Digital Brands Group, Inc. (DBGI) Stock Analysis
Digital Brands Group, Inc.
▾ What's in the 29/100 risk score? (higher = riskier)
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend). It excludes the the Altman Z score, whose retained-earnings input this filer does not report separately, which relies on a proxied (estimated) input. See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
How to read DBGI (pre-profit growth)
This company is reinvesting instead of generating profit, so a standard DCF cannot price it. The useful question is whether the growth the market is paying for is achievable — and whether the company can fund itself until then.
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Reverse-DCF — the growth the price demands ↓
It shows exactly how fast the business must grow to justify today's price. Compare that to what comparable companies have actually achieved.
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Cash runway ↓
Can it reach profitability before it has to raise money and dilute shareholders?
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Interactive calculator ↓
Set your own growth + margin assumptions and see what the business would be worth if you are right.
A discounted-cash-flow model can only discount POSITIVE cash flows. DBGI's free cash flow is currently negative — it's reinvesting / still pre-profit — so a forward DCF can't produce a meaningful number. That's a property of the model, not missing data; the full financials and story are below.
What to use instead: This is exactly where the Reverse-DCF earns its keep: it shows the growth the market is ALREADY pricing in, so you can judge whether that's achievable. Pair it with the EV/Sales peer lens, the Rule-of-40 read, and the cash-runway section — the right tools for a pre-profit company.
This note is only about the single DCF fair-value number — DBGI's full financial statements, health scores, and written analysis are all below.
How does DBGI stack up against its closest peers?
We take the 4 same-industry companies most similar to DBGI (similar size) and check what investors are paying for each dollar of their revenue (or profits). If DBGI is much more expensive on the same yardstick, that's a red flag — unless you have a specific reason it deserves a premium. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
0.2x / 0.4x / 0.5x |
| EV / Gross ProfitEV / Gross Profit — Enterprise value divided by gross profit — the multiple paid for what each dollar of sales contributes after direct costs. Why it matters: More refined than EV/Sales for high-margin businesses (software, marketplaces) where gross margin is the real economic engine. Reference: 8–15x for SaaS · 15–25x for hypergrowth software · >30x demanding Full explanation → |
0.8x / 1.2x / 1.3x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 4 same-industry peers; implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CURV | Torrid Holdings Inc. | Apparel & Accessory Stores | $159M | 0.4x | 1.2x | 20.2x | 69.6% |
| TLYS | TILLY'S, INC. | Apparel & Accessory Stores | $134M | 0.2x | 0.8x | — | 53.3% |
| ZUMZ | Zumiez Inc | Apparel & Accessory Stores | $418M | 0.4x | 1.3x | 24.5x | 1.7% |
| CTRN | Citi Trends Inc | Apparel & Accessory Stores | $421M | 0.5x | — | 109.4x | 11.5% |
| SRI | STONERIDGE INC | Motor Vehicles ·fallback | $211M | 0.5x | — | — | 1.3% |
| DLTH | DULUTH HOLDINGS INC. | Apparel & Accessory Stores ·fallback | $116M | 0.2x | 0.4x | — | 12.1% |
| JAKK | JAKKS PACIFIC INC | Sporting Goods & Toys ·fallback | $253M | 0.4x | 1.4x | 17.8x | 13.6% |
| WW | WW INTERNATIONAL, INC. | Personal Services ·fallback | $166M | 0.8x | 1.2x | — | 2.5% |
Quality & solvency checks
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
We can't produce a trustworthy Altman Z here: retained earnings weren't separately reported in our data, so a core input would have to be fabricated. Rather than show a categorical "distress" verdict from an invented number, we mark it unavailable. Judge financial health from the leverage, cash position, and the measurable Piotroski checks instead.
Why it matters: High score = fundamentals improving. Low score = deteriorating. Especially powerful for filtering cheap stocks: cheap + high F-score historically outperforms; cheap + low F-score is often a value trap.
Reference: 7–9 = strong · 4–6 = mediocre · 0–3 = weak
Full explanation →
▾ The checks — what passed, what didn't (and what we couldn't measure)
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✗ Positive net incomeNet income -$28.3M in the latest year.Why this matters: Does the company actually earn a profit? Sustained losses eventually force it to raise money — diluting you — or take on debt.
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✗ Positive operating cash flowOperating cash flow -$15.9M (was -$6.2M the prior year).Why this matters: Profit can be an accounting figure; cash from running the business is harder to fake. Negative operating cash flow means the core business consumes cash and must be funded externally.
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✓ Cash flow backs up reported profitOperating cash flow -$15.9M vs net income -$28.3M.
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✓ Return on assets improvingReturn on assets -63.5% vs -65.9% a year ago.
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✓ Debt load (vs assets)Long-term debt is 13.8% of assets vs 32.9% a year ago ($6.1M now).
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✓ Short-term liquidity (current ratio)Current ratio 0.79x vs 0.23x a year ago — below 1.0, a caution flag.
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✗ Share count (dilution)Share count rose 8,068.9% (0.2M → 14.0M year-over-year).Why this matters: Issuing lots of new shares splits the pie into more pieces, shrinking your slice. Stable or falling share count protects existing owners.
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✗ Pricing power (gross margin)Gross margin 14.3% vs 31.5% a year ago.Why this matters: Rising gross margin means stronger pricing power or lower input costs — a sign of competitive strength. Falling margin signals pressure.
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✗ Sales per asset (asset turnover)Asset turnover 0.17x vs 0.58x a year ago.Why this matters: Asset turnover measures how much revenue each dollar of assets generates. Rising = more productive use of the asset base.
Missing data is never counted as a pass or a fail — it's shown as n/a and excluded from the denominator. Each check compares the company against its own prior year.
Plain English: the company holds about $2M in cash and is burning roughly $16M/year in operations. At that pace, the cash lasts 1 mo before it must raise capital (diluting shareholders), take on debt, or cut spending.
Assumes constant burn and ignores financing/asset sales. For pre-profit biotech and growth companies, this matters more than a DCF — a great drug pipeline is worthless if they run out of money before approval.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 10.0%, the figure our model used for DBGI. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: no headline intrinsic value is published for this stock (the valuation is held for a data-quality reason — see the notes above). The calculator below is a what-if tool: the values it produces are your assumptions played out, not our estimate.
A full intrinsic value isn't shown for DBGI because the valuation is currently held for a data-quality reason (see the guardrail notes above). The reverse-DCF reading still works — it needs only the price and cash flow — but we won't publish a forward value until the underlying data passes our checks.
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⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
A standard discounted cash flowDCF — Discounted Cash Flow — sums up all future cash a business will produce, adjusted for the fact that future dollars are worth less than dollars today.
Why it matters: It is the most fundamentally honest valuation method when applicable — but only works for companies with predictable, positive cash flow.
Reference: Best for: mature, profitable businesses. Fails for: pre-profit growth, banks, REITs.
Full explanation → (DCF) valuation is not meaningful for Digital Brands Group, Inc. (DBGI) because the company exhibits negative operating cash flow and negative net income, indicating it is not currently generating profits or sufficient cash from operations. Valuing DBGI would require a focus on its ability to achieve significant revenue growth and improve its gross margins to reach profitability. Investors are likely betting on the market's potential assignment of value to the company's ability to scale its digital brands and capture market share in the apparel sector, which is not captured by backward-looking cash flow models. The #1 quantifiable risk is the compressing gross margin, which makes achieving profitability increasingly challenging.
As of 2 months ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Quarterly revenue growth acceleration
- Improvement in gross margin percentage
- Reduction in operating cash flow burn
The trend, in plain numbers (2024 → 2025)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
Nothing clearly improving year-over-year.
- Revenue fell -36% to $7.4M.
- Free cash flow is negative at -$15.9M — the cash burn widened vs last year.
- Gross margin shrank to 14% (-17 pts).
- Still unprofitable at -$28.3M — loss widening.
Management & Leadership
Hilton L. Schlosberg serves as the Chief Executive Officer of Digital Brands Group, Inc. He has been instrumental in leading the company's strategy in the digital-first apparel and accessory market. The company focuses on acquiring and growing direct-to-consumer brands.
What They Make
Digital Brands Group, Inc. designs, manufactures, and sells apparel and accessories through a portfolio of digital-first brands, primarily targeting consumers online.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
What we use instead: earnings (P/E, EV/EBIT), book value (P/B) — computed from the figures this company does report, shown in the sections below. Those numbers are unaffected by the missing cash-flow data.
The market is likely pricing DBGI based on expectations for future revenue growth and the potential for its portfolio of digital brands to gain traction and market share, rather than current cash flow, which is negative. The market may be assigning value to the company's ability to rapidly expand its brand portfolio and leverage e-commerce distribution, which is not in the model. The current ratio of 0.79, indicating current liabilities exceed liquid assets, suggests a focus on future capital raises or operational improvements to sustain growth.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
The company funds itself primarily through equity raises and debt, as indicated by rising long-term debt and negative operating cash flow, with no dividends or buybacks.
Growth / Revenue DCF
Negative free cash flow: revenue/margin growth model used - standard FCF DCF is unreliable for companies still scaling.
Show advanced inputs
| RevenueGrowth | 2.0% |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project same-store sales, store/showroom count and gross margin independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Moat Signals
Revenue has been roughly flat, declining -0.7%/yr over four years, from $8M to $7M.
Geography & Markets
Digital Brands Group, Inc. is headquartered in the US and primarily operates its digital brands within the North American market, though exact geographic revenue segmentation is not available from current data sources.
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)30.5NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BearishLine below signalThe fast trend is below the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently downward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (6 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (5)
- FCF negative: revenue/margin growth model projects future cash flows from revenue trajectory.
- Terminal growth (3%) capped to 1.6% (80% of near-term growth 2%).
- INVARIANT: weighted IV is non-positive. Model may not be appropriate.
- Model implies no positive equity value under these assumptions. Valuation is speculative/low-confidence.
- Illiquidity discount 25% applied (small/micro-cap — harder to exit, demand a margin).
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From Digital Brands Group, Inc.'s SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 7.4M | -28.3M | $-2.18 |
| 2024 | 11.6M | -13.1M | $-76.71 |
| 2023 | 14.9M | -10.2M | $-457.78 |
| 2022 | 10.3M | -38.0M | $-1,233.09 |
| 2021 | 7.6M | -32.4M | $-424.15 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC & adj. | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | -15.9M | — | — | -15.9M |
| 2024 | -6.2M | — | 169,614 | -6.3M |
| 2023 | -6.0M | 29,675 | 408,810 | -6.5M |
| 2022 | -10.8M | 61,286 | 602,038 | -11.4M |
| 2021 | -14.2M | 43,179 | 4.8M | -19.1M |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF's starting value is a projected from revenue × terminal margin, not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 44.5M |
| Total Liabilities | 35.7M |
| Equity | 8.8M |
| Total Debt | 6.1M |