Apollo Global Management, Inc. (APO) Stock Analysis
Apollo Global Management, Inc.
▾ What's in the 37/100 risk score? (higher = riskier)
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend, DCF applicability). It excludes the Altman Z score, whose retained-earnings input this filer does not report separately. See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
How to read APO (holding company)
A holding company is worth the sum of its parts plus its investment portfolio — value it on book value / sum-of-parts, not a single DCF.
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1
Sum-of-parts / book value lens ↓
Price-to-book and the value of the underlying businesses/holdings are the right yardstick.
APO earns management fees and carried interest. Under GAAP, much of that economics doesn't show up as free cash flow, so a cash-flow DCF structurally reads "overvalued" for firms like this — analysts value them on distributable earnings and fee-related earnings instead. Treat our DCF number as a conservative floor, lean on the peer comparison, P/E and dividend yield, and read the filings' distributable-earnings figures.
Is now a good time to buy APO?
Macro: Neutral / mid-cycle
APO trades at $128.98 vs an estimated
intrinsic value
of $428.25
— a 69.9% discount to model IV.
Today's price is consistent with APO's owner-earnings free cash flow per share growing about 2.3% per year 5-YR · SCENARIO PATH over the next 5 years (the
price-implied growth rate).
Our DCF projects
modeled growth
of 25.0% per year based on history + sector defaults
(analyst consensus estimates not yet integrated).
Note: this is a 5-year, per-share view. The Reverse-DCF section below asks the same question on a stricter 10-year free-cash-flowFree Cash Flow (FCF) — Operating cash flow minus capital spending: cash left after a company covers operating costs, taxes and interest and reinvests in the business — but BEFORE repaying debt principal or paying dividends. The cash actually available to investors.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation → basis — so its growth number is different, not contradictory.
▾ Exactly how this 5-year figure is computed
Current price: $128.98 (live)
Discount rate: 11.2%; terminal growth: 3.0%
Forecast: 5 years explicit growth, then a linear fade to terminal; end-of-period cash flows discounted to today
Growth path: the model's scenario-weighted path (conservative 40% / base 35% / optimistic 25% — assumed weights, not measured probabilities) — see the "Three Scenarios, Weighted" table below for the three IVs
Method: solve for the constant 5-year per-share growth rate that, run through this same structure, makes the intrinsic value equal today's price. (The 10-year figure below uses a flat 10-yr path instead — hence a different number.)
Not investment advice. The model can be wrong. Verify the assumptions in the sections below and consider consulting a licensed advisor for significant decisions.
What growth must the market believe? Reverse DCF — Instead of asking "what is this stock worth?", asks "what growth rate is the current market price already assuming?"
Why it matters: It crystallizes the bull thesis as a single number you can argue with. If the market expects 40% growth for 10 years and you do not believe that, the stock is overvalued.
Reference: 10–15% = sustainable for strong companies · 20–25% = exceptional · 30%+ = historically very rare
Traditional DCF asks "what is this stock worth?" Reverse DCF flips it: it treats today's price as correct and solves for the growth rate that justifies it. In plain terms — if our model is right about everything else, the company's cash flow would have to grow (or shrink) by this much every year for the next 10 years for today's price to make sense. If that required growth looks unrealistic, the price is stretched; if it looks easy to beat, the price may be cheap.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation → must grow at:
▾ Exactly how this 10-year figure is computed
Forecast length: 10 years, single flat growth rate (no fade)
Terminal growth after year 10: 3.0%
Discount rate: 11.2% (the rate the model used)
Price used: $128.98 — the live price shown on this page (not frozen)
Method: solve for the constant annual growth rate that makes the discounted 10-year FCF stream + terminal value equal today's price.
Almost any healthy business should clear this bar. Likely undervalued unless something serious is wrong.
For reference: A low bar — most financially healthy companies clear this comfortably.
▾ How we computed this · Reality check thresholds · Assumptions
- Starting FCF/share: $10.88 (TTM)
- Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation →: 11.2% — standard 8-12%; 9-10% matches S&P 500 historical return - Terminal Growth RateTerminal Growth Rate — The growth rate we assume the company holds forever, after the explicit 10-year forecast period ends.
Why it matters: It anchors the long-tail value. Cannot mathematically exceed long-term GDP growth or the company eventually becomes larger than the global economy.
Reference: 2–3% (matches long-term US GDP growth) · Above 4% is mathematically problematic
Full explanation →: 3.0% — matches long-term GDP growth - Forecast horizon: 10 years explicit + terminal perpetuity
| ≤ 0% | Priced for decline — likely undervalued OR dying business |
| 5-12% | Reasonable; sustainable for quality businesses |
| 12-18% | Demanding — strong execution required |
| 18-25% | Exceptional — few companies sustain for a decade |
| 25-35% | Heroic — historically very rare |
| 35%+ | Borderline impossible at scale |
Sustaining 30%+ cash-flow growth for a full decade at scale is exceedingly rare — the bar is brutally high.
Use the interactive calculator below to change the discount rate, growth and terminal-growth assumptions and watch the value move.
Football field: where does the price sit?
Different valuation methods produce different fair-value ranges depending on assumptions. Plotting them together lets you see at a glance whether the current price is reasonable across approaches, or only one specific lens.
Industry multiples sourced from: broad market average (sector unknown). See the Peer Basket section below for the peer comparison and its limited-comparables caveat.
How does APO stack up against its closest peers?
We take the 8 same-industry companies most similar to APO (similar size) and check what investors are paying for each dollar of their revenue (or profits). If APO is much more expensive on the same yardstick, that's a red flag — unless you have a specific reason it deserves a premium. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
2.1x / 3.2x / 6.9x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 same-industry peers; implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KKR | KKR & Co. Inc. | Asset Management | $86.1B | 4.4x | — | — | 2.1% |
| BX | Blackstone Inc. | Asset Management | $86.9B | 6.9x | — | — | 3.4% |
| ARES | Ares Management Corp | Asset Management | $40.2B | 7.2x | — | — | 3.7% |
| AMP | AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC | Asset Management | $40.1B | 2.1x | — | — | 18.2% |
| TROW | PRICE T ROWE GROUP INC | Asset Management | $22.4B | 3.1x | — | 10.2x | 5.5% |
| KKRT | KKR & Co. Inc. | Asset Management | $21.9B | 1.1x | — | — | 21.2% |
| CG | Carlyle Group Inc. | Asset Management | $16.4B | 3.4x | — | — | 0.2% |
| BEN | FRANKLIN RESOURCES INC | Asset Management | $16.1B | 2.1x | — | 30.6x | 4.3% |
Valued like a holding company, not an operating business
APO is structured as a holding company with multiple operating subsidiaries and/or a large equity portfolio. Standard DCF on consolidated free cash flow misses the value of investments + cash on the balance sheet. The relevant anchor is book value per share — what each share owns of the underlying assets.
Why it matters: Per-share metrics are the only way to fairly compare two companies with different share counts.
▾ Why book value matters more than DCF for conglomerates
Caveats: book value uses historical cost — understates appreciated equity holdings. A premium of 30-60% to book is historically normal for well-managed conglomerates.
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
Insurance/investment holding companies (e.g. Berkshire) sit on huge securities portfolios and float liabilities — Altman Z reads that capital structure as "distress" even with tens of billions in earnings and cash. See the Sum-of-Parts / Book Value lens above instead.
Why it matters: High score = fundamentals improving. Low score = deteriorating. Especially powerful for filtering cheap stocks: cheap + high F-score historically outperforms; cheap + low F-score is often a value trap.
Reference: 7–9 = strong · 4–6 = mediocre · 0–3 = weak
Full explanation →
Piotroski F's checks (operating cash flow, gross-margin trend, current ratio, asset turnover) assume an industrial cost structure, so they misread asset-heavy or financial businesses like this one — a healthy REIT, utility, pipeline, BDC/fund or holding company can score low for reasons that aren't weakness. See the sector lens above for the metrics that actually matter.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 11.2%, the figure our model used for APO. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: the calculator opens at our published value of $428.25 — it is initialised to the same scenario-weighted result, so the two match exactly on load. The moment you move a slider, the value below becomes a single-path what-if at your assumptions (not the three-scenario weighting), which is why it can differ from the headline once you've touched it.
11.2% — beta-based (CAPM), from this stock's BetaBeta — How much the stock moves when the overall market moves. 1.0 = moves with the market; 1.5 = moves 50% more than the market.
Why it matters: Higher beta = more volatile = should demand higher discount rate. Low beta stocks (utilities, consumer staples) move less.
Reference: Most stocks 0.5–1.5 · Defensives ~0.3 · High-vol tech ~1.5–2.0
Full explanation → of 1.22. The safe Treasury rate plus a premium scaled by how much more (or less) volatile the stock is than the market.
10.0% — sector/quality tier. A simpler hurdle set by industry and business durability: lower for stable, wide-moat companies; higher for speculative or micro-caps.
The headline value and this calculator start at 11.2% — the beta-based rate. Drag the slider to the other rate to see the full range.
A full intrinsic value isn't shown for APO because it's valued with a sum-of-parts model this quick calculator doesn't replicate — see our published value above and the sector lens for the right metrics.
Move any slider above to recompute this against your own assumptions.
⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
Apollo Global Management, Inc. (APO) appears deeply undervalued by the model, showing a 69.9% discount. However, the market likely discounts APO due to its rising long-term debt, which has more than doubled from $6,472M to $13,364M. The primary quantifiable risk is the significant increase in debt, which could impact future financial flexibility.
As of 3 months ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Trend in long-term debt in upcoming earnings reports
- Operating cash flow stability and growth
- Announcement of new fundraises or strategic partnerships
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Revenue grew +23% to $32.05B.
- Free cash flow rose to $6.46B.
- Net income fell -24% to $3.49B.
Management & Leadership
Marc Rowan serves as the Chief Executive Officer of Apollo Global Management, Inc. He has been instrumental in the firm's growth and strategic direction since taking the helm. Josh Harris is a notable co-founder and Executive Chairman.
What They Make
Apollo Global Management is a leading global alternative investment manager. It provides investment solutions across private equity, credit, and real assets to institutional and individual investors.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
The market prices APO at a 69.9% discount to the model, likely reflecting concerns over its financial structure. Specifically, the long-term debt has risen significantly from $6,472M to $13,364M, which could signal increased financial risk despite positive operating cash flow and revenue growth. This rising debt may be a key factor in the market's cautious valuation.
Three Scenarios, Weighted
| Scenario | IV | Upside from today's price | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | $295.46 | 129.1% | 40% |
| Base | $434.55 | 236.9% | 35% |
| Optimistic | $631.88 | 389.9% | 25% |
| Weighted | $428.25 | 232.0% | 100% |
Reading the last column: it is the move from today's price to each value (IV ÷ price − 1). The headline "premium/discount to model IV" measures the same gap from the value's side (price ÷ IV − 1), so the two percentages differ in size and sign by construction — e.g. a price 8% above value is a value 7.4% below price.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
Free Cash Flow DCF High
Standard FCF DCF: positive free cash flow in a sector suited for cash-flow-based valuation.
Show advanced inputs
| Revenue Growth | 52.3% |
| Historical Fcf Growth | 25.7% |
| Sector Default | 8.0% |
| Best Estimate | 25.0% |
| Method | blend(70% revenue_cagr, 30% sector) |
| Growth Basis | total |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project net interest income and fee-income lines independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Revenue has been growing at 52.3%/yr over the last four years.
Geography & Markets
Apollo Global Management is headquartered in the US and operates globally, with a significant presence in North America, Europe, and Asia. Exact geographic segment percentages are not available from current data sources.
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)51.4NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BearishLine below signalThe fast trend is below the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently downward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (1 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (1)
- Growth 39% capped to 25% (large-cap >$50B without analyst confirmation).
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From Apollo Global Management, Inc.'s SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 32.0B | 3.5B | $5.54 |
| 2024 | 26.1B | 4.6B | $7.33 |
| 2023 | 32.6B | 5.0B | $8.28 |
| 2022 | 11.0B | -2.0B | $-3.43 |
| 2021 | 6.0B | 1.8B | $7.32 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
Capital expenditure isn't tagged in this filer's machine-readable data (the CapEx column shows "—"). The free-cash-flow column is therefore operating cash flow less stock-based compensation only — an upper bound on true owner earnings, not the real figure. Companies that report capex under a custom label (some large IFRS filers do) look better here than they are.
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC & adj. | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 7.2B | — | 789.0M | 6.5B |
| 2024 | 3.3B | — | 721.0M | 2.5B |
| 2023 | 6.3B | — | 1.0B | 5.3B |
| 2022 | 3.8B | — | 540.0M | 3.2B |
| 2021 | 1.1B | — | 1.2B | -117.0M |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: 7.2B − — − 789.0M (SBC & adj.) = 6.5B. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 460.9B |
| Total Liabilities | 418.4B |
| Equity | 23.3B |
| Total Debt | 13.4B |
Similar companies worth a look
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