Is SM Energy Co (SM) a good stock to buy?
Our tested checks disagree with each other, so the answer depends on something further down the page rather than on any one measure.
What each rating means, in numbers
Can it survive? — Middling. Safer than 57% of the companies we cover, judged on the warning signs that came before companies that really did fail.
Cash it pays you — High. For every $100 of share price, the business threw off about $23.9 of spare cash a year, averaged over the last three years. Higher is better: the cheap fifth on this measure ran about 7.7 points a year ahead of the dear fifth, 2011 to 2025.
Business quality — Strong. Passes 7 of the 8 health checks we can measure — things like making a profit, turning it into cash, and not piling on debt. Across 131,000 company-quarters the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% against 1.4% for the strongest, in every era and all twelve sectors.
How wild is the price? — Wild. The share price swings about 54% in a typical year, which puts it in the above average. Out of every 100 companies that swung like this, about 3.7 went bankrupt within the year. Across the three periods we tested that ran from 0.9% to 5.7%.
What "tested" means here, and why there is no score out of 100
Tested means the read was measured against what actually happened afterwards, on a history that keeps the companies that were later delisted, using only figures that had been filed on the day they are used. Survival was ranked on companies that really did fail. What an owner keeps was tested across the universe from 2011 to 2025.
The full record of everything we have tested is on the research pages.
Which benchmark. Over the period we tested, the median listed company returned +5.8% a year while the S&P 500 returned about +13.9% — the index is weighted by size and was carried by a handful of enormous winners. So "beats the index" and "beats the other companies you could have bought" are different questions. Where a read says it picks better companies, it means the second one. None of these gets you an index fund's return, and we would rather say that than imply otherwise.
The quality read is the strongest thing we have tested: 131,000 company-quarters across 5,300 companies, where the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% against 1.4% for the strongest, holding in every era and all twelve sectors. It still says less likely to break, not likely to beat the market — every band in that study lost to the index at the median, because the median listed company does.
Each read is shown on its own rather than merged into a single score, so you can see which part is strong and which is weak instead of taking an average on trust.
▾ What goes into the smart-money reading
Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend, DCF applicability). See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.
Chance the S&P 500 falls 10% or more in the next three months.
Counted from every day since 2006. Says nothing about SM — see the board for how it is measured.
📍 Where to start on this page, and what to look at first
How to read SM (cyclical commodity producer)
SM generates real cash flow, but the DCF here is a low-confidence estimate — the value is sensitive to how we normalize cash flow, cyclicality, and secular/industry risk. Treat the DCF as one input, then pressure-test it against the reverse-DCF, leverage, and the operating trends below.
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1
EV/Sales peer comparison ↓
How the price compares to similar producers is more meaningful than a through-cycle DCF.
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2
Interactive calculator (test cycle assumptions) ↓
Flex the growth/discount inputs to see how sensitive the value is to where we are in the cycle.
Miners, metals and energy producers earn whatever the commodity price is at the time. A discounted-cash-flow model leans on recent cash flow, so it swings with the cycle: right now SM trades well below our through-cycle DCF — typical when commodity prices (and therefore profits) are near a cycle low. That isn't automatically "deep value"; depressed cash flow can stay depressed while the cycle is weak.
For this business type, lean on the EV/Sales peer comparison and Reverse-DCF below (how today's price compares to similar producers and what growth it implies), and weigh the commodity-price outlook. Treat the DCF number as a rough mid-cycle reference, not a buy/sell trigger.
Who owns SM, and how it moves
From the SEC's own filings: every fund manager over $100M reports its holdings each quarter, and every officer and director reports theirs. Each point is what was public at the time.
498 institutions reported holding it at the latest quarter-end. Above 100% is not a mistake in the filings: when a fund lends shares to a short seller, the fund and whoever buys the borrowed shares can both report them.
Safer than 57% of the stocks we cover
What this rating means, and what it does not
What this rank is — Middling. Safer than 57% of the companies we cover. Out of every 100 companies ranked here, about <0.1% went bankrupt within the year, against 0.6% for the average company we cover. The rank comes from a model trained on every US filing since 2012, including 823 companies that really did fail, and scored each year by a version that had not seen that year.
What it is not — Not a trade. We tested shorting these names and buying puts, spreads, straddles and condors on them at real option prices, 2010-2025. Every version lost money: the market already prices the distress and the survivors squeeze. A high rank is a reason to read the filings and to size for a total loss, not a reason to bet against the company. A low rank says the balance sheet is calm, not that the price is sensible.
▾ The numbers, the logic, and why not to trade on it
The logic. A model trained on every US filing since 2012 — including 823 companies that went bankrupt or stopped trading under a dollar — ranks each covered stock by its chance of failing in the next year, from its latest filing, price history and credit conditions. The rank is a position among peers; the table is a count of what happened to stocks in each position, scored each year by a model that had not seen that year.
| Rank band | went bankrupt within 12 months | fell 80% or more (or failed) within 12 months | fell 50% or more (or failed) within 6 months |
|---|---|---|---|
| All covered stocks (average) | 0.59% | 4.21% | 8.51% |
| Energy (sector average) | 2.40% | 10.09% | 15.14% |
| riskiest 1% | 16.4% | 33.0% | 45.5% |
| next 2% (97-99) | 5.9% | 24.9% | 38.2% |
| next 2% (95-97) | 3.4% | 21.2% | 33.8% |
| next 5% (90-95) | 1.6% | 15.1% | 27.3% |
| next 15% (75-90) | 0.8% | 8.5% | 17.8% |
| next 25% (50-75) | 0.2% | 2.7% | 6.2% |
| safest half ← this stock | <0.1% | 0.5% | 2.1% |
Why not to trade on it. We tested shorting these names and buying puts, spreads, straddles and condors on them at real option prices, 2010–2025: every version lost money. The market already prices the distress, and the survivors squeeze. Use a high rank to read the filings and to size for a total loss — not to bet against the company. A low rank says the balance sheet is calm, not that the price is sensible.
Scored from the most recent SEC filing we had (dated 2026-05-08), which can be a quarterly report newer than the yearly figures used elsewhere on this page; scores last updated 2026-09-18. Within Energy: rank 40 of 100. Rough one-year odds for this stock alone: bankruptcy 0.1%, an 80% fall 0.7% (the model overstates the middle of the range). On the same data, the Altman Z score caught 26% of bankruptcies in its riskiest 5%; this rank caught 59%.
▾ The logic, and why not to buy on it
The logic. Trained on 2,900 acquisitions since 2012, the model leans on size (small), age, retained earnings, asset growth, volatility and how many deals the sector has just seen. Announcement = the day the stock jumped, not the day the paperwork was filed.
| top 1% | 15.4% acquired within a year |
| next 2% (97-99) | 10.3% acquired within a year |
| next 2% (95-97) | 9.0% acquired within a year |
| next 5% (90-95) | 7.3% acquired within a year |
| next 15% (75-90) | 6.4% acquired within a year |
| next 25% (50-75) | 4.8% acquired within a year |
| bottom half ← this stock | 3.0% acquired within a year |
Why not to buy on it. A takeover paid a median +22% on the day — but even in the top band about 6 in 7 companies are not bought, and those lag. Buying the whole top list returned what the S&P 500 did (2012–2023), and adding "cheap" or "beaten-down" filters did not change that. Read it as context for a thesis you already have, never as the thesis.
What cash-flow improvement must the market believe? Reverse DCF — Instead of asking "what is this stock worth?", asks "what growth rate is the current market price already assuming?"
Why it matters: It crystallizes the bull thesis as a single number you can argue with. If the market expects 40% growth for 10 years and you do not believe that, the stock is overvalued.
Reference: 10–15% = sustainable for strong companies · 20–25% = exceptional · 30%+ = historically very rare
Reverse DCF treats today's price as correct and solves for the cash-flow path that justifies it. For a cyclical, read the result as the annual improvement in through-cycle free cash flow the price requires — which could come from higher realized commodity prices, margin recovery, lower input costs, more volume, or reduced capex, not just organic growth. The starting base is our normalized mid-cycle median, not last year's number.
Why it matters: A company can show big profits on paper while burning through cash. FCF is what actually fills the bank account.
Reference: Healthy mature businesses convert 8–15% of revenue into FCF · Growth companies often negative
Full explanation → must improve by:
▾ Exactly how this 5-year figure is computed
Forecast length: 5 years at the solved rate, then a linear fade to terminal growth over years 6-10 — the same shape the DCF above uses
Terminal growth after the fade: 2.5%
Discount rate: 9.8% (the rate the model used)
Price used: $37.00 — the live price shown on this page (not frozen)
Method: solve for the constant annual growth rate that makes the discounted 10-year FCF stream + terminal value equal today's price.
The market is pricing in shrinking cash flow — often a sign of undervaluation, and sometimes of a dying business. Check leverage, the cash-flow trend and the health screens below to tell those apart.
For reference: The market is pricing in a material multi-year contraction in cash flow (≈24.1%/yr) — a significant decline, not a flat business.
▾ How we computed this · Reality check thresholds · Assumptions
- Starting FCF/share: $11.56 (mid-cycle estimate (median operating cash flow less estimated maintenance capex and stock compensation — by design NOT the table's FCF, which deducts every year's full capex))
- Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation →: 9.8% — standard 8-12%; 9-10% matches S&P 500 historical return - Terminal Growth RateTerminal Growth Rate — The growth rate we assume the company holds forever, after the explicit 10-year forecast period ends.
Why it matters: It anchors the long-tail value. Cannot mathematically exceed long-term GDP growth or the company eventually becomes larger than the global economy.
Reference: 2–3% (matches long-term US GDP growth) · Above 4% is mathematically problematic
Full explanation →: 2.5% — matches long-term GDP growth - Forecast horizon: 10 years explicit + terminal perpetuity
| ≤ 0% | Priced for decline — likely undervalued OR dying business |
| 5-12% | Reasonable; sustainable for quality businesses |
| 12-18% | Demanding — strong execution required |
| 18-25% | Exceptional — few companies sustain for a decade |
| 25-35% | Heroic — historically very rare |
| 35%+ | Borderline impossible at scale |
Sustaining 30%+ cash-flow growth for a full decade at scale is exceedingly rare — the bar is brutally high.
Use the interactive calculator below to change the discount rate, growth and terminal-growth assumptions and watch the value move.
What this rating means
What the rating says — Below every method. Every model's range sits above the current price, but that does not prove mispricing. The gap may reflect secular or cyclical pressures, leverage, or information not yet captured by the model. Review recent filings and test lower normalized cash-flow assumptions before relying on the valuation.
What it does not say — Not a forecast. This shows where today's price sits against several different ways of valuing the business. Where the methods disagree, the spread itself is the useful part - it tells you how much the answer depends on which one you trust.
Football field: where does the price sit?
Different valuation methods produce different fair-value ranges depending on assumptions. Plotting them together lets you see at a glance whether the current price is reasonable across approaches, or only one specific lens.
Industry multiples sourced from: industry similar to Oil & Gas. See the Peer Basket section below for the peer comparison and its limited-comparables caveat.
How does SM stack up against its closest peers?
We take the 8 same- or closely-related-industry companies closest in size to SM and check what investors are paying for each dollar of their revenue (or profits). If SM is much more expensive on the same yardstick, that's a red flag — unless you have a specific reason it deserves a premium. For a leveraged business, EV/EBIT and FCF yield (both in the table) are usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.
▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?
EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.
EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).
p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.
| EV / SalesEV / Sales — For every $1 of yearly revenue, this is how many dollars investors pay to own the whole business (including debt). Why it matters: Works for pre-profit growth companies where P/E and FCF don't apply. The most apples-to-apples cross-company multiple because it ignores accounting choices. Reference: 1–3x for mature companies · 4–10x for software/SaaS · 10–20x for hypergrowth · >20x is rare and demanding Full explanation → |
2.4x / 3.2x / 5.3x |
| EV / EBITEV / EBITDA — Enterprise value divided by earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. Why it matters: A classic "what would a private buyer pay" multiple — used in M&A. Strips out tax and capital-structure noise. Reference: 8–12x for mature businesses · 15–25x for growth · Below 5x often signals distress Full explanation → |
8.5x / 10.1x / 14.1x |
Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 same-industry peers; implausible multiples excluded.
⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.
▾ View peer list (8)
| Ticker | Company | Industry | Mcap | EV/Sales | EV/GP | EV/EBIT | FCF Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRK | COMSTOCK RESOURCES INC | Oil & Gas Extraction | $3.9B | 3.0x | — | 10.5x | 8.8% |
| CRC | California Resources Corp | Oil & Gas Extraction | $4.6B | 1.6x | — | 9.9x | 8.0% |
| HESM | Hess Midstream LP | Oil & Gas Extraction | $4.8B | 5.3x | — | 8.5x | 13.1% |
| CNX | CNX Resources Corp | Oil & Gas Extraction | $4.9B | 3.3x | — | — | 6.9% |
| MUR | MURPHY OIL CORP | Oil & Gas Extraction | $5.2B | 2.4x | — | 21.4x | 26.5% |
| MGY | Magnolia Oil & Gas Corp | Oil & Gas Extraction | $5.8B | 4.7x | — | 14.1x | 8.8% |
| BSM | Black Stone Minerals, L.P. | Oil & Gas Extraction | $3.1B | 6.6x | — | 10.1x | 9.6% |
| GPOR | GULFPORT ENERGY CORP | Oil & Gas Extraction | $3.0B | 2.7x | — | 6.4x | 18.8% |
Bankruptcy + quality screens
Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.
What these health ratings mean, in numbers
Business quality — Strong. Passes 7 of the 8 health checks we can measure — making a profit, turning it into cash, not piling on debt, not issuing shares. Across 131,000 company-quarters the weakest scorers went on to fail at 5.4% within a year against 1.4% for the strongest, and that held in every era and all twelve sectors. It says "less likely to break", not "likely to beat the market".
Bankruptcy score (Altman Z) — Strained. Altman Z is 1.72. It combines working capital, retained earnings, operating profit and market value against total assets into one bankruptcy score. Above 3.0 is the safe zone, 1.8 to 3.0 is grey, below 1.8 is the distress zone. It was calibrated on manufacturers in 1968, so it reads asset-light and heavily-financed businesses badly — which is why it is one input here and never the verdict.
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
Distress zone under the classic Altman thresholds — scores here have historically preceded a high rate of financial distress within ~2 years. This is a warning signal, not a direct bankruptcy probability, and its reliability varies by industry. Be very skeptical of any "cheap" valuation on this name.
The classic Z-score was calibrated on manufacturers. It is less reliable for asset-light or non-manufacturing businesses (broadcasters, media, software, services) and not applicable to banks, REITs, or insurers — for those the coefficients and the asset-turnover term distort the result. Read it as one screening input, not a verdict.
▾ The checks — what passed, what didn't (and what we couldn't measure)
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✓ Positive net incomeNet income $648.0M in FY2025.
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✓ Positive operating cash flowOperating cash flow $2,011.0M (was $1,783.0M the prior year).
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✓ Cash flow backs up reported profitOperating cash flow $2,011.0M vs net income $648.0M.
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✗ Return on assets improvingReturn on assets 7.0% vs 9.0% a year ago.Why this matters: Is the company squeezing more profit out of each dollar of assets than last year? Rising = getting more efficient; falling = the opposite.
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✓ Debt load (vs assets)The filing reports no interest-bearing debt in either year (total assets $9,253.0M).
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✓ Short-term liquidity (current ratio)Current ratio 0.69x vs 0.55x a year ago — improved, but still below 1.0: the ✓ grades the trend, the level remains a caution flag.
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✓ Share count (dilution)Share count held roughly flat (115.0M → 115.0M year-over-year).
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· Pricing power (gross margin) (n/a — data not reported; not scored)
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✓ Sales per asset (asset turnover)Asset turnover 0.34x vs 0.31x a year ago.
Missing data is never counted as a pass or a fail — it's shown as n/a and excluded from the denominator. Each check compares the company against its own prior year.
This stock looks cheap by our DCF (~79% below intrinsic value) but the financial health scores show structural weakness. Many cheap stocks are cheap because the market correctly sees what's coming. Be very skeptical of a "deep value" thesis here without an explicit catalyst.
What if you assume different inputs?
Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount RateDiscount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 9.8%, the figure our model used for SM. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.
Note: the calculator opens at our published value of $176.85 — it is initialised to the same scenario-weighted result, so the two match exactly on load. The moment you move a slider, the value below becomes a single-path what-if at your assumptions (not the three-scenario weighting), which is why it can differ from the headline once you've touched it.
8.5% — beta-based (CAPM), from this stock's BetaBeta — How much the stock moves when the overall market moves. 1.0 = moves with the market; 1.5 = moves 50% more than the market.
Why it matters: Higher beta = more volatile = should demand higher discount rate. Low beta stocks (utilities, consumer staples) move less.
Reference: Most stocks 0.5–1.5 · Defensives ~0.3 · High-vol tech ~1.5–2.0
Full explanation → of 0.56. The safe Treasury rate plus a premium scaled by how much more (or less) volatile the stock is than the market.
11.0% — sector/quality tier. A simpler hurdle set by industry and business durability: lower for stable, wide-moat companies; higher for speculative or micro-caps.
The headline value and this calculator start at 9.8% — the mid-point of the two (we use the more conservative sector/quality rate when model applicability is limited or the balance sheet is stretched). Drag the slider to the other rate to see the full range.
-79.1%
At the default assumptions the flat path lands near our published value of $176.85. Move any slider to recompute it with your own.
Move any slider above to recompute this against your own assumptions.
⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
SM Energy Co. is deeply undervalued, with the price 79.1% below intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation → (a 79.1% discount / margin of safetyMargin of Safety — How much room there is between the current price and intrinsic value, in your favor.
Why it matters: Benjamin Graham's core idea: only buy when there is enough discount that you can be wrong about your assumptions and still not lose money.
Reference: 20%+ is the classic Graham target · 30%+ for higher-risk companies
Full explanation →); equivalently the intrinsic value is about 415% ABOVE the price. The market is likely discounting the stock due to its current ratio of 0.69, indicating current liabilities exceed liquid assets, and a low franchise durability score of 1/5. The biggest risk to our model's base assumptions is that normalized cash flow declines, rather than growing at the modeled rate of +4.2%, especially given the cyclical nature of the energy sector.
As of 18 days ago
Anatomy of a share
What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.
What's free cash flow / what do these mean?
Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.
Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.
Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.
Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.
What you actually need to decide
Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.
- Improvement in the current ratio above 1.0
- Stabilization or growth in operating cash flow above $2.0 billion
- Evidence of increased franchise durability
The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)
Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.
- Revenue grew +17% to $3.15B.
- Free cash flow turned positive at $1.95B.
- Net income fell -16% to $648.0M.
Management & Leadership
Elizabeth Anne McDonald serves as the President & COO and Chief Executive Officer, while Wade Pursell A. is the Chief Financial Officer. James Barker Lebeck is the EVP, General Counsel & Corporate Secretary, and Blake Douglas McKenna is also an EVP and COO.
President & COO — Chief Executive Officer
Chief Financial Officer
EVP, GC & Corp Secretary
EVP and COO
What They Make
SM Energy Co. is an independent energy company engaged in the acquisition, exploration, development, and production of oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids. Their primary payers are purchasers of these commodities in the energy markets.
End Markets
Revenue Drivers
Why Is It Priced Like This?
Why Customers Pay
The market prices SM Energy Co. at a significant discount of 79.1% to the model's intrinsic valueIntrinsic Value — Our DCF model's estimate of what each share is mathematically worth based on projected cash flows.
Why it matters: Compare to current price. Below IV = potentially undervalued. Above IV = priced for growth that must actually happen.
Reference: Model-derived; quality depends on data and assumptions.
Full explanation →. This is likely due to the company's current ratio of 0.69, which indicates that current liabilities exceed liquid assets, suggesting potential short-term liquidity challenges. Additionally, the company's low franchise/durability score of 1/5 suggests limited competitive advantages, and the reverse DCFReverse DCF — Instead of asking "what is this stock worth?", asks "what growth rate is the current market price already assuming?"
Why it matters: It crystallizes the bull thesis as a single number you can argue with. If the market expects 40% growth for 10 years and you do not believe that, the stock is overvalued.
Reference: 10–15% = sustainable for strong companies · 20–25% = exceptional · 30%+ = historically very rare
Full explanation → implies the price is consistent with roughly a -20.0% annual per-share cash-flow decline, indicating the market expects a material multi-year contraction.
Three Scenarios, Weighted
| Scenario | IV | Upside from today's price | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | $152.14 | 311.2% | 40% |
| Base | $179.80 | 385.9% | 35% |
| Optimistic | $212.25 | 473.6% | 25% |
| Weighted | $176.85 | 378.0% | 100% |
Reading the last column: it is the move from today's price to each value (IV ÷ price − 1). The headline "premium/discount to model IV" measures the same gap from the value's side (price ÷ IV − 1), so the two percentages differ in size and sign by construction — e.g. a price 8% above value is a value 7.4% below price.
Business Model & Valuation
How They Make Money
The company does not currently pay dividends or engage in significant buybacks based on available flags; it has reduced its long-term debt from $2.0 billion to $0M, strengthening its balance sheet.
Normalized FCF Low
Cyclical/commodity sector (Oil & Gas Extraction): normalized FCF uses 5-year median to smooth peak/trough distortions.
▾ Why is DCF applicability "Low" for SM?
- The latest single-year FCF sits materially below the normalized figure the model uses, a sign of cyclicality (e.g. the commodity-price cycle).
- Individual business-segment drivers are not forecast separately — the model works off consolidated cash flow only.
Because of this, we headline the more conservative discount rate and urge you to weight the reverse-DCF, leverage, and operating trends alongside the DCF.
Show advanced inputs
| Revenue Growth | 4.7% |
| Eps Growth | 109.4% |
| Sector Default | 4.0% |
| Sector Default Source | Energy sector default |
| Best Estimate | 4.2% |
| Method | blend(30% revenue_cagr, 70% sector) |
| Growth Basis | total |
What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings cash-flow model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project production volumes, realized commodity prices and unit cash costs independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.
Maturity & Competitive Position
Revenue has been growing at 4.7% per year over the last four years, from $2623M to $3.2 billion.
Geography & Markets
Geographic Risks
Market Signals
These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.
Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
Full explanation → (14)42.9NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
Full explanation →BearishLine below signalThe fast trend is below the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently downward.
Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.
QUALITY
Data Quality & Risk Flags (3 notes — click to expand/collapse)
Guardrail Notes (3)
- Cyclical sector: using normalized cash flow (median OCF minus estimated maintenance capex).
- Median OCF: $1.69B, est. maintenance capex: $337.28M, normalized SBC: $20.00M, normalized owner-earnings FCF: $1.33B.
- Extreme valuation gap (P/IV 0.19): result may be dominated by model assumptions, share count issues, or sector-specific dynamics. Treat as low confidence.
FINANCIALS
Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)
From SM Energy Co's SEC filings (EDGAR).
Income (5yr)
| Year | Revenue | Net Income | EPS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 3.2B | 648.0M | $5.64 |
| 2024 | 2.7B | 770.0M | $6.67 |
| 2023 | 2.4B | 818.0M | $6.86 |
| 2022 | 3.4B | 1.1B | $8.96 |
| 2021 | 2.6B | 36.2M | $0.29 |
Cash Flow (5yr)
| Year | Operating CF | CapEx | − SBC | Free Cash Flow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 2.0B | 34.0M | 29.0M | 1.9B |
| 2024 | 1.8B | 2.1B | 25.0M | -346.0M |
| 2023 | 1.6B | 110.0M | 20.0M | 1.4B |
| 2022 | 1.7B | 7,000 | 18.8M | 1.7B |
| 2021 | 1.2B | 3.3M | 18.8M | 1.1B |
How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: 2.0B − 34.0M − 29.0M (stock-based comp) = 1.9B. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF's starting value is a mid-cycle estimate (median operating cash flow less estimated maintenance capex and stock compensation — by design NOT the table's FCF, which deducts every year's full capex), not this single year.
Balance Sheet
| Total Assets | 9.3B |
| Total Liabilities | 4.4B |
| Equity | 4.8B |
Similar companies worth a look
Same sector and industry, similar fundamentals shape. Verify everything yourself — this list is computed mechanically and does not reflect our judgment about whether any of these are a good investment.
The questions people ask about SM
Is SM Energy Co (SM) a good stock to buy?
SM Energy Co (SM) trades about 79% below our $176.85 estimate of what the business is worth, so the price is not the obstacle. The questions are why it is cheap: check the failure-warning checks, the debt, and whether insiders are buying, all on this page. This is educational research from SEC filings, not investment advice.
Is SM Energy Co (SM) overvalued?
No, by our measure. SM Energy Co (SM) trades at $37.00, about 79% below our estimate of $176.85 for what the business is worth. This is educational research from SEC filings, not investment advice.
What is SM's intrinsic value?
Our model estimates SM is worth about $176.85 per share, built from the cash the business is expected to generate, taken from its SEC filings. The market price is $37.00.
What growth is priced into SM?
Working backwards from today's price, the market expects SM's cash flow per share to shrink by roughly 20.0% a year over the next five years. Compare that with the company's actual record on this page.
Where do these numbers come from?
From SM Energy Co's own SEC filings (10-K and 10-Q), Form 4 insider filings and daily market prices. Every figure on the page links to how it was calculated, and the model's weak spots are listed next to its results.