AleAnna, Inc. (ANNAW) Stock Analysis
AleAnna, Inc.
▾ What's in the 50/100 risk score? (higher = riskier)
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend, DCF applicability). It excludes the Altman Z score, whose retained-earnings input this filer does not report separately. See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
How to read ANNAW (speculative micro-cap)
No model can pin a precise fair value on a company this small — but that does not mean there is nothing to learn. The useful questions are what the price is betting on, and whether the company can survive long enough to deliver it.
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1
Reverse-DCF — what growth the price assumes ↓
The single most useful number here: it backs out the growth the market is paying for. If that figure is "historically unprecedented," the price is running on hype, not fundamentals.
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2
Cash runway ↓
A pre-profit micro-cap lives or dies on whether it can fund itself to profitability before running out of money and diluting you.
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3
The raw financial statements + the 10-K ↓
At this scale, the actual numbers, insider ownership, and share-count trend tell you more than any ratio.
Miners, metals and energy producers earn whatever the commodity price is at the time. A discounted-cash-flow model leans on recent cash flow, so it swings with the cycle: right now ANNAW trades well above our through-cycle DCF — typical when commodity prices (and therefore profits) are near a cycle high. That isn't necessarily "overvalued"; the market is paying for current pricing power, reserves and asset value the cash-flow model doesn't capture.
For this business type, lean on the EV/Sales peer comparison and Reverse-DCF below (how today's price compares to similar producers and what growth it implies), and weigh the commodity-price outlook. Treat the DCF number as a rough mid-cycle reference, not a buy/sell trigger.
Is now a good time to buy ANNAW?
Macro: Neutral / mid-cycleANNAW trades at $0.35 vs an estimated intrinsic value of $0.10 — a +256.0% above our mid-cycle reference value. Low confidence: commodity prices and normalized margins dominate this result. ANNAW is a cyclical commodity producer (Oil & Gas Extraction), so a single growth-DCF is the wrong tool — its profits rise and fall with the commodity price. We value it off normalized, mid-cycle cash flow, which is why the modeled growth reads near 0%: we deliberately don't extrapolate growth from a possibly-elevated base. A premium here usually just means today's price sits above mid-cycle worth — common when the commodity is near a cycle high (near a trough the same model would read "cheap"). On its own that's not a sell signal — judge it against its peers and where you think the cycle is heading.
Not investment advice. The model can be wrong. Verify the assumptions in the sections below and consider consulting a licensed advisor for significant decisions.
What cash-flow improvement must the market believe? Reverse DCF — Instead of asking "what is this stock worth?", asks "what growth rate is the current market price already assuming?"
Why it matters: It crystallizes the bull thesis as a single number you can argue with. If the market expects 40% growth for 10 years and you do not believe that, the stock is overvalued.
Reference: 10–15% = sustainable for strong companies · 20–25% = exceptional · 30%+ = historically very rare
Reverse DCF treats today's price as correct and solves for the cash-flow path that justifies it. For a cyclical, read the result as the annual improvement in through-cycle free cash flow the price requires — which could come from higher realized commodity prices, margin recovery, lower input costs, more volume, or reduced capex, not just organic growth. The starting base is our normalized mid-cycle median, not last year's number.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation → must improve by:
▾ Exactly how this 10-year figure is computed
Forecast length: 10 years, single flat growth rate (no fade)
Terminal growth after year 10: 2.5%
Discount rate: 11.3% (the rate the model used)
Price used: $0.35 — the live price shown on this page (not frozen)
Method: solve for the constant annual growth rate that makes the discounted 10-year FCF stream + terminal value equal today's price.
Above-average expectation. Achievable for genuinely strong compounders but the business needs to execute well.
For reference: Exceptional is not a compliment here — sustaining mid-teens cash-flow growth for ten straight years is rare at scale. The price is betting on a top-tier outcome.
▾ How we computed this · Reality check thresholds · Assumptions
- Starting FCF/share: $0.01 (mid-cycle estimate (median operating cash flow less estimated maintenance capex and stock compensation — by design NOT the table's FCF, which deducts every year's full capex))
- Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation →: 11.3% — standard 8-12%; 9-10% matches S&P 500 historical return - Terminal Growth RateTerminal Growth Rate — The growth rate we assume the company holds forever, after the explicit 10-year forecast period ends.
Why it matters: It anchors the long-tail value. Cannot mathematically exceed long-term GDP growth or the company eventually becomes larger than the global economy.
Reference: 2–3% (matches long-term US GDP growth) · Above 4% is mathematically problematic
Full explanation →: 2.5% — matches long-term GDP growth - Forecast horizon: 10 years explicit + terminal perpetuity
| ≤ 0% | Priced for decline — likely undervalued OR dying business |
| 5-12% | Reasonable; sustainable for quality businesses |
| 12-18% | Demanding — strong execution required |
| 18-25% | Exceptional — few companies sustain for a decade |
| 25-35% | Heroic — historically very rare |
| 35%+ | Borderline impossible at scale |
Sustaining 30%+ cash-flow growth for a full decade at scale is exceedingly rare — the bar is brutally high.
Use the interactive calculator below to change the discount rate, growth and terminal-growth assumptions and watch the value move.
⚠ Standard industry multiples (the bars below) collapse toward $0 at this scale, so they aren't the useful read. For a micro-cap with sales, lean on the Reverse-DCF (what revenue growth that price implies), the Momentum trend, and cash runway — see 📍 What to focus on.
Football field: where does the price sit?
Different valuation methods produce different fair-value ranges depending on assumptions. Plotting them together lets you see at a glance whether the current price is reasonable across approaches, or only one specific lens.
Industry multiples sourced from: industry similar to Oil & Gas. See the Peer Basket section below for the peer comparison and its limited-comparables caveat.
How to read a company this small
ANNAW is too small and/or too volatile for the valuation lenses we use on larger, more stable companies. The numbers shown below should be taken as rough orientation only.
- Market cap $14.1M — nano-cap territory (below $50M)
Growth percentages on tiny revenue bases (1000% going from $200K to $2M is not predictive). P/E and ROE swing wildly with small earnings changes. Peer comparisons fail because there often aren't comparable companies at this scale.
Start with the Reverse-DCF above — it backs out the growth the price is betting on; if that figure is "historically unprecedented," the price is running on hype, not fundamentals. Then the cash runway (can it fund itself to profitability before diluting you?). Then the raw Financials table and the 10-K on SEC EDGAR — at this scale, insider ownership and the share-count trend often matter more than any ratio.
Classified as Speculative Nano / Micro-cap (confidence 80%). Disagree? An admin can override via the post edit screen.
⚠ Genuine comparables are scarce at this size, so peer multiples are unreliable here. Treat as rough context only — see 📍 What to focus on above.
How does ANNAW stack up against its closest peers?
We take the 8 same-industry companies most similar to ANNAW (similar size) and check what investors are paying for each dollar of their revenue (or profits). If ANNAW is much more expensive on the same yardstick, that's a red flag — unless you have a specific reason it deserves a premium. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
1.1x / 2.4x / 3.8x |
| EV / EBITEV / EBITDA — Enterprise value divided by earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. Why it matters: A classic "what would a private buyer pay" multiple — used in M&A. Strips out tax and capital-structure noise. Reference: 8–12x for mature businesses · 15–25x for growth · Below 5x often signals distress Full explanation → |
2.7x / 6.0x / 9.2x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 same-industry peers; implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BRN | BARNWELL INDUSTRIES INC | Oil & Gas Extraction | $15M | 1.1x | — | 499.0x | 7.4% |
| TPET | Trio Petroleum Corp | Oil & Gas Extraction | $12M | 29.1x | 52.1x | — | 2.7% |
| MXC | MEXCO ENERGY CORP | Oil & Gas Extraction | $18M | 2.4x | — | 9.2x | 18.5% |
| CKX | CKX LANDS, INC. | Oil & Gas Extraction | $22M | 26.0x | — | 6.0x | 1.5% |
| ANNA | AleAnna, Inc. | Oil & Gas Extraction | $8M | 0.3x | — | 2.7x | 0.6% |
| EONR | EON Resources Inc. | Oil & Gas Extraction | $29M | 3.8x | — | — | 125.1% |
| INDO | Indonesia Energy Corp Ltd | Oil & Gas Extraction | $44M | 21.9x | — | — | 0.3% |
| AGIG | ABUNDIA GLOBAL IMPACT GROUP, INC. | Oil & Gas Extraction | $51M | 149.5x | — | — | 0.9% |
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
We can't produce a trustworthy Altman Z here: retained earnings weren't separately reported in our data, so a core input would have to be fabricated. Rather than show a categorical "distress" verdict from an invented number, we mark it unavailable. Judge financial health from the leverage, cash position, and the measurable Piotroski checks instead.
▾ The checks — what passed, what didn't (and what we couldn't measure)
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✓ Positive net incomeNet income $2.9M in FY2025.
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✓ Positive operating cash flowOperating cash flow $10.2M (was -$16.9M the prior year).
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✓ Cash flow backs up reported profitOperating cash flow $10.2M vs net income $2.9M.
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✓ Return on assets improvingReturn on assets 2.8% vs -15.0% a year ago.
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✓ Debt load (vs assets)The filing reports no interest-bearing debt in either year (total assets $101.3M).
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✗ Short-term liquidity (current ratio)Current ratio 1.93x vs 13.18x a year ago.Why this matters: The current ratio compares assets it can turn to cash within a year against bills due within a year. Below 1.0 means it may struggle to cover near-term obligations.
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✗ Share count (dilution)Share count rose 6.1% (38.3M → 40.6M year-over-year).Why this matters: Issuing lots of new shares splits the pie into more pieces, shrinking your slice. Stable or falling share count protects existing owners.
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· Pricing power (gross margin) (n/a — data not reported; not scored)
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✓ Sales per asset (asset turnover)Asset turnover 0.25x vs 0.02x a year ago.
Missing data is never counted as a pass or a fail — it's shown as n/a and excluded from the denominator. Each check compares the company against its own prior year.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 11.3%, the figure our model used for ANNAW. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: the calculator opens at our published value of $0.10 — it is initialised to the same scenario-weighted result, so the two match exactly on load. The moment you move a slider, the value below becomes a single-path what-if at your assumptions (not the three-scenario weighting), which is why it can differ from the headline once you've touched it.
8.5% — beta-based (CAPM), from this stock's BetaBeta — How much the stock moves when the overall market moves. 1.0 = moves with the market; 1.5 = moves 50% more than the market.
Why it matters: Higher beta = more volatile = should demand higher discount rate. Low beta stocks (utilities, consumer staples) move less.
Reference: Most stocks 0.5–1.5 · Defensives ~0.3 · High-vol tech ~1.5–2.0
Full explanation → of 0.56. The safe Treasury rate plus a premium scaled by how much more (or less) volatile the stock is than the market.
14.0% — sector/quality tier. A simpler hurdle set by industry and business durability: lower for stable, wide-moat companies; higher for speculative or micro-caps.
The headline value and this calculator start at 11.3% — the mid-point of the two (we use the more conservative sector/quality rate when model applicability is limited or the balance sheet is stretched). Drag the slider to the other rate to see the full range.
+256.0%
At the default assumptions the flat path lands near our published value of $0.10. Move any slider to recompute it with your own.
Move any slider above to recompute this against your own assumptions.
⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
AleAnna, Inc. (ANNAW) is deeply overvalued; the price is 256.0% above intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation → (a 187.2% premium). The market appears to be paying for significant future growth, implying a 19.4% annual per-share cash flow growth, despite the company's historical operating cash flow being positive only 1/5 years. The biggest risk to our model's base assumptions proving too high is the company's historical inability to consistently generate positive operating cash flow.
As of 6 days ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Consistent positive operating cash flow in future quarters
- Expansion of proven reserves
- Improvement in net income profitability
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Revenue grew +1,663% to $25.0M.
- Free cash flow turned positive at $2.4M.
- Swung to a profit of $2.9M (from a loss the prior year).
Nothing was clearly worsening year-over-year.
Management & Leadership
Limited executive data available. AleAnna, Inc. is an energy company, and without specific executive details, it's difficult to assess leadership tenure or strategic direction.
Names marked "per latest SEC filing" come from Form 4 / Item 408 filings and take precedence over our AI-compiled roster when they differ.
What They Make
AleAnna, Inc. operates in the oil and gas extraction industry, focusing on the exploration and production of energy resources. Their paying counterparties are typically energy distributors and industrial consumers.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
The market prices ANNAW at a premium of 256.0% above intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation →, implying an aggressive 19.4% annual per-share cash flow growth. This optimism is despite the company's operating cash flow being positive in only 1 of the last 5 years, suggesting investors are betting on a significant turnaround and sustained profitability not yet evident in historical performance.
Three Scenarios, Weighted
| Scenario | IV | Upside from today's price | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | $0.08 | -76.2% | 40% |
| Base | $0.10 | -71.9% | 35% |
| Optimistic | $0.11 | -67.6% | 25% |
| Weighted | $0.10 | -71.9% | 100% |
Reading the last column: it is the move from today's price to each value (IV ÷ price − 1). The headline "premium/discount to model IV" measures the same gap from the value's side (price ÷ IV − 1), so the two percentages differ in size and sign by construction — e.g. a price 8% above value is a value 7.4% below price.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
Not available from current data sources regarding specific dividend or buyback rates; the company likely funds operations through cash flow from production or external financing given its cyclical nature.
Normalized FCF High
Cyclical/commodity sector (Oil & Gas Extraction): normalized FCF uses 5-year median to smooth peak/trough distortions.
Show advanced inputs
| Revenue Growth | 1,663.0% |
| Sector Default | 4.0% |
| Sector Default Source | Energy sector default |
| Best Estimate | 4.0% |
| Method | sector_default |
| Growth Basis | total |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project production volumes, realized commodity prices and unit cash costs independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Net income has been positive in 2 out of the last 5 years, indicating inconsistent profitability.
Geography & Markets
Geographic mix data is not available from current data sources. As an oil and gas extraction company, AleAnna, Inc. likely operates in regions with significant hydrocarbon reserves.
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)61.5NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BullishLine above signalThe fast trend is above the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently upward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (7 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (7)
- Cyclical sector: using normalized cash flow (median OCF minus estimated maintenance capex).
- Median OCF is negative — OCF-based normalization not applicable.
- Normalized OCF-capex was negative. Falling back to median raw FCF.
- No positive normalized FCF. Using EPS as proxy.
- Model implies no positive equity value under these assumptions. Valuation is speculative/low-confidence.
- Noncontrolling interests: only 61% of the consolidated business belongs to this share class (average of the net-income split and the equity split (latest fiscal year)), so every cash-flow input to the valuation is scaled to the economic share held by these shareholders. The financial statements below remain consolidated. Holding-company structure — read the underlying operating entity too.
- Illiquidity discount 25% applied (small/micro-cap — harder to exit, demand a margin).
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From AleAnna, Inc.'s SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 25.0M | 2.9M | $0.04 |
| 2024 | 1.4M | -12.4M | $-4.38 |
| 2023 | — | -5.2M | $-1.84 |
| 2022 | — | 1.5M | $0.33 |
| 2021 | — | -482,997 | $-0.11 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
CapEx is approximated. This filer reports capital expenditure under a company-specific tag our parser cannot read, so the CapEx column uses total investing outflow instead. That includes acquisitions and investment purchases, so the free cash flow shown is a conservative (lower-bound) figure in years with large deals.
| Year | Operating CF | Investing outflow (capex proxy) | − SBC | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 10.2M | 7.0M | 774,220 | 2.4M |
| 2024 | -16.9M | 3.8M | — | -20.7M |
| 2023 | -5.7M | 8.9M | — | -14.7M |
| 2022 | -413,917 | 25.3M | — | -25.7M |
| 2021 | -1.1M | 202.0M | — | -203.1M |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: 10.2M − 7.0M − 774,220 (stock-based comp) = 2.4M. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF's starting value is a mid-cycle estimate (median operating cash flow less estimated maintenance capex and stock compensation — by design NOT the table's FCF, which deducts every year's full capex), not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 101.3M |
| Total Liabilities | 42.6M |
| Equity | 58.7M |
Similar companies worth a look
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