Is Estee Lauder Companies Inc (EL) a good stock to buy?
Two or more of our tested checks point the wrong way. When the survival check is one of them, no price makes that acceptable.
What each rating means, in numbers
Can it survive? — Safe. Safer than 73% of the companies we cover, judged on the warning signs that came before companies that really did fail.
Cash it pays you — Low. For every $100 of share price, the business threw off about $2.1 of spare cash a year, averaged over the last three years. Higher is better: the cheap fifth on this measure ran about 7.7 points a year ahead of the dear fifth, 2011 to 2025.
Business quality — Strong. Passes 7 of the 9 health checks we can measure — things like making a profit, turning it into cash, and not piling on debt. Across 131,000 company-quarters the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% against 1.4% for the strongest, in every era and all twelve sectors.
How wild is the price? — Wild. The share price swings about 54% in a typical year, which puts it in the above average. Out of every 100 companies that swung like this, about 3.7 went bankrupt within the year. Across the three periods we tested that ran from 0.9% to 5.7%.
What "tested" means here, and why there is no score out of 100
Tested means the read was measured against what actually happened afterwards, on a history that keeps the companies that were later delisted, using only figures that had been filed on the day they are used. Survival was ranked on companies that really did fail. What an owner keeps was tested across the universe from 2011 to 2025.
The full record of everything we have tested is on the research pages.
Which benchmark. Over the period we tested, the median listed company returned +5.8% a year while the S&P 500 returned about +13.9% — the index is weighted by size and was carried by a handful of enormous winners. So "beats the index" and "beats the other companies you could have bought" are different questions. Where a read says it picks better companies, it means the second one. None of these gets you an index fund's return, and we would rather say that than imply otherwise.
The quality read is the strongest thing we have tested: 131,000 company-quarters across 5,300 companies, where the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% against 1.4% for the strongest, holding in every era and all twelve sectors. It still says less likely to break, not likely to beat the market — every band in that study lost to the index at the median, because the median listed company does.
Each read is shown on its own rather than merged into a single score, so you can see which part is strong and which is weak instead of taking an average on trust.
The market expects more growth than we do, by 27.8 points a year. Nothing in the recent filings shows growth that fast yet, so the price is betting on something new: a product, a market, or a turnaround.
Not a stock pick. This shows what the price assumes. None of our numbers has picked stocks that beat the S&P 500 so far. What we tested →
How we get our growth number, and how often it has been right
How it's built: 30% from EL's own revenue growth over recent years (-4.0%) and 70% from the typical rate for its industry (5.0%, Consumer Defensive sector). We lean on the industry more than on the company's own past because, tested on past filings, recent growth fades back toward the norm more than people expect.
How often it has been right: on 3,782 filings, 1,129 companies, 2014-2021, scored on the next five years of revenue, our estimate missed actual growth by a median 4.3 points a year; the growth implied by the price missed by 8.8. Ours was the closer of the two 69% of the time.
For companies like this one (revenue growing shrinking a year over the past five years): our estimate missed by a median 4.6 points a year and the price's implied rate by 10.4; ours was closer 72% of the time. The chance above uses this group's own record.
Do fast growers break it? No. Tested by how fast companies had been growing, we did not underestimate fast growers (if anything slightly the reverse), and leaning more on their own past made the estimate worse, not better: their growth fades faster than it looks.
Who has been closer, by time window (same two numbers, scored on what revenue actually did):
| Window | Our typical miss | Market's typical miss | Ours closer |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 months | 8.1 pts | 11.9 pts | 61% |
| 6 months | 8.2 pts | 12 pts | 61% |
| 1 year | 7.7 pts | 11.6 pts | 62% |
| 2 years | 6.9 pts | 11.1 pts | 64% |
| 5 years | 4.3 pts | 8.8 pts | 69% |
Is the chance above honest? We built these chances on 2014–2018 and checked them on 2019–2021: when they said about 15%, it happened 16% of the time; about 25%, 25%; about 50%, 50%.
Growth is scored on revenue over the next five years.
▾ What goes into the smart-money reading
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend). See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
Chance the S&P 500 falls 10% or more in the next three months.
Counted from every day since 2006. Says nothing about EL — see the board for how it is measured.
📍 Where to start on this page, and what to look at first
How to read EL
We are not publishing an intrinsic value for this one — the section below says exactly why. Everything on this page that comes straight from the filings and the tape is still here; treat the missing valuation as a known gap, not as a verdict on the business.
-
1
Reported earnings & margins ↓
What the company actually reported — unaffected by the valuation being held.
-
2
Balance sheet & book value ↓
Assets, liabilities and equity as filed.
-
3
Who's selling & betting against it ↓
Insider and short-interest behaviour needs no valuation model.
Today's price for EL is more than four times what its current cash flow supports in our model. That is not a data error: the market is paying for growth, or for heavy investment to pay off, that past cash flow does not show yet. A fair value built from today's cash flow would mislead, so we do not publish one.
What to use instead: The growth the price assumes, shown just below, and your own view of whether the business can deliver it. Pair it with the peer multiples, the survival checks and the financial statements below.
This note is only about the single DCF fair-value number — EL's full financial statements, health scores, and written analysis are all below.
Who owns EL, and how it moves
From the SEC's own filings: every fund manager over $100M reports its holdings each quarter, and every officer and director reports theirs. Each point is what was public at the time.
827 institutions reported holding it at the latest quarter-end.
Safer than 73% of the stocks we cover
What this rating means, and what it does not
What this rank is — Safe. Safer than 73% of the companies we cover. Out of every 100 companies ranked here, about <0.1% went bankrupt within the year, against 0.6% for the average company we cover. The rank comes from a model trained on every US filing since 2012, including 823 companies that really did fail, and scored each year by a version that had not seen that year.
What it is not — Not a trade. We tested shorting these names and buying puts, spreads, straddles and condors on them at real option prices, 2010-2025. Every version lost money: the market already prices the distress and the survivors squeeze. A high rank is a reason to read the filings and to size for a total loss, not a reason to bet against the company. A low rank says the balance sheet is calm, not that the price is sensible.
▾ The numbers, the logic, and why not to trade on it
The logic. A model trained on every US filing since 2012 — including 823 companies that went bankrupt or stopped trading under a dollar — ranks each covered stock by its chance of failing in the next year, from its latest filing, price history and credit conditions. The rank is a position among peers; the table is a count of what happened to stocks in each position, scored each year by a model that had not seen that year.
| Rank band | went bankrupt within 12 months | fell 80% or more (or failed) within 12 months | fell 50% or more (or failed) within 6 months |
|---|---|---|---|
| All covered stocks (average) | 0.59% | 4.21% | 8.51% |
| Chemicals (sector average) | 0.75% | 2.76% | 8.23% |
| riskiest 1% | 16.4% | 33.0% | 45.5% |
| next 2% (97-99) | 5.9% | 24.9% | 38.2% |
| next 2% (95-97) | 3.4% | 21.2% | 33.8% |
| next 5% (90-95) | 1.6% | 15.1% | 27.3% |
| next 15% (75-90) | 0.8% | 8.5% | 17.8% |
| next 25% (50-75) | 0.2% | 2.7% | 6.2% |
| safest half ← this stock | <0.1% | 0.5% | 2.1% |
Why not to trade on it. We tested shorting these names and buying puts, spreads, straddles and condors on them at real option prices, 2010–2025: every version lost money. The market already prices the distress, and the survivors squeeze. Use a high rank to read the filings and to size for a total loss — not to bet against the company. A low rank says the balance sheet is calm, not that the price is sensible.
Scored from the most recent SEC filing we had (dated 2026-05-04), which can be a quarterly report newer than the yearly figures used elsewhere on this page; scores last updated 2026-09-18. Within Chemicals: rank 32 of 100. Rough one-year odds for this stock alone: bankruptcy 0.1%, an 80% fall 0.5% (the model overstates the middle of the range). On the same data, the Altman Z score caught 26% of bankruptcies in its riskiest 5%; this rank caught 59%.
▾ The logic, and why not to buy on it
The logic. Trained on 2,900 acquisitions since 2012, the model leans on size (small), age, retained earnings, asset growth, volatility and how many deals the sector has just seen. Announcement = the day the stock jumped, not the day the paperwork was filed.
| top 1% | 15.4% acquired within a year |
| next 2% (97-99) | 10.3% acquired within a year |
| next 2% (95-97) | 9.0% acquired within a year |
| next 5% (90-95) | 7.3% acquired within a year |
| next 15% (75-90) | 6.4% acquired within a year |
| next 25% (50-75) | 4.8% acquired within a year |
| bottom half ← this stock | 3.0% acquired within a year |
Why not to buy on it. A takeover paid a median +22% on the day — but even in the top band about 6 in 7 companies are not bought, and those lag. Buying the whole top list returned what the S&P 500 did (2012–2023), and adding "cheap" or "beaten-down" filters did not change that. Read it as context for a thesis you already have, never as the thesis.
How does EL stack up against its closest peers?
We take the 8 same- or closely-related-industry companies closest in size to EL and check what investors are paying for each dollar of their revenue (or profits). If EL is much more expensive on the same yardstick, that's a red flag — unless you have a specific reason it deserves a premium. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
2.6x / 4.0x / 4.6x |
| EV / Gross ProfitEV / Gross Profit — Enterprise value divided by gross profit — the multiple paid for what each dollar of sales contributes after direct costs. Why it matters: More refined than EV/Sales for high-margin businesses (software, marketplaces) where gross margin is the real economic engine. Reference: 8–15x for SaaS · 15–25x for hypergrowth software · >30x demanding Full explanation → |
3.9x / 5.1x / 6.5x |
| EV / EBITEV / EBIT — Enterprise value divided by operating income (earnings before interest and tax) — what a buyer of the whole business pays per dollar of operating profit. Why it matters: Unlike EV/EBITDA it counts depreciation as a real cost, so capital-heavy businesses are not flattered. Because EV includes debt, it compares companies with different borrowing fairly. Reference: 10–15x for mature businesses · 20x+ for growth · below 8x is cheap or signals trouble Full explanation → |
14.6x / 19.1x / 24.9x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 same-industry peers; implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HLN | Haleon plc | Soaps & Cleaning Products | $45.4B | 3.9x | 6.1x | 17.9x | 6.4% |
| KVUE | Kenvue Inc. | Soaps & Cleaning Products | $33.2B | 2.3x | 3.9x | 14.3x | 4.8% |
| CL | COLGATE PALMOLIVE CO | Soaps & Cleaning Products | $74.4B | 4.0x | 6.7x | 24.9x | 4.6% |
| ECL | ECOLAB INC. | Soaps & Cleaning Products | $80.6B | 5.5x | n/r | 32.5x | 2.2% |
| ELF | e.l.f. Beauty, Inc. | Soaps & Cleaning Products | $6.7B | 4.6x | 6.5x | n/m | 0.8% |
| PG | PROCTER & GAMBLE Co | Soaps & Cleaning Products | $366.5B | 4.6x | n/r | 20.3x | 3.8% |
| IPAR | INTERPARFUMS INC | Soaps & Cleaning Products | $3.8B | 2.6x | 4.2x | 14.6x | 5.0% |
| COTY | COTY INC. | Soaps & Cleaning Products | $2.6B | 1.0x | 1.5x | loss | 11.8% |
loss = the company lost money on that line, so the multiple has no meaning · neg. cash = free cash flow was below zero · n/r = not reported separately in its SEC filings · n/m or struck through = implausible, left out. None of these enter the medians above.
Bankruptcy + quality screens
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
What these health ratings mean, in numbers
Business quality — Strong. Passes 7 of the 9 health checks we can measure — things like making a profit, turning it into cash, and not piling on debt. Across 131,000 company-quarters the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% within a year against 1.4% for the strongest, and that held in every era and all twelve sectors. It says "less likely to break", not "likely to beat the market".
Bankruptcy score (Altman Z) — Safe. Altman Z is 3.26. It combines working capital, retained earnings, operating profit and market value against total assets into one bankruptcy score. Above 3.0 is the safe zone, 1.8 to 3.0 is grey, below 1.8 is the distress zone. It was calibrated on manufacturers in 1968, so it reads asset-light and heavily-financed businesses badly — which is why it is one input here and never the verdict.
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
Safe zone under the classic Altman thresholds — companies scoring here have historically gone bankrupt only rarely within ~2 years. A screening signal, not a guarantee.
The classic Z-score was calibrated on manufacturers. It is less reliable for asset-light or non-manufacturing businesses (broadcasters, media, software, services) and not applicable to banks, REITs, or insurers — for those the coefficients and the asset-turnover term distort the result. Read it as one screening input, not a verdict.
Why it matters: High score = fundamentals improving. Low score = deteriorating. Especially powerful for filtering cheap stocks: cheap + high F-score historically outperforms; cheap + low F-score is often a value trap.
Reference: 7–9 = strong · 4–6 = mediocre · 0–3 = weak
Full explanation →
▾ The checks — what passed, what didn't (and what we couldn't measure)
-
✓ Positive net incomeNet income $182.0M in FY2026.
-
✓ Positive operating cash flowOperating cash flow $1,773.0M (was $1,272.0M the prior year).
-
✓ Cash flow backs up reported profitOperating cash flow $1,773.0M vs net income $182.0M.
-
✓ Return on assets improvingReturn on assets 0.9% vs -5.7% a year ago.
-
✓ Debt load (vs assets)Long-term debt is 34.4% of assets vs 36.8% a year ago ($6,803.0M of $19,762.0M assets).
-
✗ Short-term liquidity (current ratio)Current ratio 1.22x vs 1.30x a year ago.Why this matters: The current ratio compares assets it can turn to cash within a year against bills due within a year. Below 1.0 means it may struggle to cover near-term obligations.
-
✗ Share count (dilution)Share count rose 0.6% (360.1M → 362.3M, average shares for the year, fiscal 2025 → 2026).Why this matters: Issuing lots of new shares splits the pie into more pieces, shrinking your slice. Stable or falling share count protects existing owners.
-
✓ Gross margin improvingGross margin 75.5% vs 74.0% a year ago.
-
✓ Sales per asset (asset turnover)Asset turnover 0.76x vs 0.72x a year ago.
Missing data is never counted as a pass or a fail — it's shown as n/a and excluded from the denominator. Each check compares the company against its own prior year.
The market appears to be paying up for future growth that significantly exceeds the model's base assumptions, potentially driven by the brand's global reach and perceived resilience in the luxury consumer market. The biggest risk to our model's base assumptions proving too high is the continuation of declining revenue, which has fallen -4%/yr over the past four years.
As of 2 days ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though no cash leaves the company). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation → from its current $1.0 billion level, making the implied 28.3% growth rate unsustainable.
- Next quarter's revenue growth rate
- Changes in gross margin percentage
- Trends in operating cash flow
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2025 → FY2026, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Revenue grew 5.0%, from $14.33B to $15.05B.
- Free cash flow rose 174.9%, from $366.0M to $1.01B.
- Gross margin improved to 75.5%, from 74.0% (+1.5 pts).
- Swung to a profit of $182.0M (from a loss the prior year).
Nothing was clearly worsening year-over-year.
Management & Leadership
Phane De La Faverie St serves as the Chief Executive Officer, overseeing the company's strategic direction. Akhil Shrivastava is the Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, managing financial operations. Other key executives include Meridith Webster, Exec VP GlobalComm/PubAffairs, and Hudis Jane Hertzmark, Exec VP & CBO.
Leads the overall strategic direction and operations of the company
Manages the financial strategy and reporting for the organization
What They Make
Estée Lauder Companies Inc. manufactures and markets a wide range of skincare, makeup, fragrance, and hair care products. Consumers purchase these products through various retail channels, making them the direct payers.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
What we use instead: the growth today's price assumes (at the top of the page), operating profit against value (EV/EBIT, in the peer comparison), dividend yield & payout — computed from the figures this company does report, shown on this page.
The market is likely pricing in significant future growth, with an implied growth rate of 28.3% compared to the model's 2.3%. This optimism may be supported by the company's stable gross margin (75.5% latest year) and consistent operating cash flow (positive 5/5 yrs), despite recent revenue declines. The market may be assigning value to the potential for new product innovation and expansion into emerging luxury markets, which is not in the model.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
The company generated $1.0 billion in free cash flowFree Cash Flow (FCF) — Operating cash flow minus capital spending: cash left after a company covers operating costs, taxes and interest and reinvests in the business — but BEFORE repaying debt principal or paying dividends. The cash actually available to investors.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation → after stock compensation in the latest fiscal year, which is 5.5x its net income of $182.0 million. Total debt has been rising, from $5.4 billion to $7.3 billion.
Free Cash Flow DCF Moderate franchise
This is the model the pipeline would normally apply to a company like this. Its output failed our checks here, so no intrinsic value is published; the notes below are context, not a valuation. Extended fade horizon (5→6 years)
▾ Exactly how the $— normalized FCF/share is computed
2026: 1.01B
2025: 366M
2024: 1.12B
Sum ÷ 3 = 829M average total FCF
÷ 364.8M current diluted shares = $2.27/share
We divide the multi-year total-FCF average by today's share count (not each year's own share count), so the buyback effect is captured once, via the current denominator.
Show advanced inputs
| Revenue Growth | -4.0% |
| Historical Fcf Growth | -11.9% |
| Sector Default | 5.0% |
| Sector Default Source | Consumer Defensive sector default |
| Best Estimate | 2.3% |
| Method | blend(30% revenue_cagr, 70% sector) |
| Growth Basis | total |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings cash-flow model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project its revenue segments independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Revenue has been declining at -4%/yr over the past four years, from $17.7 billion to $15.0 billion.
Geography & Markets
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)65.4NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BullishLine above signalThe fast trend is above the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently upward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (4 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (4)
- Stock-based compensation equals 24% of pre-SBC free cash flow; FCF used here is net of SBC (a real shareholder-dilution cost), so it is lower than the headline GAAP cash-flow figure.
- Latest FCF ($1.0B, net of stock-based compensation) is 5.5x net income ($0.2B) - using 3yr average FCF to reduce one-time inflation.
- Terminal growth set to 1.8% — the lowest of the applicable caps (binding: 80% of near-term growth (2.3%)). We use one effective terminal rate everywhere on the page.
- Price is far above the model output - market may be pricing optionality, narrative catalysts, or margin expansion beyond what trailing cash flows support.
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From Estee Lauder Companies Inc's SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | Diluted EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | 15.0B | 182M | $0.50 |
| 2025 | 14.3B | -1.13B | $-3.15 |
| 2024 | 15.6B | 409M | $1.08 |
| 2023 | 15.9B | 1.01B | $2.79 |
| 2022 | 17.7B | 2.41B | $6.55 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | 1.77B | 457M | 310M | 1.01B |
| 2025 | 1.27B | 602M | 304M | 366M |
| 2024 | 2.36B | 919M | 325M | 1.12B |
| 2023 | 1.73B | 1.00B | 267M | 461M |
| 2022 | 3.04B | 1.04B | 331M | 1.67B |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: 1.77B − 457M − 310M (stock-based comp) = 1.01B. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF starts from the trailing 3-year average, not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 19.8B |
| Total Liabilities | 16.0B |
| Equity | 3.81B |
| Total Debt | 7.31B |
Similar companies worth a look
Same sector and industry, similar fundamentals shape. Verify everything yourself — this list is computed mechanically and does not reflect our judgment about whether any of these are a good investment.
The questions people ask about EL
Is Estee Lauder Companies Inc (EL) a good stock to buy?
Today's price for Estee Lauder Companies Inc is more than four times what its current cash flow supports in our model, so the market is paying for growth, or for heavy investment to pay off, that past cash flow does not show yet. We publish no fair value for it. The page shows the growth the price assumes, so you can judge whether the business can deliver it. This is educational research from SEC filings, not investment advice.
Is Estee Lauder Companies Inc (EL) overvalued?
Against today's cash flow the price is far above what our model supports, but the market is paying for future growth, so we do not call it overvalued or undervalued. The page shows how much growth the price assumes, alongside the company's financial health and insider activity. This is educational research from SEC filings, not investment advice.
Where do these numbers come from?
From Estee Lauder Companies Inc's own SEC filings (10-K and 10-Q), Form 4 insider filings and daily market prices. Every figure on the page links to how it was calculated, and the model's weak spots are listed next to its results.