Open Lending Corp (LPRO) Stock Analysis

Price updated 4 days ago · SEC data refreshed 3 months ago ⓘ · Not investment advice

Open Lending Corp

LPRO Financial Services Personal Credit Institutions📄 SEC filings ↗ CUSIP 68373J104
Valuation N/A
Long-term trend (200d) 76% above 200-day Risk 52/100 Elevated
▾ What's in the 52/100 risk score? (higher = riskier)
Fundamental health (43%) 62/100 → +26.6
leverage 40/100 · FCF trend 90/100 · Altman Z not scored — input unavailable (see Financial Health)
Smart money (short interest + insider buying) (31%) 55/100 → +17.3
Macro backdrop (VIX, curve, credit, fear/greed + week-over-week momentum) (26%) 33/100 → +8.5
Total52/100

Contributions (weight × component score) sum to the total. This near-term score now includes fundamental health (leverage, FCF trend). It excludes the Altman Z score, whose retained-earnings input this filer does not report separately. See the Financial Health section for the full balance-sheet read.

💵 Price $3.14 · 4 days ago 📄 Financials SEC EDGAR · refreshed 3 months ago
📍 START HERE

How to read LPRO (pre-profit growth)

This company is reinvesting instead of generating profit, so a standard DCF cannot price it. The useful question is whether the growth the market is paying for is achievable — and whether the company can fund itself until then.

Where to start — the sections that matter most for this stock
  1. 1 Reverse-DCF — the growth the price demands ↓
    It shows exactly how fast the business must grow to justify today's price. Compare that to what comparable companies have actually achieved.
  2. 2 Cash runway ↓
    Can it reach profitability before it has to raise money and dilute shareholders?
  3. 3 Interactive calculator ↓
    Set your own growth + margin assumptions and see what the business would be worth if you are right.
Or — what are you trying to decide?
A note on process: fear-driven decisions — including fear of missing out — tend to be the expensive ones. A stock up 10% a day for three days is excitement, not evidence. Whichever reader you are, the data below is there to be checked before anything is decided.
🚀
"It's surging — should I chase it?"
The momentum / FOMO trade. Before you chase, see whether the people who know it best are quietly selling into the rally.
🏷️
"Is it a cheap bargain?"
The deep-value trade. How far below assets and our value it trades — and whether it's cheap for a reason.
ⓘ Using the right valuation lens for this business type

Standard DCF doesn't fit LPRO well — but that's expected for this kind of business. The Rule of 40 (Pre-Profit Growth) Lens below uses the metrics actually used by analysts who value personal credit institutions. Reverse DCF + Football Field also work as cross-checks.

ⓘ Why does LPRO trade at $3.14?

Open Lending Corp has 118.6 million shares outstanding. At $3.14 per share, the market values all outstanding LPRO equity at $372 million. That's market capitalization, not enterprise value — enterprise value also accounts for debt and cash — and it matters here because LPRO carries substantial debt. The share price by itself tells you almost nothing — a company can pick any share price by splitting or issuing more shares. What matters is the total value (Market Cap?Market Cap — The total dollar value the market is assigning to the entire company.
Why it matters: This is the number that actually matters when comparing companies. Two companies with the same business but different share counts have the same market cap.
Reference: Mega cap >$200B · Large $10–200B · Mid $2–10B · Small $300M–2B · Micro <$300M
Full explanation →) compared to what the business actually produces. This page values LPRO in Per Share?Per Share — A company-level figure divided by total shares — what one share represents.
Why it matters: Per-share metrics are the only way to fairly compare two companies with different share counts.
Full explanation → economics — what each share represents of the underlying business. Play with the share-price calculator on the homepage →

Loading insider & short-seller data…
Checking filings for failure warnings…
PEER BASKET — LIMITED COMPARABLES

⚠ We found only 1 genuine same-industry (Personal Credit Institutions) comparable — fewer than the 4 we require for a reliable median. The 8 names in the table below therefore include 7 broader Financial Services names marked fallback, whose business models and margins differ — which is why any median below is computed over that wider set, not over true comparables. So we do not derive a peer-implied share value here. Read the multiples as rough context only.

How does LPRO stack up against its closest peers?

Ideally we compare LPRO only to same-industry peers, but too few exist in our universe right now, so the basket below mixes in broader-sector names. Treat the multiples as rough context, not a valuation. For a leveraged business, FCF yield (in the table) is usually more reliable than EV/Sales, because revenue multiples ignore differences in margins and debt.

▾ What's "EV / Sales" in plain English?

EV (Enterprise Value) = market cap + total debt − cash. It's "what you'd pay to buy the entire company outright" — you pay the market cap to shareholders and take over their debt, but you keep their cash. EV is fairer than market cap alone because it includes the debt the new owner inherits.

EV / Sales = EV ÷ annual revenue. So "2.5×" means investors pay $2.50 of enterprise value per $1 of yearly sales. Higher = market is paying more per dollar of sales (usually because they expect future growth or fat margins).

p25 / median / p75 are the 25th, 50th (middle), and 75th percentile of the peers' multiples. Half the peers fall between p25 and p75. The median (p50) is the typical peer — that's the benchmark we compare to.

What peers trade at (p25 / median / p75)

Bold middle number = median peer. Half the peers trade above it, half below. Computed over 8 peers (broad — see caveat); implausible multiples excluded.

Peer-implied value check
We're not showing a peer-implied price for LPRO: with only 1 genuine same-industry comparable, a median built partly from broader-sector names would be misleading. Lean on the DCF above; use the multiples table only as loose context.

⚠️ Important caveat: peer multiples only work if the peers are genuinely comparable. Always check the peer list below — if the auto-picker grabbed micro-caps or unrelated businesses, the comparison is noise. A medical-device giant priced against tiny biotech startups won't produce a useful signal.

▾ View peer list (8)
Ticker Company Industry Mcap EV/Sales EV/GPEV/EBIT FCF Yield
WRLD WORLD ACCEPTANCE CORP Personal Credit Institutio $815M 2.2x —— 28.1%
WSBF Waterstone Financial, Inc. Banks ·fallback $378M — —— 7.1%
XRN Chiron Real Estate Inc. REITs ·fallback $477M 909.0x —— 1.2%
ZSQR Z Squared Inc. Financial Services ·fallback $479M 351.4x 405.1x— 1.2%
WTBA WEST BANCORPORATION INC Banks ·fallback $487M — —— 6.7%
WNEB Western New England Bancorp, Inc. Banks ·fallback $273M — —— 5.5%
XRPZ Franklin XRP Trust Investment Banking ·fallback $230M — —— —
WASH WASHINGTON TRUST BANCORP INC Banks ·fallback $621M 10.8x —— 8.3%
FINANCIAL HEALTH SCREENS

Quality & solvency checks

Cheap stocks can be cheap for a reason. These screens warn when a low valuation comes paired with structural fragility.

Altman Z-Score?Altman Z-Score — A bankruptcy-risk score combining 5 financial ratios into one number. Predictive of bankruptcy within 2 years.
Why it matters: Cheap-looking stocks (low P/E or P/B) often have low Z-scores because the market knows the company is dying. Z-score warns you before you fall into a value trap.
Reference: > 3.0 = safe zone · 1.81–3.0 = grey zone · < 1.81 = distress zone
Full explanation →
n/a
Not reliably computable

We can't produce a trustworthy Altman Z here: retained earnings weren't separately reported in our data, so a core input would have to be fabricated. Rather than show a categorical "distress" verdict from an invented number, we mark it unavailable. Judge financial health from the leverage, cash position, and the measurable Piotroski checks instead.

Piotroski F-Score?Piotroski F-Score — A 9-point quality checklist scoring profitability, leverage, and operating efficiency.
Why it matters: High score = fundamentals improving. Low score = deteriorating. Especially powerful for filtering cheap stocks: cheap + high F-score historically outperforms; cheap + low F-score is often a value trap.
Reference: 7–9 = strong · 4–6 = mediocre · 0–3 = weak
Full explanation →
6 / 9
Mediocre
▾ The checks — what passed, what didn't (and what we couldn't measure)
  • ✗ Positive net income
    Net income -$4.2M in FY2025.
    Why this matters: Does the company actually earn a profit? Sustained losses eventually force it to raise money — diluting you — or take on debt.
  • ✗ Positive operating cash flow
    Operating cash flow -$3.2M (was $17.6M the prior year).
    Why this matters: Profit can be an accounting figure; cash from running the business is harder to fake. Negative operating cash flow means the core business consumes cash and must be funded externally.
  • ✓ Cash flow backs up reported profit
    Operating cash flow -$3.2M vs net income -$4.2M.
  • ✓ Return on assets improving
    Return on assets -1.8% vs -45.6% a year ago.
  • ✓ Debt load (vs assets)
    Long-term debt is 35.8% of assets vs 47.1% a year ago ($84.8M of $236.7M assets).
  • ✗ Short-term liquidity (current ratio)
    Current ratio 4.52x vs 5.84x a year ago.
    Why this matters: The current ratio compares assets it can turn to cash within a year against bills due within a year. Below 1.0 means it may struggle to cover near-term obligations.
  • ✓ Share count (dilution)
    Share count held roughly flat (119.2M → 118.6M year-over-year).
  • ✓ Pricing power (gross margin)
    Gross margin 76.9% vs 0.7% a year ago.
  • ✓ Sales per asset (asset turnover)
    Asset turnover 0.39x vs 0.08x a year ago.

Missing data is never counted as a pass or a fail — it's shown as n/a and excluded from the denominator. Each check compares the company against its own prior year.

Cash Runway
55.3 yrs
COMFORTABLE — 2+ years at the current burn

Plain English: the company holds about $177M in cash and is burning roughly $3M/year in operations. At that pace, the cash lasts 55.3 yrs before it must raise capital (diluting shareholders), take on debt, or cut spending.

Assumes constant burn and ignores financing/asset sales. For pre-profit biotech and growth companies, this matters more than a DCF — a great drug pipeline is worthless if they run out of money before approval.

INTERACTIVE — TWEAK YOUR ASSUMPTIONS

What if you assume different inputs?

Here's where we land — and what happens if you change the assumptions. Drag the sliders to set your own Discount Rate?Discount Rate — The annual return you demand for taking single-stock risk instead of buying a safe Treasury or index fund.
Why it matters: Higher discount rate = stricter valuation (a stock has to produce more cash to be worth holding). Lower = more generous.
Reference: 8–12% is standard · 9–10% matches S&P 500 historical return · Below 7% is illogical for single-stock risk
Full explanation → (the annual return you demand for single-stock risk) and terminal growth; the value updates live so you can see whether the stock looks cheaper or richer. The discount rate starts at 10.0%, the figure our model used for LPRO. Open Advanced to also change beta, growth and the rate path.

Note: no headline intrinsic value is published for this stock (the valuation is held for a data-quality reason — see the notes above). The calculator below is a what-if tool: the values it produces are your assumptions played out, not our estimate.

4.5% (risk-free)9-10% normal18% (deep-risk)
0%2-3% (GDP)5% (rarely sustainable)

A full intrinsic value isn't shown for LPRO because the valuation is currently held for a data-quality reason (see the guardrail notes above). The reverse-DCF reading still works — it needs only the price and cash flow — but we won't publish a forward value until the underlying data passes our checks.

For comparison — the revenue growth today's price already assumes
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—

—

⚙ Advanced — tinker with every input (beta, growth, rate path, margin → full intrinsic value)
Where the discount rate comes from — discount rate = risk-free + beta × equity-risk-premium
What you'd earn risk-free from government bonds — the floor under every other rate. Slide it down to model the market expecting rate cuts (value rises); up for higher-for-longer.
The extra yearly return investors demand for owning stocks instead of safe bonds — the price of risk. History runs ~4.5–6.5%; we default to 5.5% (slightly conservative). It's an estimate, not a law — lower it if you think equities are less risky than that.
Inflation reduces the purchasing power of a nominal return: a 9% gain at 3% inflation is about 6% in real terms. The intrinsic value above is already in today's dollars (a nominal DCF carries inflation in both the growth and the discount rate), so this switch does not change the value — it restates the return in real terms.
Higher beta → higher discount rate (sets the rate above). 1.0 = moves with the market.
What you think LPRO can grow revenue for ~5 years, then fades to terminal.
For a pre-profit company: the % of revenue that eventually becomes free cash flow once mature. (Our published value uses the sector norm.)
All inputs start at the values our model used.

    Copy shareable link to this scenario →

    Price$3.14
    Model IVNot applicable — DCF couldn't price this stock. The other valuation lenses on this page (reverse-DCF, peers, sector lens — whichever apply to this filer) carry the read instead.

    A standard discounted cash flow?DCF — Discounted Cash Flow — sums up all future cash a business will produce, adjusted for the fact that future dollars are worth less than dollars today.
    Why it matters: It is the most fundamentally honest valuation method when applicable — but only works for companies with predictable, positive cash flow.
    Reference: Best for: mature, profitable businesses. Fails for: pre-profit growth, banks, REITs.
    Full explanation →     (DCF) valuation is not meaningful for Open Lending Corp due to its negative operating cash flow and declining revenue. The market is likely focusing on the company's ability to stabilize its core business and return to profitability. The primary quantifiable risk is the continued decline in revenue, which has been -18.9% annually over the last four years.

    ⚠️ FCF negative: revenue/margin growth model projects future cash flows from revenue trajectory.

    As of 3 months ago

    ANATOMY

    Anatomy of a share

    What you're buying per share. Bars are at the same scale so you can see the relative size of revenue, costs, cash flow, and debt — not just read them in a table.

    LPRO Open Lending Corp stock anatomy showing per-share revenue, operating expenses, free cash flow, and debt
    −4.5%
    loss
    Where each $1 of revenue goes
    For every $1 of revenue, LPRO currently loses 4.5¢ — costs exceed sales. A money-losing business can still be a good investment if losses are shrinking toward profitability; check the trend, not just the snapshot.
    Net margin = net income ÷ revenue (most recent fiscal year).
    Plain English: each share (at $3) represents $0.79 of revenue per share per year, $0.04 lost per share per year, and $0.09 of cash burned per share (negative free cash flow) from the latest fiscal year. Each share carries $0.71 of total debt (interest-bearing borrowings, current + long-term).
    What's free cash flow / what do these mean?

    Revenue per share — how much the business earns from customers, divided by the number of shares outstanding. Top of the income statement.

    Earnings per share — profit left after operating costs, interest, and taxes, per share. Two versions appear on this page and are not interchangeable: GAAP diluted EPS uses the company's weighted-average diluted share count during the reporting period (this is the "earnings" in "price-to-earnings"); net income per current share divides annual net income by today's share count. They differ whenever the share count has changed.

    Owner-earnings free cash flow per share — the cash the business produces for shareholders. Savng's owner-earnings FCF subtracts capital expenditures and stock-based compensation from operating cash flow (SBC is a real dilution cost even though it's non-cash). This is deliberately more conservative than "standard" FCF, which subtracts only capital expenditures — so our figure is lower than the headline FCF you'll see elsewhere. FCF funds dividends, buybacks, debt repayment, and acquisitions; a company can report positive earnings yet negative FCF.

    Debt per share — total interest-bearing borrowings divided by shares. High debt-per-share next to thin FCF-per-share is a fragility signal.

    THE KEY DEBATE

    What you actually need to decide

    Every stock price is a disagreement. Here's the single thing that must go right for the bulls, the single thing that breaks the thesis, and the concrete signposts to watch so you can update your view as real results arrive.

    🐂 The Bull Case
    Operating cash flow must turn positive and revenue must re-accelerate from the current -18.9%/yr decline to demonstrate business viability and growth potential.
    🐻 The Bear Case
    Continued revenue decline and negative operating cash flow will erode the company's financial position, potentially leading to further value destruction.
    📌 Signposts to watch — update your view as these print
    • Quarterly revenue growth returning to positive territory
    • Operating cash flow turning consistently positive
    • Gross margin stabilization or expansion above 76.9%
    MOMENTUM — WHAT'S GETTING BETTER & WORSE

    The trend, in plain numbers (FY2024 → FY2025, latest reported)

    Straight from the financial statements — no model, no opinion. For a small or unprofitable company, the direction of these numbers usually tells you more than any single valuation.

    ✅ Improving
    • Revenue grew +288% to $93.2M.
    • Gross margin improved to 77% (+76 pts).
    • Still unprofitable at -$4.2M — loss narrowing.
    ⚠ Worsening
    • Free cash flow is negative at -$10.3M — the cash burn widened vs last year.
    WHO

    Management & Leadership

    John J. Posimus is the current CEO of Open Lending Corp, having served in this role since 2013. He also co-founded the company in 2000. Ross Jessup serves as President and COO.

    John J. Posimus
    Chief Executive Officer
    Ross Jessup
    President and Chief Operating Officer
    WHAT

    What They Make

    Open Lending Corp provides a lending enablement platform that allows financial institutions to make loans to underserved near-prime and sub-prime borrowers. They offer risk-based pricing and risk mitigation solutions.

    End Markets

    Automotive lendingFinancial institutionsCredit unions

    Revenue Drivers

    Loan origination fees
    Program fees
    Data and analytics services
    Market Cap: 372.4MBeta: 1.77
    WHY

    Why Is It Priced Like This?

    Why Customers Pay

    Enables lending to higher-risk segments
    Provides risk-based pricing models
    Offers default insurance and analytics
    No discounted-cash-flow value for this filer This company's reported free cash flow is negative, so a discounted-cash-flow valuation has no positive cash stream to discount. That is a fact about the business, not missing data — the reported figures below are complete.

    What we use instead: earnings (P/E, EV/EBIT), book value (P/B) — computed from the figures this company does report, shown in the sections below. Those numbers are unaffected by the missing cash-flow data.

    The market is likely pricing Open Lending Corp based on expectations for a turnaround in its core business, despite negative operating cash flow and declining revenue. The market may be assigning value to the potential for new partnerships or product expansions in the underserved lending market, which is not in the model. Investors are likely watching for signs of revenue stabilization and a return to positive net income, given the company's historical profitability in 3 out of 5 years.

    HOW

    Business Model & Valuation

    How They Make Money

    Fees from facilitating auto loans
    Commissions on credit default insurance
    Data analytics and risk assessment services

    The company funds itself primarily through its operations, though it has experienced negative operating cash flow recently, and long-term debt is falling.

    Growth / Revenue DCF

    Negative free cash flow: revenue/margin growth model used - standard FCF DCF is unreliable for companies still scaling.

    Show advanced inputs
    Revenue Growth2.0%

    What this model does NOT do: this is a consolidated owner-earnings FCF model. Standalone segment assumptions: none. It does not project net interest income and fee-income lines independently; their combined effect is embedded in the historical revenue and cash-flow trend the model extrapolates. The calculator above can only approximate a segment's impact through the single consolidated growth rate — it cannot model any one line separately. For a true segment-level view, build a separate model from the company's segment disclosures.

    WHEN

    Maturity & Competitive Position

    Growth / re-investment phase

    Moat Signals

    Proprietary risk modeling algorithms
    Established network of lenders
    Specialization in near-prime/sub-prime auto loans

    Revenue has been declining at -18.9% per year over the last four years, while net income was negative in the latest period.

    WHERE

    Geography & Markets

    Open Lending Corp is headquartered in the United States and primarily serves the U.S. automotive lending market. Exact geographic revenue splits are not available from current data sources.

    Geographic Risks

    Concentration risk in the U.S. auto lending market
    Sensitivity to changes in credit cycles and interest rates
    SIGNALS

    Market Signals

    These are timing signals, not value signals — they describe the stock's recent price behavior, not what the business is worth. Use them for the "the thesis looks good, but is now the moment?" question. Each tile below explains what it's saying.

    Model neutral, tape neutral - aligned.
    RSI?RSI — Relative Strength Index — a 0-100 momentum gauge. Above 70 = overbought; below 30 = oversold.
    Why it matters: Short-term contrarian indicator. Extreme readings often precede mean reversion, though not always.
    Reference: 30–70 normal · >70 overbought · <30 oversold
    Full explanation →     (14)    69.3NeutralMomentum is balanced — neither overbought nor oversold.
    MACD?MACD — Moving Average Convergence Divergence — compares a fast and a slow price trend to gauge momentum direction.
    Why it matters: When the fast line crosses above the slow line, short-term momentum is turning up; below, turning down. A timing cue, not a value signal.
    Reference: Line above signal = bullish momentum · below = bearish
    Full explanation →    BullishLine above signalThe fast trend is above the slow trend — short-term momentum is currently upward.
    50-Day Average$1.66Price above (+89.2%)Price above its 50-day average = near-term uptrend.
    200-Day Average$1.78Price aboveThe 200-day line is the long-term trend divider — above it is generally considered a bull market for the stock.
    50 vs 200 CrossDeath50-day below 200-dayA "death cross" — the medium trend is below the long trend (often read as bearish).

    Technicals describe price, not the business. A great company can have a "bearish" tape (a buying chance) and a weak one a "bullish" tape (a trap). Pair these with the valuation and health sections above.

    QUALITY

    Data Quality & Risk Flags (6 notes — click to expand/collapse)
    Guardrail Notes (6)
    • FCF negative: revenue/margin growth model projects future cash flows from revenue trajectory.
    • Terminal growth (3%) capped to 1.6% (80% of near-term growth 2%).
    • Model implies no positive equity value under these assumptions. Valuation is speculative/low-confidence.
    • Illiquidity discount 15% applied (small/micro-cap — harder to exit, demand a margin).
    • Extreme valuation (P/IV withheld — see the note above); output dominated by data/units issue (often a multi-class share-count mismatch). Suppressed.
    • DATA UNAVAILABLE: per-share values suppressed due to missing/unreliable shares data.
    FINANCIALS

    Financial Statements (5-year tables — click to expand)

    From Open Lending Corp's SEC filings (EDGAR).

    Income (5yr)

    YearRevenueNet IncomeEPS
    202593.2M-4.2M$-0.04
    202424.0M-135.0M$-1.13
    2023117.5M22.1M$0.18
    2022179.6M66.6M$0.53
    2021215.7M146.1M$1.16

    Cash Flow (5yr)

    YearOperating CFCapEx− SBC & adj.Free Cash Flow
    2025 -3.2M 56,000 7.0M -10.3M
    2024 17.6M 165,000 8.7M 8.8M
    2023 82.7M 123,000 9.5M 73.0M
    2022 107.4M 238,000 5.4M 101.7M
    2021 95.2M 111,000 3.8M 91.2M

    How we define FCF: operating cash flow − capital expenditure − stock-based compensation (owner-earnings basis — SBC is a real cost to shareholders even though it's non-cash). Latest year: -3.2M − 56,000 − 7.0M (SBC & adj.) = -10.3M. This is the same owner-earnings FCF definition the valuation model uses, though the DCF's starting value is a projected from revenue × terminal margin, not this single year.

    Balance Sheet

    Total Assets236.7M
    Total Liabilities161.7M
    Equity75.0M
    Total Debt84.8M
    VIDEOS

    Recent video coverage

    Top recent YouTube videos by date. We don't endorse the channels — these are surfaced for context.

    PG
    Methodology by Pouyan Golshani, MD — founder of Gighz. Savng was built by a physician for busy professionals: every number on this page comes from SEC filings (EDGAR) and FINRA data through transparent, rules-based models — no analyst opinions, no hidden inputs. How we calculate every number →
    ⚠️ Not investment advice. Automated model outputs, last refreshed May 30, 2026 (the analysis-refresh date, not the latest filing period). All models have blind spots. Full disclaimer →
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