NEXPOINT DIVERSIFIED REAL ESTATE TRUST (NXDT) Stock Analysis
NEXPOINT DIVERSIFIED REAL ESTATE TRUST
▾ What's in the 32/100 risk score? (higher = riskier)
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend). It excludes the Altman Z score, whose retained-earnings input this filer does not report separately. See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
How to read NXDT (REIT)
REITs pay out most of their cash, so judge them on cash distributions and the value of their property — not on earnings or a standard DCF.
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REIT lens (P/AFFO + dividend yield) ↓
Price-to-AFFO and the dividend yield are the real cheap/expensive gauges for real estate.
Standard DCF doesn't fit NXDT well — but that's expected for this kind of business. The REIT Valuation Lens below uses the metrics actually used by analysts who value reits. Reverse DCF + Football Field also work as cross-checks.
Riskier than 77% of the stocks we cover
A model trained on every US filing since 2012 — including the 823 companies that went bankrupt or stopped trading under a dollar — ranks each covered stock by its chance of failing in the next year. This is a position among peers, not a prediction about this company alone. Below is what happened to stocks that sat in the same position in past years.
▾ Every band, and what happened to the stocks in it
| Rank band | went bankrupt within 12 months | fell 80% or more (or failed) within 12 months | fell 50% or more (or failed) within 6 months |
|---|---|---|---|
| All covered stocks (average) | 0.59% | 4.21% | 8.51% |
| Finance (sector average) | 0.13% | 1.25% | 3.09% |
| riskiest 1% | 16.4% of 1,749 | 33.0% of 1,998 | 45.5% of 2,239 |
| next 2% (97-99) | 5.9% of 3,360 | 24.9% of 3,985 | 38.2% of 4,461 |
| next 2% (95-97) | 3.4% of 3,409 | 21.2% of 3,984 | 33.8% of 4,462 |
| next 5% (90-95) | 1.6% of 8,443 | 15.1% of 9,965 | 27.3% of 11,155 |
| next 15% (75-90) ← this stock | 0.8% of 25,328 | 8.5% of 29,884 | 17.8% of 33,459 |
| next 25% (50-75) | 0.2% of 36,310 | 2.7% of 49,810 | 6.2% of 55,771 |
| safest half | <0.1% of 92,256 | 0.5% of 99,617 | 2.1% of 111,538 |
Counts are stock-quarters 2012–2025, scored each year by a model that had not seen that year. The rank is recomputed from each company's latest filing (this one: 2026-05-18); table generated 2026-09-17. Calibrated one-year odds for this stock alone: bankruptcy 0.3%, 80%+ fall 2.1%, 50%+ fall in six months 3.0% — treat these as rougher than the band counts; the model overstates the middle of the range.
What this is not. It is not a trade. We tested shorting these names and buying puts on them at real option prices (2010–2025): every version lost money, because the market already prices the distress and the survivors squeeze. A high rank is a reason to read the filings and to size a position for the chance of a total loss — not a reason to bet against the company. A low rank says the balance sheet and the market are calm; it says nothing about whether the price is sensible.
How does NXDT stack up against its closest peers?
We take the 8 same-industry companies most similar to NXDT (similar size) and check what investors are paying for each dollar of their revenue (or profits). If NXDT is much more expensive on the same yardstick, that's a red flag — unless you have a specific reason it deserves a premium. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
6.3x / 8.8x / 11.5x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 same-industry peers; implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| REFI | Chicago Atlantic Real Estate Finan | REITs | $241M | — | — | — | 18.0% |
| SITC | SITE Centers Corp. | REITs | $265M | 14.5x | — | — | 134.3% |
| RC | Ready Capital Corp | REITs | $294M | — | — | — | 38.1% |
| SEVN | Seven Hills Realty Trust | REITs | $193M | 6.6x | — | — | 14.5% |
| PINE | Alpine Income Property Trust, Inc. | REITs | $318M | 11.5x | 13.4x | 53.0x | 5.9% |
| TCI | TRANSCONTINENTAL REALTY INVESTORS | REITs | $335M | 11.1x | — | — | 3.0% |
| STWD | STARWOOD PROPERTY TRUST, INC. | REITs | $178M | 0.1x | — | — | 398.1% |
| STRW | Strawberry Fields REIT, Inc. | REITs | $176M | 6.3x | — | 11.5x | 3.0% |
Real-estate-specific metrics
REITs are valued on AFFO (Adjusted Funds from Operations) and dividend yield, not DCF. Reported depreciation isn't a real cash cost for real estate — properties typically hold or appreciate. The metrics below are the industry-standard yardsticks.
Note: Depreciation & Amortization line not available — using FCF/share as AFFO proxy. Directionally correct but understates true AFFO (true AFFO adds back D&A and subtracts only maintenance CapEx; FCF subtracts all CapEx).
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
REITs deliberately carry high leverage backed by long-life real estate and pay out 90%+ of taxable income — both inputs that Altman Z flags as distress. See the REIT Valuation Lens above for P/AFFO, dividend yield and payout ratio.
Why it matters: High score = fundamentals improving. Low score = deteriorating. Especially powerful for filtering cheap stocks: cheap + high F-score historically outperforms; cheap + low F-score is often a value trap.
Reference: 7–9 = strong · 4–6 = mediocre · 0–3 = weak
Full explanation →
Piotroski F's checks (operating cash flow, gross-margin trend, current ratio, asset turnover) assume an industrial cost structure, so they misread asset-heavy or financial businesses like this one — a healthy REIT, utility, pipeline, BDC/fund or holding company can score low for reasons that aren't weakness. See the sector lens above for the metrics that actually matter.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 10.0%, the figure our model used for NXDT. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: no headline intrinsic value is published for this stock (the valuation is held for a data-quality reason — see the notes above). The calculator below is a what-if tool: the values it produces are your assumptions played out, not our estimate.
A full intrinsic value isn't shown for NXDT because the valuation is currently held for a data-quality reason (see the guardrail notes above). The reverse-DCF reading still works — it needs only the price and cash flow — but we won't publish a forward value until the underlying data passes our checks.
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⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
A standard discounted cash flowDCF — Discounted Cash Flow — sums up all future cash a business will produce, adjusted for the fact that future dollars are worth less than dollars today.
Why it matters: It is the most fundamentally honest valuation method when applicable — but only works for companies with predictable, positive cash flow.
Reference: Best for: mature, profitable businesses. Fails for: pre-profit growth, banks, REITs.
Full explanation → valuation is not meaningful for NEXPOINT DIVERSIFIED REAL ESTATE TRUST due to its erratic profitability, with net income negative in the latest period and only profitable in 1 of the last 4 years. Investors are likely focused on the company's ability to generate consistent operating cash flow, which has been positive in 2 of the last 4 years, and its dividend yield. The #1 quantifiable risk is the inconsistent profitability, making future cash flows difficult to predict.
As of 3 months ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Consistent positive net income in upcoming quarters
- Growth in operating cash flow per share
- Stability or growth in dividend payouts
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Revenue grew +3% to $86.0M.
- Free cash flow turned positive at $4.5M.
- Still unprofitable at -$130.2M — loss widening.
Management & Leadership
James Dondero serves as the Chairman and President of NexPoint Diversified Real Estate Trust. He is also the founder of NexPoint, a leading alternative investment firm. Brian Mitts is the Chief Financial Officer.
What They Make
NexPoint Diversified Real Estate Trust is a real estate investment trust that invests in a diversified portfolio of real estate properties and real estate-related assets. Its customers are tenants and investors seeking exposure to real estate.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
What we use instead: earnings (P/E, EV/EBIT), book value (P/B) — computed from the figures this company does report, shown in the sections below. Those numbers are unaffected by the missing cash-flow data.
The market is likely pricing NXDT based on its dividend payout, which is derived from its operating cash flow, and expectations for future stability in its real estate portfolio. Despite negative net income in the latest period, the company has positive operating cash flow, which supports its dividend. The market may be anticipating improved profitability and consistent cash generation from its diversified real estate assets.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
Dividend Discount
REIT (REITs): dividend discount model - GAAP earnings distort REIT valuations.
Show advanced inputs
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project net interest income and fee-income lines independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Net income has been negative in the latest period, with profitability in 1 of the last 4 years.
Geography & Markets
NexPoint Diversified Real Estate Trust operates primarily within the United States, investing in a range of real estate properties and related assets across various regions. Specific geographic mix percentages are not available from current data sources.
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)57.5NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BullishLine above signalThe fast trend is above the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently upward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (6 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (6)
- Dividend derived from cash-flow statement ($0.13/yr; SEC has no per-share dividend feed).
- Price is far above the model output - market may be pricing optionality, narrative catalysts, or margin expansion beyond what trailing cash flows support.
- Illiquidity discount 15% applied (small/micro-cap — harder to exit, demand a margin).
- Dividend data sparse; DDM using estimated yield. Confidence reduced.
- Extreme valuation (P/IV withheld — see the note above); output dominated by data/units issue (often a multi-class share-count mismatch). Suppressed.
- DATA UNAVAILABLE: per-share values suppressed due to missing/unreliable shares data.
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From NEXPOINT DIVERSIFIED REAL ESTATE TRUST's SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 86.0M | -130.2M | $-2.81 |
| 2024 | 83.2M | -51.3M | $-1.28 |
| 2023 | 63.3M | -121.9M | $-3.26 |
| 2021 | — | 245.5M | $4.75 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
Capital expenditure isn't tagged in this filer's machine-readable data (the CapEx column shows "—"). The free-cash-flow column is therefore operating cash flow less stock-based compensation only — an upper bound on true owner earnings, not the real figure. Companies that report capex under a custom label (some large IFRS filers do) look better here than they are.
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC & adj. | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 9.2M | — | 4.7M | 4.5M |
| 2024 | -11.7M | — | 3.0M | -14.7M |
| 2023 | -24.3M | — | 1.3M | -25.6M |
| 2021 | 38.1M | — | — | 38.1M |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: 9.2M − — − 4.7M (SBC & adj.) = 4.5M. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF's starting value is a TTM dividend, not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 1.1B |
| Total Liabilities | 353.9M |
| Equity | 700.1M |
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