CVR PARTNERS, LP (UAN) Stock Analysis
CVR PARTNERS, LP
▾ What's in the 40/100 risk score? (higher = riskier)
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend, DCF applicability). See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
How to read UAN (cyclical commodity producer)
A miner or energy producer earns whatever the commodity price is, so a single DCF swings with the cycle. Judge it against peers and where you think the commodity cycle is heading.
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EV/Sales peer comparison ↓
How the price compares to similar producers is more meaningful than a through-cycle DCF.
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Interactive calculator (test cycle assumptions) ↓
Flex the growth/discount inputs to see how sensitive the value is to where we are in the cycle.
Is now a good time to buy UAN?
Macro: Neutral / mid-cycleUAN trades at $123.50 vs an estimated intrinsic value of $284.40 — a 56.6% below our mid-cycle reference value. Low confidence: commodity prices and normalized margins dominate this result. UAN is a cyclical commodity producer (Agricultural Chemicals), so a single growth-DCF is the wrong tool — its profits rise and fall with the commodity price. We value it off normalized, mid-cycle cash flow, which is why the modeled growth reads near 0%: we deliberately don't extrapolate growth from a possibly-elevated base. A premium here usually just means today's price sits above mid-cycle worth — common when the commodity is near a cycle high (near a trough the same model would read "cheap"). On its own that's not a sell signal — judge it against its peers and where you think the cycle is heading.
Not investment advice. The model can be wrong. Verify the assumptions in the sections below and consider consulting a licensed advisor for significant decisions.
What cash-flow improvement must the market believe? Reverse DCF — Instead of asking "what is this stock worth?", asks "what growth rate is the current market price already assuming?"
Why it matters: It crystallizes the bull thesis as a single number you can argue with. If the market expects 40% growth for 10 years and you do not believe that, the stock is overvalued.
Reference: 10–15% = sustainable for strong companies · 20–25% = exceptional · 30%+ = historically very rare
Reverse DCF treats today's price as correct and solves for the cash-flow path that justifies it. For a cyclical, read the result as the annual improvement in through-cycle free cash flow the price requires — which could come from higher realized commodity prices, margin recovery, lower input costs, more volume, or reduced capex, not just organic growth. The starting base is our normalized mid-cycle median, not last year's number.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation → must improve by:
▾ Exactly how this 10-year figure is computed
Forecast length: 10 years, single flat growth rate (no fade)
Terminal growth after year 10: 2.5%
Discount rate: 7.6% (the rate the model used)
Price used: $123.50 — the live price shown on this page (not frozen)
Method: solve for the constant annual growth rate that makes the discounted 10-year FCF stream + terminal value equal today's price.
Market is pricing in shrinking cash flow — often a sign of undervaluation OR a dying business. Check leverage, the cash-flow trend and the measurable financial-health screens below to tell them apart.
For reference: The market is pricing in a material multi-year contraction in cash flow (≈8.4%/yr) — a significant decline, not a flat business.
▾ How we computed this · Reality check thresholds · Assumptions
- Starting FCF/share: $14.28 (normalized multi-year median)
- Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation →: 7.6% — standard 8-12%; 9-10% matches S&P 500 historical return - Terminal Growth RateTerminal Growth Rate — The growth rate we assume the company holds forever, after the explicit 10-year forecast period ends.
Why it matters: It anchors the long-tail value. Cannot mathematically exceed long-term GDP growth or the company eventually becomes larger than the global economy.
Reference: 2–3% (matches long-term US GDP growth) · Above 4% is mathematically problematic
Full explanation →: 2.5% — matches long-term GDP growth - Forecast horizon: 10 years explicit + terminal perpetuity
| ≤ 0% | Priced for decline — likely undervalued OR dying business |
| 5-12% | Reasonable; sustainable for quality businesses |
| 12-18% | Demanding — strong execution required |
| 18-25% | Exceptional — few companies sustain for a decade |
| 25-35% | Heroic — historically very rare |
| 35%+ | Borderline impossible at scale |
Sustaining 30%+ cash-flow growth for a full decade at scale is exceedingly rare — the bar is brutally high.
Use the interactive calculator below to change the discount rate, growth and terminal-growth assumptions and watch the value move.
Football field: where does the price sit?
Different valuation methods produce different fair-value ranges depending on assumptions. Plotting them together lets you see at a glance whether the current price is reasonable across approaches, or only one specific lens.
Industry multiples sourced from: broad market average (sector unknown). See the Peer Basket section below for the peer comparison and its limited-comparables caveat.
⚠ We found no genuine same-industry (Agricultural Chemicals) comparables at all — fewer than the 4 we require for a reliable median. The 8 names in the table below therefore include 8 broader Basic Materials names marked fallback, whose business models and margins differ — which is why any median below is computed over that wider set, not over true comparables. So we do not derive a peer-implied share value here. Read the multiples as rough context only.
How does UAN stack up against its closest peers?
Ideally we compare UAN only to same-industry peers, but too few exist in our universe right now, so the basket below mixes in broader-sector names. Treat the multiples as rough context, not a valuation. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
0.4x / 0.7x / 11.9x |
| EV / Gross ProfitEV / Gross Profit — Enterprise value divided by gross profit — the multiple paid for what each dollar of sales contributes after direct costs. Why it matters: More refined than EV/Sales for high-margin businesses (software, marketplaces) where gross margin is the real economic engine. Reference: 8–15x for SaaS · 15–25x for hypergrowth software · >30x demanding Full explanation → |
1.0x / 3.8x / 4.7x |
| EV / EBITEV / EBITDA — Enterprise value divided by earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. Why it matters: A classic "what would a private buyer pay" multiple — used in M&A. Strips out tax and capital-structure noise. Reference: 8–12x for mature businesses · 15–25x for growth · Below 5x often signals distress Full explanation → |
1.5x / 6.2x / 9.3x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 peers (broad — see caveat); implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UAMY | UNITED STATES ANTIMONY CORP | Nonferrous Metals ·fallback | $1.3B | 33.9x | 134.8x | — | 0.1% |
| TROX | Tronox Holdings plc | Industrial Chemicals ·fallback | $1.3B | 0.4x | 4.7x | — | 9.5% |
| USAS | Americas Gold & Silver Corp | Metal Mining ·fallback | $1.4B | 11.9x | — | — | 1.3% |
| ROCK | GIBRALTAR INDUSTRIES, INC. | Steel ·fallback | $1.1B | 1.0x | 3.8x | 9.3x | 11.5% |
| SLVM | Sylvamo Corp | Paper Mills ·fallback | $1.6B | 0.5x | — | 6.2x | 16.2% |
| VZLA | Vizsla Silver Corp. | Gold & Silver Mining ·fallback | $1.0B | — | — | — | — |
| SLI | STANDARD LITHIUM LTD. | Industrial Chemicals ·fallback | $964M | — | — | — | — |
| SID | NATIONAL STEEL CO | Steel ·fallback | $1.8B | — | 1.0x | 1.5x | 0.0% |
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
The Z-score needs working capital, retained earnings, EBIT, sales and total assets from the latest balance sheet, and at least one of those isn't reported in machine-readable form here — common for foreign private issuers. We leave it blank rather than compute a distress verdict from an estimated input. It doesn't affect the reported figures in the financial tables below.
▾ The checks — what passed, what didn't (and what we couldn't measure)
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✓ Positive net incomeNet income $98.7M in the latest year.
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✓ Positive operating cash flowOperating cash flow $149.6M (was $150.5M the prior year).
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✓ Cash flow backs up reported profitOperating cash flow $149.6M vs net income $98.7M.
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✓ Return on assets improvingReturn on assets 10.2% vs 6.0% a year ago.
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✓ Debt load (vs assets)Long-term debt is 0.0% of assets vs 0.0% a year ago ($0.0M now).
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✓ Short-term liquidity (current ratio)Current ratio 2.21x vs 2.10x a year ago.
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✓ Share count (dilution)Share count held roughly flat (10.6M → 10.6M year-over-year).
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· Pricing power (gross margin) (n/a — data not reported; not scored)
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✓ Sales per asset (asset turnover)Asset turnover 0.63x vs 0.52x a year ago.
Missing data is never counted as a pass or a fail — it's shown as n/a and excluded from the denominator. Each check compares the company against its own prior year.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 7.6%, the figure our model used for UAN. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: at default inputs this calculator mirrors the headline model's three-scenario weighting (conservative/base/optimistic, 40/35/25), so its opening value should land close to the headline intrinsic value of $284.40. A small gap is rounding; a large one would be a data problem — and we check for it below.
7.6% — beta-based (CAPM), from this stock's BetaBeta — How much the stock moves when the overall market moves. 1.0 = moves with the market; 1.5 = moves 50% more than the market.
Why it matters: Higher beta = more volatile = should demand higher discount rate. Low beta stocks (utilities, consumer staples) move less.
Reference: Most stocks 0.5–1.5 · Defensives ~0.3 · High-vol tech ~1.5–2.0
Full explanation → of 0.56. The safe Treasury rate plus a premium scaled by how much more (or less) volatile the stock is than the market.
12.0% — sector/quality tier. A simpler hurdle set by industry and business durability: lower for stable, wide-moat companies; higher for speculative or micro-caps.
The headline value and this calculator start at 7.6% — the beta-based rate. Drag the slider to the other rate to see the full range.
-56.6%
At the default assumptions the flat path lands near our published value of $284.40. Move any slider to recompute it with your own.
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⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
UAN is deeply undervalued by the model, showing a 57.3% discount to its intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation →. The market likely discounts UAN due to its cyclical sector classification and low franchise durability score of 1/5, despite recent positive financial trends. The primary quantifiable risk is the market's implied decline rate of 11.6% versus the model's 3.8%.
As of 2 months ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Next quarter's revenue growth rate
- Trends in nitrogen fertilizer prices
- Changes in operating cash flow
The trend, in plain numbers (2024 → 2025)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Revenue grew +15% to $606.0M.
- Net income grew +62% to $98.7M.
- Free cash flow fell to $89.0M.
Management & Leadership
Mark P. Pytosh serves as the Chief Executive Officer of CVR Partners, LP. He has been in this role since 2014, overseeing the company's operations in the agricultural chemicals sector. The company is a subsidiary of CVR Energy, Inc.
What They Make
CVR Partners, LP produces and markets nitrogen fertilizers, primarily urea ammonium nitrate (UAN) and ammonia. These products are sold to agricultural customers for crop nutrient applications.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
The market prices UAN at a 57.3% discount to the model's intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation →, likely reflecting its classification as a cyclical sector company and a low franchise/durability score of 1/5. While revenue has grown 3.3%/yr over 4 years and operating cash flow is positive, the market's implied decline rate of 11.6% suggests skepticism about the sustainability of these trends in a commodity-linked business.
Three Scenarios, Weighted
| Scenario | IV | vs Price | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | $242.38 | 96.3% | 40% |
| Base | $289.34 | 134.3% | 35% |
| Optimistic | $344.71 | 179.1% | 25% |
| Weighted | $284.40 | 130.3% | 100% |
What has to be true
Today's price implies a material multi-year contraction in cash flow (implied growth ≈ -11.6%/yr) — so historical growth anchors don't apply here. The real question isn't "can it grow like Apple did" but "is the decline the market is pricing in real, or an overreaction?" The Financial Health trend and the Reverse-DCF above are the right lenses for that.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
The company has reduced its long-term debt from $611M to $0M, indicating a focus on debt reduction rather than explicit dividend or buyback programs based on available flags.
Normalized FCF High
Cyclical/commodity sector (Agricultural Chemicals): normalized FCF uses 5-year median to smooth peak/trough distortions.
Show advanced inputs
| RevenueGrowth | 3.3% |
| EpsGrowth | 6.3% |
| HistoricalFcfGrowth | -11.5% |
| SectorDefault | 5.0% |
| BestEstimate | 3.8% |
| Method | blend(70% revenue_cagr, 30% sector) |
| GrowthBasis | total |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project production volumes, realized commodity prices and unit cash costs independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Revenue has been growing at 3.3%/yr over the last four years, from $533M to $606M.
Geography & Markets
CVR Partners, LP primarily operates its production facilities within the United States, serving agricultural customers in key farming regions. Exact geographic revenue segmentation is not available from current data sources.
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)42.0NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BearishLine below signalThe fast trend is below the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently downward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (3 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (3)
- Cyclical sector: using normalized cash flow (median OCF minus estimated maintenance capex).
- Median OCF: $188.72M, est. maintenance capex: $37.74M, normalized FCF: $150.98M.
- Illiquidity discount 7% applied (small/micro-cap — harder to exit, demand a margin).
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From CVR PARTNERS, LP's SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 606.0M | 98.7M | $9.33 |
| 2024 | 525.3M | 60.9M | $5.76 |
| 2023 | 681.5M | 172.4M | $16.31 |
| 2022 | 835.6M | 286.8M | $27.07 |
| 2021 | 532.6M | 78.2M | $7.31 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC & adj. | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 149.6M | 50.8M | 9.8M | 89.0M |
| 2024 | 150.5M | 37.1M | 4.9M | 108.6M |
| 2023 | 243.5M | 24.2M | 8.2M | 211.1M |
| 2022 | 301.5M | 44.7M | 25.3M | 231.5M |
| 2021 | 188.7M | 20.6M | 23.1M | 145.1M |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: 149.6M − 50.8M − 9.8M (SBC & adj.) = 89.0M. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF's starting value is a normalized multi-year median, not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 969.5M |
| Total Liabilities | — |
| Equity | — |