bank Valuation Lens above.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 10.3%, the figure our model used for NTRS. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: the calculator opens at our published value of $89.82 — it is initialised to the same scenario-weighted result, so the two match exactly on load. The moment you move a slider, the value below becomes a single-path what-if at your assumptions (not the three-scenario weighting), which is why it can differ from the headline once you've touched it.
10.3% — beta-based (CAPM), from this stock's BetaBeta — How much the stock moves when the overall market moves. 1.0 = moves with the market; 1.5 = moves 50% more than the market.
Why it matters: Higher beta = more volatile = should demand higher discount rate. Low beta stocks (utilities, consumer staples) move less.
Reference: Most stocks 0.5–1.5 · Defensives ~0.3 · High-vol tech ~1.5–2.0
Full explanation → of 1.05. The safe Treasury rate plus a premium scaled by how much more (or less) volatile the stock is than the market.
9.0% — sector/quality tier. A simpler hurdle set by industry and business durability: lower for stable, wide-moat companies; higher for speculative or micro-caps.
The headline value and this calculator start at 10.3% — the beta-based rate. Drag the slider to the other rate to see the full range.
A full intrinsic value isn't shown for NTRS because it's valued with a bank residual-income model this quick calculator doesn't replicate — see our published value above and the sector lens for the right metrics.
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⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
NTRS is deeply overvalued, trading at a premium of +84.2% to the model's intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation →. The market appears to be paying up for the company's consistent profitability, as evidenced by positive net income in 5/5 years and positive operating cash flow in 4/5 years. The number one quantifiable risk is the significant valuation gap, as the stock price is nearly double the model's estimate.
As of 3 months ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Quarterly revenue growth rate
- Changes in net interest income
- Trends in assets under custody/management
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Revenue grew +6% to $5.02B.
- Free cash flow turned positive at $5.33B.
- Net income fell -14% to $1.74B.
Management & Leadership
Northern Trust Corporation is led by CEO Michael O'Grady, who has served in the role since 2018. The company is a long-established financial institution with a history dating back to 1889, focusing on wealth management and asset servicing.
What They Make
Northern Trust provides investment management, asset and fund administration, banking, and fiduciary services to institutional clients and high-net-worth individuals globally.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
The market prices NTRS at a premium of +84.2% to its intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation →, likely due to its consistent financial health. The company has demonstrated positive net income in 5/5 years and positive operating cash flow in 4/5 years, suggesting a stable and reliable business model that investors are willing to pay extra for, despite a low franchise/durability score of 2/5.
Three Scenarios, Weighted
| Scenario | IV | Upside from today's price | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | $74.67 | -60.5% | 40% |
| Base | $93.10 | -50.8% | 35% |
| Optimistic | $109.45 | -42.1% | 25% |
| Weighted | $89.82 | -52.5% | 100% |
Reading the last column: it is the move from today's price to each value (IV ÷ price − 1). The headline "premium/discount to model IV" measures the same gap from the value's side (price ÷ IV − 1), so the two percentages differ in size and sign by construction — e.g. a price 8% above value is a value 7.4% below price.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
Northern Trust funds its operations and returns capital to shareholders through dividends and share repurchases, typical for a mature financial institution.
Residual Income High
Balance-sheet financial (Banks): residual income model - book value is meaningful anchor.
Show advanced inputs
| Sector Default | 8.0% |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project net interest income and fee-income lines independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Revenue has been growing at 3.6%/yr over the last four years, from $4361M to $5018M.
Geography & Markets
Northern Trust is headquartered in the United States but operates globally, serving clients across North America, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific. Exact geographic segment percentages are not available from current data sources.
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)55.2NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BearishLine below signalThe fast trend is below the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently downward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (1 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (1)
- Financial sector: using residual income model. IV = Book Value + PV(excess earnings).
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From NORTHERN TRUST CORP's SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 5.0B | 1.7B | $8.74 |
| 2024 | 4.7B | 2.0B | $9.77 |
| 2023 | 4.4B | 1.1B | $5.08 |
| 2022 | 4.4B | 1.3B | $6.14 |
| 2021 | 4.4B | 1.5B | $7.14 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC & adj. | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 5.5B | 74.0M | 126.5M | 5.3B |
| 2024 | -486.0M | 101.5M | 119.4M | -706.9M |
| 2023 | 2.6B | 116.5M | 118.2M | 2.4B |
| 2022 | 2.4B | 128.6M | 125.2M | 2.1B |
| 2021 | 1.4B | 95.5M | 95.5M | 1.2B |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: 5.5B − 74.0M − 126.5M (SBC & adj.) = 5.3B. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF's starting value is a EPS basis (residual-income model), not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 177.1B |
| Total Liabilities | 164.2B |
| Equity | 13.0B |
Similar companies worth a look
Same sector and industry, similar fundamentals shape. Verify everything yourself — this list is computed mechanically and does not reflect our judgment about whether any of these are a good investment.